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Introduction
This dissertation contributes to the large and solid pillar of labor economics. In a soci-
ety where work is considered as one of the most important component of life, it is not
surprising to see that scientists, politicians and ￿the man of the street￿ are all concerned
with the performance of the labor market. This introductory Chapter presents ￿rst the
main questions addressed in this manuscript (Section 1.1), second, the building blocks
or background behind each chapter (Section 1.2) and, third, a summary of each chapter
revealing the most important conclusions (Section 1.3).
1.1 Motivation and questions
The oil shocks in the seventies severely hit the economies and in particular, the labor
markets, in the developed world. However the United States and to some extent other
Anglo-Saxon countries recovered faster than most European countries. The literature
opened the debate opposing the ￿exible United States to the ￿institutionally rigid￿ Eu-
ropean countries. Although it is not so obvious what actually hides behind these rather
vague concepts, there has now been a long tradition of believing that there were impor-
tant regulations present in most European countries that slowed down the adjustment
process on the labor market after the oil shocks. Friedman (1968) oﬀers probably one of
121 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
the earliest traces of an assessment of a theoretical role of ￿institutional arrangements￿
on the equilibrium rate of unemployment, stating that the natural rate of unemployment
is
￿the level which would ground out by the Walrasian system of general
equilibrium equations, provided that there is embedded in them the actual
characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including labor market
imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gath-
ering information about job vacancies and labor availibilities, the costs of mo-
bility and so on.￿
The concept of natural rate of unemployment has been the subject of a lot of discus-
sions. Without entering into the details, the literature usually assumes that the natural
or structural unemployment rate depends on essential and institutional characteristics of
the economies.
The role of labor market rigidities has been widely studied, both theoretically and
empirically. A nice overview is given by Nickell and Layard (1999) in their chapter of the
Handbook of Labor Economics.
It is of course very diﬃcult to give an operational de￿nition of the labor market
institutions which would have played a signi￿cant role in distinguishing the European
and American histories in terms of labor market performance. The ones that are usually
considered in the literature are regulations that do in￿u e n c em o r eo rl e s sd i r e c t l yt h e
functioning of the labor market. Hence, there has been interest in the taxes levied on
labor, in labor standards and employment protection legislation, in the trade unions, in the
wage bargaining system, in the minimum wage(s), in the bene￿t systems, in the ￿active￿
labor market policies, in education policies and in barriers to geographical mobility. The
choice is of course to some extent arbitrary as some of these institutions concern also
people who are not in the labor force (such as the tax system) and other regulations are1.1. Motivation and questions 3
not mentioned here although they may play a role in the labor market (such as product
market regulations, etc.)
The unemployment rate was a major source of concern in most European countries
and reforms have been implemented almost everywhere at diﬀerent scales. Some countries
started to intrigue scientists as their unemployment ratse were quite low, although they
were classi￿ed as ￿rigid￿ countries. The ￿rst striking example is of some Nordic countries
(as Norway). Later, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand also succeeded
in reducing their unemployment rates signi￿cantly, raising new questions with respect to
the role of labor market institutions. Furthermore, the blame of some institutions has
been questioned. The best example is probably the one of the employment protection
legislation (EPL), that is much more present in European labor markets than in the US.
EPL is usually de￿ned as the set of regulations that makes it harder for a ￿rm to get
rid of its workers. This particular institution is probably one of the most challenging
to study. The reason is twofold. First, indicators measuring its intensity are somewhat
unsatisfying and, second, theories predict that its eﬀect on the stocks of the labor market
(such as the unemployment rate) is ambiguous. The most common reason advanced for
that is the negative role employment protection plays both on job destruction and job
creation. The idea is that employment protection discourages ￿rings but also hirings (since
￿rms cannot easily get rid of their lowest productive workers in bad times). EPL slows
down the reallocation from bad productive places to good ones. It also gives workers
some insider power in the bargaining of wages and, by de￿nition, protects their jobs
against negative shocks. EPL diﬀers a lot across countries. Given that it does not
have a clear eﬀect on the labor market stocks but that it does seem to aﬀect negatively
labor market ￿ows, an interesting question is why some countries have a strict EPL
while other (in particular Anglo-Saxon countries) have a much more ￿exible regulation.
Furthermore, a lot of countries ranged in the "strict" category have implemented reforms
towards more ￿exibility, but these reforms often miss political support. More than ever it41 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
seems necessary to understand the political forces behind this institution and the bene￿ts
and costs associated with its preservation. The largest part of this thesis is therefore
devoted to the study of employment protection. The other institutions deserve as much
attention but the literature already provides a lot of answers regarding the eﬀects of and
political forces behind labor taxes, unions and unemployment bene￿ts. Some uncertainties
persist with respect to the employment protection legislation, in particular concerning its
raison d￿Œtre.
Given the developments in unemployment rates and institutional reforms, the following
questions deserve attention:
-W h a ti sp r e c i s e l yt h ee ﬀect of labor market institutions on the unemployment rate?
And two questions directly related to the employment protection legislation:
- Can we explain the political support for employment protection legislation in Euro-
pean countries, as opposed to the US?
- Does employment protection legislation make sense, from a welfare point of view?
This manuscript provides some answers. The ￿rst question is addressed in Chapter 2.
The originality of this chapter is that it considers the eﬀects of institutions as dependent
on each other, i.e. it shows that the eﬀect of an institution depends on the rest of the
institutional framework. The argument is supported by an empirical analysis based on
the experience of OECD countries.
Chapter 3 proposes an answer to the second question. It argues that the reason
why the United States prefer a lower level of EPL than most European countries lies in
essential characteristics such as the size of the country and the (low) migration costs that
increase the opportunities for pro￿table labor reallocation and reduce the need for income
and employment protection.
Finally, the last question is treated in Chapters 4 and 5. Both chapters show that
employment protection makes sense if one considers investments into human capital either
prior to the entry into the labor market (Chapter 4) or on-the-job (Chapter 5).1.2. The building blocks 5
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the building blocks
1.2 The building blocks
This dissertation uses important theories, methods and facts of the literature in labor
economics. Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the building blocks of the various chapters.
First, this dissertation is inspired by facts observed in OECD countries, regarding labor
market performance and labor market institutions. Second, it leans against the wide
literature in labor economics and other economic ￿elds which are more or less related to
labor. Hence, it is inspired by the well-established literature on the political economy of
various institutions, and by theories on human capital investments. Similarly, it is built
on theories of the economics of migration, which are concerned with the determinants of
migration, that are often labor-related but do not have to. This section gives a ￿avour of
what one can ￿nd inside of each of these building blocks.61 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.2.1 Labor Market Performance in OECD Countries
Keeping aside normative considerations, a labor market is usually evaluated as well per-
forming in reference to several key indicators. The ￿rst part presents indicators relative
to labor market stocks and the second part indicators relative to labor market ￿ows.
Labor market stocks
The OECD (1994) proposes a collection of facts underlying their ￿diagnosis￿ of the labor
market performance of the OECD countries. Indicators can be re￿ned almost to in￿n-
ity. The most important and relevant aspects of labor market developments in OECD
countries are presented here.
The ￿rst graph presented in the OECD Jobs Study relates to the unemployment
rates, suggesting a ￿structural￿ change after the two oil shocks in 1974 and 1979. The
unemployment rate probably attracts the most attention because it is the least voluntary
of all states in the labor market. It is often the indicator looked at when labor market
policies are implemented. This is the reason why the empirical analysis, in Chapter 2,
focuses on the unemployment rate as indicator of the labor market performance. Three
types of unemployment histories can be distinguished (see Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4). First,
w eh a v et h ec o u n t r i e sw h i c hh a v en o tb e e ns i g n i ￿cantly aﬀected by the oil shocks such
as the United States, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and to some extent Canada. Then we
have countries that have experienced a continuously rising unemployment rate since the
mid-seventies such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. Then we
have some countries which did experience a rise in their unemployment rate after the oil
shocks but then succeeded in reducing it signi￿cantly, such as Denmark, Ireland, Finland,
New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Beyond this general indicator,
some re￿ned measures of unemployment capture the attention. Indeed, unemployment
is far from being equally spread across the population. Hence, signi￿cant diﬀerences are
























Figure 1.2: Unemployment rates in OECD countries (1)
skill-biased technological change argues that the demand for high-skilled workers increased
a lot over time relatively to the demand for low-skilled workers. Of course, there has been
in the same time an increase in the average educational attainment, meaning that the
supply of high-skilled workers also increased relatively. However, one usually observes
that low-skilled workers experience higher unemployment rates, and this disadvantage
has grown over time, suggesting that the demand eﬀect dominated the supply eﬀect.
The OECD (1994) shows that the ratio of the unemployment rate for workers with lower
secondary diploma or less and the unemployment rate for workers with upper secondary
or higher education diploma has increased over time.
Besides the unemployment ￿gures, other indicators of labor market performance de-
s e r v es o m ea t t e n t i o n .T h ep a r t i c i p a t i o nr a t ei so n eo ft h e m .T h er e a s o nw h yp a r t i c i p a t i o n
rates are used as a measure of labor market performance is because they re￿ect to some
extent the labor supply. It is not a perfect measure as discouraged workers may drop out
of the labor force when times are bad but would re-enter as soon as the prospects are
better. This said, the evolution of participation rates is also characterized by substan-
















































Figure 1.4: Unemployment rates in OECD countries (3)1.2. The building blocks 9
trend1 is a rise in the participation rates of women (from roughly 40% in the beginning
of the sixties to 60% in Europe and 70% in North America in 2000, the exception being
Japan with a more or less constant female participation rate around 60%), and a fall in
the participation rate of men (from roughly 95% in the beginning of the sixties to 80%
in 2000 in Europe and from 90% to 83% in North America over the same period of the
time). A cultural change in the way family and work have been organized is generally
considered as the main reason for this change in pattern. Increase in schooling and pre-
retirement schemes explain part of the fall in the participation rates of men. As far as
cross-country diﬀerences are concerned, we usually ￿nd that women participate less in
Southern countries than in Nordic ones (Belgium and the Netherlands being found on the
low side though). Participation rates diﬀer also signi￿cantly across educational levels and
age groups. More details can be found in the OECD Employment Outlooks.
The employment/population ratio is also a natural measure of labor market perfor-
mance. Of course, the causes for its variation are far from obvious as they combine
voluntary decisions by workers (as decisions to become self-employed or to withdraw from
the labor force) but also more exogenous aggregate or speci￿c conditions (such as reces-
sions and booms, structural changes in the employment structure in the economy, etc.).
However, as Table 1.1 shows, the employment/population ratios generate a picture that
is relatively close to the one of the unemployment rates. Also over time the evolutions
are linked. This suggests that employment is mainly driven by ￿involuntary forces￿, such
as structural changes in the economy, recessions and booms, etc. Hence, we also observe
that the changes in unemployment over the last decade are mostly re￿e c t e di nc h a n g e si n
the employment rates (employment/population 15-64 ratio (OECD, 2001)).
The presentation of indicators of labor market performance is restrictive. Other indi-
cators such as the level of self-employment, the incidence of long-term employment, the
incidence of part-time and temporary employment, the number of average annual hours
1Source: OECD (1994)10 1. Introduction

































































Table 1.1: Employment and unemployment rates 20011.2. The building blocks 11
worked per person in employment, etc. are all other possible indicators enabling scientists
and politicians to get an idea of how well the labor market is functioning. This subsection
is limited to labor market stocks. But not less interesting are the dynamics observed
on the labor market, i.e. job destructions and job creations, ￿ows of workers between
various states in the labor market or even between jobs. This is the purpose of the next
subsection.
Labor market dynamics
Labor market ￿ows are probably as interesting as labor market stocks as they give an idea
of how dynamic the labor market is. Reallocation of labor between low productive to high
productive places is a key mechanism, that will get a lot of attention in this dissertation.
This subsection gives a brief overview of the developments of labor market ￿ows over time
and diﬀerences across OECD countries.
Job turnover is usually de￿ned as the sum of gross job gains and gross job losses in
the economy. It is measured by looking at the evolution of the stock of employment in
establishments between two points in time. Therefore, it re￿ects only the net job changes
by establishment and does not take internal reorganizations into account. Table 1.2 shows
￿gures for some OECD countries. It appears that job turnover is large, when related to
total employment, meaning that there are a lot of changes experienced by establishments
over a year. Furthermore, the United States do not distinguish themselves very clearly
from the rest of the developed world.
Also important for the functioning of the labor market are the movements between
diﬀerent states of the labor market, especially between unemployment and employment.
In particular, the same unemployment rate may be compatible with two diﬀerent types
of labor markets: one where ￿ows into and out of unemployment are large and another
one where ￿ows into and out of unemployment are low. These two labor markets call
however for diﬀerent types of labor market policies, as the unemployed workers in the12 1. Introduction



















































Source: OECD (1994), Employment Outlook
Table 1.2: Job turnover in OECD countries
low-￿ow case tend to remain longer unemployed, they may experience skill depreciation
or a bad signalling eﬀect to the labor market. Table 1.3 shows ￿gures for some OECD
countries. It appears that the average duration of unemployment is by far much shorter
in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in the rest of the developed world.
This very brief overview enables us to get a rough idea of the functioning of the labor
markets in OECD countries. European countries are usually classi￿ed as performing less
well than North America.
1.2.2 Labor Market Institutions in OECD Countries
Labor market institutions are usually de￿ned as regulations that more or less directly
distort the functioning of the labor market. Identifying conceptually what these could be
is one step, the second being to ￿nd reliable indicators. These indicators are subject to
discussion as they translate sometimes vague concepts such as ￿the strictness of regula-
tion￿, etc. However, a lot of eﬀort has been done to build reliable indicators, at least for
comparability matters.






































Table 1.3: Implicit average duration of unemployment (in months): 1987-1989
erature.
The ￿rst group of institutions is labelled as ￿public ￿nance￿ institutions. These in-
clude labor and consumption taxes, government expenditures on passive (unemployment
bene￿ts), active labor market policies and education.
The taxes considered here are the ones that increase the discrepancy between the labor
wage cost and the net consumable income. This tax wedge varies a lot across countries.
Nickell and Layard (1999) give an overview of the total tax wedge2 and marginal tax
wedge3 in selected OECD countries (see Table 1.5). It appears that continental European
countries (and especially southern European countries) have a higher tax wedge than
other OECD countries.
Regarding passive labor market policies such as the income support to unemployed
workers, the literature usually looks at replacement rates, i.e. the ratio of the unemploy-
ment bene￿t and the average wage in the economy. Of course, unemployment bene￿ts
diﬀer often according to the family situation, the previous earned wage, the duration of
unemployment, etc. Furthermore, unemployment bene￿ts may not be taxed as heavily
2De￿ned as the sum of payroll tax rate, income tax rate and consumption tax rate.
3Based on the OECD Jobs Study (1994). Calculated by applying the tax rules to the average pro-
duction worker. Includes employees￿ and employers￿ social security contributions, personal income taxes
and consumption taxes.14 1. Introduction
Group Institution
Public ￿nance
Labor taxes (payroll + income + consumption taxes)
Social security contributions
Unemployment bene￿ts, Replacement rates
Active labor market policies (expenditures, recipients)
Public funding of education
Labor Standards
Minimum Wages
Employment Protection Legislation (strictness)
Collective Bargaining Systems
Trade Unions bargaining power
(Union density, union coverage)
Level of bargaining and coordination
Barriers to mobility Housing regulations, Pension schemes
Table 1.4: Labor market institutions
as labor incomes. The OECD computed an average gross replacement rate summarizing
various situations and giving therefore a rough idea of the generosity of the unemployment
bene￿t system. Table 1.6 presents the evolution of this ratio for selected OECD coun-
tries. There is no clear clustering of countries. Some countries usually thought as rigid
present a very low level of average replacement ratio, such as Italy, Norway and Sweden.
These exceptions being made, most European countries have a more generous unemploy-
ment bene￿t system than the United States and Japan. Note that the other Anglo-Saxon
countries (Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom) are relatively generous.
Active labor market policies (ALMP) include training programs, or support in search
activities of the unemployed. Table 1.7 presents the spending on ALMP as a percentage
of GDP. Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium spend the most on
ALMP. The least ￿generous￿ countries are Japan, the United States and Canada. The
general trend has however been towards an increase in the expenditures on ALMP.
The last institution grouped under the "public ￿nance" label is the public ￿nancing
of education prior to the entry into the labor market. Since indicators of labor market
performance show that better educated workers usually face better labor market prospects1.2. The building blocks 15
Total tax wedge(%)
1989-1994




































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Spending on ALMP (percentage of GDP)18 1. Introduction
than lower educated, institutions in￿uencing the distribution of skills within the society
are important for a labor economist. Hence, the accessibility to the education system
measured by the extent of public funding and the number of graduations plays potentially
an important role on labor market performance. Table 1.8 reproduces a table of the OECD
(1995) showing the distribution of educational levels across the population. It shows that
North America has a better educated population than European countries.
Table 1.9 presents the distribution of public and private funds in tertiary education. It
appears that education is much more privately funded in North America than in Europe.
The second group of institutions relate to the ￿labor Standards￿. It includes regula-
tions protecting income (by setting a ￿oor to the wages for example) and employment.
Several aspects deserve special care when describing the minimum wage institution. It
diﬀers according to the roles of the government and the social partners in its setting,
mechanisms of indexation, coverage, special provisions (diﬀerentiation in rates according
to various criteria) and levels. Table 1.10 summarizes information found in Bratt (1995)
and in Dolado et al. (1996)4. Again the United States are the least requiring in terms of
minimum wages (the ratio with the average earnings is the smallest).
Employment Protection Legislation includes a set of regulations that makes it harder
for a ￿rm to ￿re a worker. There are three types of regulations: one concerning the
traditional open-end contracts, one concerning the regulation of ￿xed-term contracts and
the last concerning the regulation of Temporary Work Agencies (which act as an inter-
mediary in the temporary contracting between a ￿rm and a worker). It includes diﬀerent
requirements: a requirement for noticing the person to be dismissed or a third party, a
requirement for training or job re-orientation of dismissed workers, a requirement for au-
thorization from a third party before dismissal can take place and a requirement regarding
the noticing period and severance payments. The de￿nition of unfair dismissal can also be
more or less ￿exible, making it more or less hard for a ￿rm to get rid of its workers. In the














































































































Table 1.8: Distribution of population across education levels (share of the population of





































































Table 1.9: Public expenditures in tertiary education (in percent)
theoretical literature, Employment Protection Legislation is therefore usually modelled by
a pure cost incurred by the ￿rm at separation or as a transfer from the ￿rm to the worker.
OECD (1999) gives a nice overview of the major changes in the two main components
of employment protection: traditional open-end contracts and temporary employment.
Table 1.11 presents the indicators of the strictness of employment protection regulation.
The countries are ranked according to the strictness of the regulation protecting regular
contracts. As shown in the ￿rst column of Table 1.11 English speaking countries are
the most ￿exible. Then come the countries from continental Europe, Northern Europe
and ￿nally, Southern Europe. By and large, the overall strictness with respect to the
regulation of temporary employment, shown in the second column of Table 1.11 has the
same pattern. The last two decades have been marked by signi￿cant liberalizations in the
use of ￿xed-term contracts in countries that sometimes had very stringent regulations.
Among them, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain eased, for










































































Table 1.10: Minimum wages22 1. Introduction
rary employment. An important step in these reforms was the allowance of the use of
temporary contracts for non-temporary activities. Reforms in the employment protection
system have sometimes been accompanied by reforms of the social security system. For
example, in order to promote the use of ￿xed-term contracts, the Italian government es-
tablished ￿scal incentives for the employer in the form of social security tax relief (Adam
and Canziani (1998)).
The incidence of temporary employment is shown in the fourth column of Table 1.11.
This incidence is relatively small in most of the OECD countries, with the exception of
Australia and Spain. Furthermore, the evolution of the share of temporary employment
has been quite stable in the majority of countries. Nevertheless, it increased signi￿cantly
in Australia, France, the Netherlands and Spain and decreased in Belgium, Greece, Lux-
embourg and Portugal. The variation in temporary employment may have to do with
its attractiveness relative to permanent contracts. Bentolila and Dolado (1994) note that
the share of temporary employment in total employment is the highest in countries where
traditional arrangements are very rigid.
The third class of institutions relates to the collective bargaining systems. Indeed, in
most OECD countries wages are set collectively by workers and ￿rms representatives. A
￿rst important characteristic of these collective systems is their scope, i.e. the extent to
which collective agreements apply to the workforce. The union density or percentage of
the workforce member of a union is one indicator of the reach of collective agreements.
However in some countries (like in France), the union density tells little about the eﬀective
coverage of collective agreements as they generally apply to the entire concerned workforce.
Therefore, the union coverage, measuring the percentage of workers covered by a collective
agreement, is maybe a more appropriate measure of the bargaining power of the unions.
Table 1.12 reproduces a table of the OECD (1997)5.
There are three main conclusions one can draw from this table: First, union coverage





























































































































































































Table 1.11: Strictness of employment protection legislation24 1. Introduction





























































Table 1.12: Union density and coverages (in percent)1.2. The building blocks 25
is sometimes much larger than union density (such as France). Second, union density
tends to decline with time while union coverage has remained stable. Third, the Nordic
countries and continental Europe have on average stronger unions than the rest of the
OECD countries.
A second important characteristic is the level (￿rm, sector, national) at which bar-
gaining takes place. The objective functions of the partners and the variables it considers
as endogenous vary according to the bargaining level. But the bargaining level is not all.
Indeed, bargaining units can coordinate. For example, if bargaining takes place at the
sector level, the parties can coordinate between sectors on a certain level of wage growth,
etc. without having an oﬃcial centralized bargaining system. Hence, the literature some-
times refers to corporatism rather than centralization.
Canada and the United States have a tradition of very decentralized bargaining. Japan
and Switzerland bargain at the decentralized level but are very well coordinated. Nordic
countries have a more corporatist tradition, although the general trend over the last
decade is towards a more decentralized setting of wage agreements.
The fourth group of institutions concern the barriers to mobility. As far as I know, no
suitable indicator of ￿barriers to mobility￿ have been built so far for the OECD countries.
The belief is however that in general, it is less costly to migrate in the United States than
in European countries (within or between countries).
The overall conclusion of this descriptive analysis is that the United States have in
general much more ￿exible and decentralized institutions. The rigidity of European coun-
tries varies a lot, also depending on the type of institution. Nordic countries have a well-
organized centralized bargaining system, Southern European countries are characterized
by solid labor standards and continental European countries have generous unemploy-
ment bene￿ts. The next section turns to the eﬀects of labor market institutions on labor
market performance.26 1. Introduction
1.2.3 Labor Economics, Institutions and Performance
The economics of labor is a wide and rich ￿eld, where theory and empirical analysis go
hand in hand. It is ￿special￿ as it studies the forces determining the trade of a good that
cannot be separated from its supplier. An introduction into the ￿eld of labor economics
covers generally theories of the labor supply and labor demand decisions, of the equilib-
rium on the labor market determining the wage and employment. The competitive model
is usually considered as a benchmark, as one knows that the world teems with imperfec-
tions. Institutional regulations have often been considered as distorting the functioning
of the labor market, i.e. as taking the equilibrium of the labor market away from the
competitive equilibrium. Far from having the ambition to give an overview of the entire
￿eld, this section gives a ￿avour of the most important theories which have been used to
analyze the functioning of the labor market in presence of institutional rigidities and the
reasons for the existence of unemployment in the modern developed world.
There are many reasons why the equilibrium of the labor market could diﬀer from
the competitive equilibrium. This dissertation concentrates on two mechanisms widely
used in the literature in labor economics. The ￿rst mechanism is the one considered in
an important branch of the literature that has tried to model explicitly the behavior of
institutional actors and the in￿uence of speci￿c labor market regulations ("bargaining
models") and the second mechanism is linked to the imperfect information on the labor
market such that ￿nding a match is a time consuming activity ("search models").
Closer to the focus of this dissertation, all chapters are inspired by empirical ￿ndings on
the eﬀects of labor market institutions on labor market performance. The last paragraph
of this section presents a brief overview of the most relevant studies.
Bargaining models
The earliest traces of modelling of collective bargaining systems are probably to be found
in Hicks (1932). Later on, models using a game-theoretic approach have explicitly mod-1.2. The building blocks 27
elled the bargaining procedure and outcomes (Nash (1950, 1953), Rubinstein (1982)). The
translation into labor economics terms has lead to ￿collective bargaining models￿ such
as the right-to-manage model by Nickell and Andrews (1983) (with the monopoly union
model as a particular case) and the model of eﬃcient bargaining (Manning (1987)). La-
yard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) probably oﬀer the richest overview of variants of these
models. Hence, they show how one can model wage bargaining according to the bargaining
level (￿rm, industry or national). In most OECD countries, unions and representatives of
￿rms decide on many important aspects related to the employment relationship between
aw o r k e ra n da￿rm.
The design of a suitable bargaining model calls for the answer to the two following
questions: What do ￿rms and unions bargain on? And the related question: What do
the bargaining partners care about?
The setup of a bargaining model requires a precise de￿nition of the objectives of the
partners involved in the bargaining. Hence, one needs an answer to the second question:
What do unions care about? What do they maximize? One should ￿r s tk e e pi nm i n d
that unions represent workers, and therefore their preferences will be some aggregation of
individual preferences. Therefore, one should be careful when de￿ning the objective func-
tion of the unions, in particular about the assumptions made on individual preferences.
The easiest way to go is to assume that all individuals are the same and, therefore, that
unions maximize the utility of any member it represents (DrŁze and Modigliani (1981),
Mac Donald and Solow (1981) and Oswald (1982)). Dunlop (1944) considered in that line
a number of possible union objectives (maximization of total employment, maximization
of average wages, maximization of the wage bill of members, maximization of the wage bill
of employed and unemployment bene￿ts of unemployed). A simplifying assumption then
is that workers are risk neutral. Hence, in the case of a union maximizing the expected
utility of a representative member, the union just maximizes the expected income of the28 1. Introduction
worker:
UR= lw +( 1− l)b, (1.1)
where URis the utility of a representative union member, l is the probability of being
employed (and (1 − l) the probability of being unemployed), w is the wage and b is the
unemployment bene￿t.
It is also often assumed that unions care more about "rents", i.e. the diﬀerence between
the inside and outside options. In the same line we ￿nd models assuming that unions care
about some kind of "fair pay", i.e. they maximize a diﬀerence between the wage and a
"minimum wage" or "normative wage".
UR=( w − w)l, (1.2)
where w is the minimum wage or the normative wage (it could for example be the
wage in the competitive sector, or the minimum wage set by law, or the "alternative"
wage). Or more generally, the unions caring also about employment could also have some
minimum required level of employment l, their objective function taking the form of a
Stone-Geary utility function:
UR=( w − w)
ζ(l − l)
1−ζ, (1.3)
where 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1.
The assumption of identical individuals with identical preferences is rather strong. It
is possible to relax it to some extent, by assuming for example that the objective of the
unions is the result of a democratic internal process, i.e. that the objective is de￿ned by
a median voter. However, using the median voter requires again strong assumptions: (1)
there must be a unique decision subject on which the union members vote, (2) preferences
of the individuals must be single-peaked, and (3) the decision must be taken by the
majority of the union members. These assumptions are not very realistic as unions often
b a r g a i no nal o to fm a t t e r sa tt h es a m et i m e .1.2. The building blocks 29
On the other side of the bargaining table, we ￿nd the ￿rms or representatives of the
￿rms. What is usually assumed is that ￿rms care about pro￿ts and are risk neutral. Of
course, the dichotomy managers - shareholders raise agency problems that imply that
managers do not necessarily want to maximize pro￿ts but maybe their own salaries or
other personal "compensations". Booth (1995) notes that "in the private sector, there is
always the threat of potential takeover of an ineﬃcient company (and subsequent change
of management) which, it is argued, ensures that management broadly follows the pro￿t
maximization objective". Furthermore, for the ￿rms to agree on a wage higher than the
competitive equilibrium, they must bene￿t from some rents that can for example come
from the imperfect competition on the product market (although it does not necessarily
have to, see Booth (1995)).
Let us now turn to the ￿rst question: What do the unions and the ￿rms bargain? There
is a wide range of elements which are brought to the bargaining table. Wage setting is by
far the most popular subject of negotiation (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (1994)). Then we
￿nd employment, working time, union￿s rights, training, pre-retirement schemes, working
environment, etc. that all can be potential subjects of bargaining. Of course, the law
often determines some minimal requirements but the bargaining partners are free to agree
on higher standards. The most common bargaining models are the right-to-manage model
(Nickell and Andrews (1983)), with a particular case being the monopoly union model
(where the union￿s bargaining power is equal to 1 on a scale from 0 to 1) and the eﬃcient
bargaining model. In the ￿rst case, unions and ￿rms negotiate over the wages, while in
t h es e c o n dc a s e ,t h e yb a r g a i nb o t ho nt h ee m p l o y m e n ta n dw a g e s .T h ee s s e n t i a ld i ﬀerence
in outcomes being that the solution reached in the second case is more eﬃcient than in
the ￿rst case. However, as already mentioned before negotiations do not often deal with
employment directly.30 1. Introduction
Search models
As in any other relationship, agents in search for a partner do not have perfect information
about each other, meaning that ￿nding a partner is a time consuming activity. This
reasoning lies behind the literature on search frictions (Stigler (1962) and McCall (1970))
that essentially focuses on the dynamics of the labor market. Bad shocks arise all the time,
and workers need to reallocate from bad productive places to better ones. However, there
is no ￿invisible hand￿ guiding everyone immediately to the right place but a time and
resource-consuming process resulting in matches, but also in inevitable unemployment
and vacancies. This also means that the partners, once they found each other, have some
kind of monopoly power with respect to each other. The idea is that the partners cannot
be replaced at zero cost, which means that the relationship as a whole is more valuable
than the sum of the outside options of the partners. The diﬀerence between the inside
option and outside option is the rents or surplus. It is usually assumed that the partners
share this surplus according to a bargaining rule (the Nash sharing rule being by far
the most used one). This literature is interesting as it emphasizes the problem of labor
reallocation from bad to good productive places. Labor mobility has a cost that leads to
the existence of rents for the partners who found each other. Hence, labor migration is an
important mechanism of adjustment in case of negative shocks for example, to regions.
This point will get more attention in the next Chapters. The literature on search frictions
has grown a lot and has recently even been used as an interesting tool to analyze the eﬀects
of some institutions (Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)). Institutions play a role here as
they determine the inside and outside options of the partners, but also as they determine
the costs of reallocation (think for example of housing regulations or the employment
protection legislation).
Chapter 2 is inspired by the literature on bargaining models. This framework appears
indeed to be the most appropriate to a general study of the eﬀects of labor market in-
stitutions, considered as a set of interacting elements. The other chapters build theories1.2. The building blocks 31
based on the literature on search frictions, therefore focusing on the dynamics of the labor
market.
The eﬀects of Labor Market Institutions on Labor Market Performance
T h e r ei sar i c hl i t e r a t u r eo nt h ee ﬀects of labor market institutions on economic perfor-
mance, where important lessons have been drawn but puzzles persist. There are many
studies concentrating on some particular institutions only and only few looking at a more
complete picture of the institutional framework. A ￿rst series of studies analyze the direct
eﬀects of institutions on indicators such as the unemployment rate, the employment rate
and the growth rate of the national product. Then several extensions have been made.
First, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) suggest that the European institutions themselves
are not bad, but that they in￿uence the way the economy responds to shocks, such as
the ones experienced in the seventies. Second, in the line of what Chapter 2 investigates,
several papers suggest that it is the combination of institutions that matters rather than
the institutions themselves, i.e. that the institutional framework should be considered as
as e to finteracting elements. This section presents a brief overview of these main trends.
Theory
Independent Institutions Let us ￿rst start by considering the institutions inde-
pendently.
Depending on how the tax wedge is shared between ￿rms and workers, it in￿uences the
net consumable income, and therefore the incentives to work, and the total labor costs,
and therefore the incentives to employ workers.
Regarding the distribution question, Nickell (1997) argues the following:
"If capital is internationally mobile and labor is not, then we should expect to see
labor bearing all the tax burden. In this case, employment and unemployment will in the
long run, remain unaﬀected by changes in the overall tax rate on labor"32 1. Introduction
There is however one exception to this rule, as the presence of a minimum wage
prevents the adjustment of low wages to tax increases.
The unemployment bene￿ts determine the option value of being unemployed. It in￿u-
ences (negatively) the incentives to search and enables the workers to bargain high wages
(as the unemployment income determines the outside option). All in all, unemployment
bene￿ts should have a negative eﬀect on labor market performance.
Active labor market policies are usually thought as measures helping the unemployed
workers to ￿nd a job. They take the form of a training or a subsidy to ￿rms for hiring
certain types of workers. Their expected eﬀect on unemployment should therefore be
negative.
Education (public or not) increases human capital and therefore contributes to a better
labor market performance (Becker (1964)). The literature is also very wide and beyond
the scope of this introductory Chapter.
Minimum wages in￿uence the functioning of the labor market as they represent a ￿oor
for the labor costs. A high minimum wage would therefore reduce the labor demand for
workers who are at the bottom end of the productivity distribution.
Employment protection legislation makes ￿rings more expensive and introduces some
irreversibility in the hiring decision (Siebert (1997)). One therefore expects that EPL has
a negative eﬀe c tb o t ho nj o bc r e a t i o na n dj o bd e s t r u c t i o n ,a n dt h e r e f o r e ,a na m b i g u o u s
eﬀect on unemployment (Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)). EPL has therefore a negative
impact on unemployment in- and out￿ows.
There is large literature on the eﬀect of unions on labor market performance. Typ-
ically, unions raise wages and therefore reduce employment. The payoﬀs of unions and
￿rms depend on the level at which they bargain (see Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)).
Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) suggest that there is a hump-shape relationship between the
degree of centralization and the unemployment rate. There are basically two mechanisms
at work. First, at the decentralized and sector level, ￿r m st a k ep r i c e sa sg i v e n . A tt h e1.2. The building blocks 33
centralized level, a price increase means general in￿ation and so lower real wages. Second,
at the decentralized level, ￿rms face a ￿erce competition and therefore cannot translate
wage increases into price increases. At the sector and centralized level, they are less con-
strained as their most direct competitors are also included in the bargaining. Therefore,
the forces of competition prevent bargaining partners at the ￿rm level to set high wages.
At the central level, there is no gain in setting high nominal wages as they will lead into
in￿ation and therefore no real wage gains. At the sector level on the other hand, sectors
are too small to take their eﬀect on the general price level into account and furthermore,
they do not suﬀer from competition. This means that the temptation to set high wages
at the sector level is much stronger. All sectors do the same, which means that the wages
are high, the in￿ation is high and the level of employment is low.
The idea was very seducing and it was extended in many ways. For example, Calmfors
(1993) modi￿es the argument by talking about corporatism, rather than centralization.
Coordination between bargaining ￿units￿ could play the same role as centralization, as this
would mean that these units take the eﬀects of their decision on general macroeconomic
variables (such as the in￿ation) into account. One could also think that the net income
eﬀects are more likely to be taken into account at the central level, i.e. that an increase in
wages leads to more unemployment and therefore, more social security expenditures and,
therefore, more taxes levied on labor and less net consumable income. In brief, a channel
very similar to the ￿in￿ation￿ channel, as the actors take the eﬀects on the purchasing
power into account.
Barriers to labor mobility have a negative eﬀect on labor market performance by
de￿nition, as they increase the costs of reallocation of labor. Hence, Oswald (1996)
suggests that home-ownership is a barrier to mobility and would therefore harm the
functioning of the labor market.34 1. Introduction
Institutions and Shocks Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) suggest that it is the com-
bination of adverse shocks and some institutions that resulted in the poor European labor
market performance. The idea goes as follows. First, when unemployment is high and
therefore unemployment duration is long, some workers may lose their skills or not ￿nd it
pro￿table to search for a job, and therefore, reduce the downward pressure of unemploy-
ment on the wages. Second, when unemployment is high, ￿rms can be more ￿picky￿ in
their recruitment decision so that some workers become actually marginalized. European
institutions play a role here if they increase the duration of unemployment (such as for
example the employment protection legislation).
Combination of Institutions Coe and Snower (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (1997)
and Chapter 2 of this thesis all argue that the eﬀect of one given institution depends on the
rest of the institutional framework. Coe and Snower show for example that institutions
discouraging unemployed workers to search for a job (such as high unemployment bene￿ts)
reduce the eﬀectiveness of reforms aimed at stimulating hirings, as the latter also depends
on the search intensity of the workers. Daveri and Tabellini (1997) show that the eﬀect
of labor taxes is likely to be much larger is countries with strong unions.
Empirical Evidence Most of the studies based on macroeconomic data essentially
focus on the eﬀects of labor market institutions on the unemployment rate. The lack
of time series data regarding worker and job ￿ows probably explains the absence of the
variables as dependent variables. Hence, empirical work based on macro data concentrates
on labor market stocks. It is however possible to extract some information with respect to
labor market dynamics by looking at the eﬀects of institutions on the shares of short-term
and long-term unemployment. Some studies are also concerned with other indicators of
economic performance, such as the growth rate, etc., which is beyond the scope of this
introductory chapter. Microeconomic studies are much richer in their analysis of the1.2. The building blocks 35
Institutions Sign of the coeﬃcient
Total Tax Rate (%)
Replacement Rate (%)
Bene￿t Duration















Table 1.13: Nickell (1998)
transitions from one state of the labor market to another state (as from unemployment to
employment) but fail to give a global picture about the overall eﬀect of the institutional
framework.
The interested reader will ￿nd more extensive information in Nickell and Layard (2000)
and OECD (1994). The ￿rst study presented here is of Nickell (1998). He basically
regresses the standardized unemployment rate on a series of labor market institutions.
An original variable included here is the owner occupation rate, inspired by an empirical
analysis by Oswald (1996). Nickell proposes empirical results based on twenty OECD
countries over two time periods: 1983-88 and 1989-94. Table 1.13 summarizes the main
results of this study. Note that Nickell ￿nds a negative eﬀect of EPL on the short-term
unemployment rate and a positive eﬀect on the long-run unemployment rate.
Scarpetta (1996) uses yearly data covering the period 1983-1993. The explanatory
variable is the structural unemployment rate6 as computed by the OECD. Scarpetta
￿rst looks at structural determinants of the unemployment rate and then, at the role
that labor market policies and institutional factors play in determining the persistence
of unemployment. The conclusion is that institutions matter both for the determination
6De￿ned as the non-accelerating in￿ation rate of unemployment.36 1. Introduction
of the structural unemployment rate and for the speed of labor market adjustments.
Scarpetta ￿nds diﬀerent results than Nickell for the labor taxes (no signi￿cant eﬀect)
and the employment protection legislation (signi￿cant positive eﬀect). Furthermore, the
hump-shape relationship between centralization and unemployment ￿nds some empirical
support. Finally, generous unemployment bene￿ts, employment protection and a high
degree of unionization are all found to have a positive eﬀect on the adjustment period.
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) extend the previous analysis by considering
a large number of countries, taking the recent institutional developments into account
(in particular, the evolution of collective bargaining structures and of the employment
protection legislation) and testing for the existence of interactions between policies and/or
institutional factors. They conclude that the tightening of eligibility conditions and the
cut in unemployment bene￿ts, as well as the relaxation of the regulation on ￿xed term
contracts may have played a determinant role in the success of some OECD countries
in reducing their unemployment rate. Furthermore, assuming that in countries where
the degree of centralization is medium (negotiations mainly taking place at the industry
level), coordination among actors might be particularly crucial, they upgrade countries
with a medium level of centralization but a high degree of coordination. They also ￿nd
empirical support for the interaction hypothesis. They show that the tax wedge and
the EPL have a stronger eﬀect in countries with an intermediary level of centralization.
Also, unemployment bene￿ts have a larger eﬀect in countries with relatively high levels
of expenditures on active labor market policies.
Daveri and Tabellini (1997) look at complementarities between labor taxes and the
structure of collective bargaining systems. Their analysis is based on data for fourteen
OECD countries over the period 1965-1991. They ￿nd that labor taxes have a larger
negative eﬀect on unemployment in countries with strong unions. They also show that
decentralized and centralized countries are performing better, irrespective of the level of
labor taxes.1.2. The building blocks 37
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use data based on twenty OECD countries and eight
￿ve-year periods, from 1960-64 to 1995+. They test for the eﬀects of institutions (simi-
lar to the ones in Nickell (1998)), shocks (in total factor productivity, real interest rate
and labor demand shifts) and interactions between institutions and shocks on the unem-
ployment rate. They ￿nd that indeed the economic shocks7 have a larger positive eﬀect
on unemployment when the replacement rate is high, the bene￿t duration is long, the
employment protection is strict, the union density is high and the coordination is low.
1.2.4 Political economy of institutions
Since institutional rigidities seem to be the most prominent explanation of why European
labor markets perform much worse that US labor markets, it is interesting to analyze the
political economy of these institutions.
These countries are democracies and these institutions are mostly set by governments.
Therefore, this section pushes the door into the literature of political economy of labor
market institutions.
The political economy of labor market institutions leans against the more traditional
literature on endogenous policy determination, for example on redistribution policies from
rich to poor ( Meltzer and Richard (1981)), from young to old (Browning (1975), Breyer
(1994)), from employed to unemployed (Wright (1986)). Most of these contributions use
the median-voter model to describe the process of political-decision making. The median-
voter model is simple. It assumes that each member in the population has one vote and
that each vote has the same weight. The two key assumptions for the median voter model
are (Mueller (1989)) (1) that issues are de￿ned along a single dimensional vector and (2)
that preferences are single￿peaked in that one dimension. Others (such as Grossman and
Helpman (1994), Becker (1983, 1985)) consider other political decision-making processes
7The economic shocks enter the regression in such a way that their expected theoretical sign on the
unemployment rate is positive. Hence, they consider a fall in the total factor productivity, a rise in the
real interest rate and a decline in the labor share.38 1. Introduction
such as the lobbying by interest groups. It makes sense to look at interest groups in labor
economics as unions and representatives of employers participate actively to the political
arena. Their role is to some extent taken into account in models in the line of Saint-Paul
(2000) as they are built up around the concept of rents, which can obviously arise in
the presence of these powerful interest groups that unions are. Saint-Paul (2000) also
studies the political feasibility of a reform. He identi￿es three main factors hampering the
labor market reform: (1) the negative eﬀect on the welfare of the decisive voter (who is
most likely low-skilled employed), (2) the uncertainty about the winners and losers of the
reform and (3) the lack of political in￿uence of the winners (unemployed) of the reform.
The eﬀect of a reform on the welfare of the decisive voter goes through two channels:
the (expected) income eﬀect and the exposure (to unemployment) eﬀect. For example, a
relaxation of the EPL has a negative eﬀect on the expected income (lower insider power)
and increases the exposure to unemployment of employed workers. Therefore, the median
voter would never support a relaxation of the EPL.
1.2.5 Human capital investments
On-the-job investments
The literature on on-the-job investments is concerned with the following two questions:
Who is paying for the investments? And are the investments optimal? Malcomson (1999)
identi￿es three types of reasons for contracting: (1) to allocate risk, (2) to protect speci￿c
investments and (3) to motivate employees. The second type of motivation is particu-
larly interesting for this dissertation. Becker (1964), in his seminal work, draws a crucial
distinction between general and speci￿c skills. General skills are the ones that workers
can use anywhere else than at the ￿rm where they are employed, i.e. they can take their
investment with them when they leave. Speci￿c skills on the other hand are skills that
the worker can only use with a particular employer. Therefore, separation means losing
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the worker will have to bear the cost of general training (as he is the one who can capture
the full return of the investment) and, in contrast, the cost and return to speci￿ch u m a n
capital are shared between the worker and the ￿rm. Since then the literature has grown a
lot (see Gibbons and Waldman (1999), Malcomson (1999)). Speci￿c investments lead to
situations of bilateral monopolies, i.e. where both parts could be better oﬀ together than
without each other. Two main problems have been addressed: the problem of imperfect
information (or uncertainty about future outcomes) and the problem of observability of in-
vestments, resulting productivities, outside options, etc. (tangibility. i.e. translating the
idea that one can go to court with evidence). Concerning the information problem, Hall
and Lazear (1984) show that there exists in this context no feasible wage-determination
scheme that achieves separation eﬃciency. The other problem in the approach of Becker
is that investments may not be contractible in the ￿rst place (problem of observability).
I ft h e r ei sn oc o n t r a c ts p e c i f y i n gap a y o ﬀ for each partner as a function of their invest-
ment, but for example a Nash bargaining rule sharing the surplus once post-investment
productivities have been revealed, both the ￿rms and the workers will underinvest in the
relationship (hold-up problem, see Williamson (1975, 1979) and Klein et al. (1978)).
Human capital theory
Human capital theory studies the determinants of acquisition of human capital, at the
beginning focusing essentially on the human capital acquired through oﬀ-the-job education
(schooling prior to the entrance into the labor force). Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) are
the ￿rst to talk about the education decision as an economic decision, i.e. an investment
into a capital (human capital) that has a cost and a return. The essential conclusion is
that people invest into education until the point where the marginal return to education
is equal to the marginal return to any other investment in the economy (re￿ected by the
interest rate). The gains of education are higher expected earnings and the costs are
direct (tuition, books, etc.) and indirect. The indirect, or shadow cost of education, is40 1. Introduction
the opportunity cost of spending time at school rather than on the labor market.
Matching models and education
Introducing heterogenous agents in a matching model can be done in various ways. The
way Chapter 4 does it is by assuming that high skilled workers can perform low skilled
tasks as well. Similar models with heterogeneous agents are McKenna (1996), Gautier
(2002) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002), which have a similar de￿nition of skill: skilled
workers have a comparative advantage in the performance of skilled tasks, but are as
productive as unskilled workers in unskilled tasks.
1.2.6 Economics of migration
Generalities
In case of negative shocks, the labor market needs to adjust. Labor mobility is a possible
adjustment process. However labor mobility is low in European countries (see Puhani
(2001) for an overview). Furthermore, labor mobility does not respond to economic dif-
ferentials (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Bentivogli and Pagano (1999)).
M i g r a t i o nt oc e a s eb e t t e rj o bo p p o r t u n i t i e sh a sb e e na n a l y z e d￿r s ti nt h ec o n t e x to f
developing countries (Harris and Todaro (1970)). Migration was then seen as a once-for-
all decision, basically from developing countries to the developed world. Later on, return
migration has been studied (Dustmann (1994), Stark et al. (1997)).
Migration as an insurance device
Migration can be thought of as an insurance device against income ￿uctuations, in the
absence of well-functioning ￿nancial markets. Employment protection legislation is a
competing instrument to reduce the income variation associated with labor market shocks
(such as an aggregate shock to productivity). Stark (1991) introduces migration as a risk-
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However, when migration is not possible, i.e. when this instrument to maintain a high
average income is not available, one needs a substitute for it. Hence, income and job
protection systems can be thought as alternative income protection instruments.
Migration and institutions
Interesting for the purpose of this dissertation, a branch of the literature has studied the
interactions between the institutions and the migration decision. A ￿rst type of models
analyze the eﬀects of institutional asymmetries on labor mobility (Huizinga (1999)), or
what are the eﬀects of migration in societies with particular institutions (Michael and
Hatzipanayotou (2001)), taking the institutions as given. Others study the political de-
termination of institutions, given the migration possibilities (Razin and Sadka (1997,
Leite-Monteiro (1997), Cremer and Pestieau (1998) for the recent examples). These mod-
els analyze the eﬀects of labor mobility on the political preferences for redistributive
institutions. Indeed, labor mobility changes the structure of the population and therefore
potentially the preferences for redistribution.
Migration and education
Also interesting for the purpose of this dissertation, there is a literature on the migration
decision, given the educational level. This literature investigates whether high-skilled and
low-skilled workers have diﬀerent incentives to migrate. The literature on the brain drain
(Grubel and Scott (1966)) develops the idea that high-skilled workers in developing coun-
tries have more incentives to migrate than low-skilled workers. Migration opportunities
would therefore have a negative eﬀect on the economic performance of these countries, as
these lose the most productive part of their labor force. More recently, Stark, Helmenstein
and Prskawetz (1997) show that this is not necessarily true. They introduce asymmetric
information on the side of employers in the developed countries that would make migra-
tion pro￿table for some workers in a ￿rst time but that they would then return to their42 1. Introduction
country. This would mean that migration opportunities stimulate investments in human
capital that would have never been made otherwise.
1.3 Summary and conclusions
The theoretical and empirical work so far has contributed to a better understanding of
what happened in Europe and why it did not happen in the United States. However
in the last two decades, several European countries (the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland)
succeeded in reducing the unemployment rate. What was so special about them? This
i st h eq u e s t i o na d d r e s s e di nt h eC h a p t e r2 .I tg o e sf u r t h e rw i t ht h ea r g u m e n to fi n t e r a c -
tions between institutions. The theoretical model is a simple extension of the model by
Nickell and Andrews (1983) that suits well for an analysis of the eﬀects of labor market
institutions. The model can be pictured with two curves: a labor demand curve and wage
bargaining curve. The institutions determine the elasticities of these curves and the mag-
nitude of the shifts following an institutional change. The conclusion of the theoretical
study is that institutional reforms may indeed have very diﬀerent eﬀects according to the
rest of the institutional framework. A low degree of centralization for example means that
the wage and labor demand curves are ￿at (in a graph where employment is on the X-axis
and wage on the Y-axis) and therefore that an institutional change is likely to have more
employment eﬀects. The empirical analysis uses some other indicators than the studies
mentioned hereabove. Some institutional indicators used in the previous studies have
very little time variation (such a the index for employment protection legislation, central-
ization, coordination, etc.). However major institutional changes have been implemented
in some OECD countries that are not re￿ected in these indicators. Therefore Chapter
2 uses indicators that carefully re￿ect institutional changes. Indeed, the ambition is to
explain why some institutional reforms had better eﬀects in some countries than others.
Chapter 2 uses data on seven ￿ve-year periods and 18 OECD countries. It ￿nds support1.3. Summary and conclusions 43
for the interaction hypothesis. But it also shows that some institutional changes have
been better irrespective of the initial institutional framework. Hence, it shows that most
of the OECD countries would have experienced a better labor market performance if they
would have implemented the reforms made in the Netherlands or in the UK.
Chapter 3 looks at the political support for Employment Protection Legislation. On
one extreme, we ￿nd the Anglo-Saxon countries, and in particular the United States, that
have a very ￿exible employment protection (low ￿ring costs, if any). On the other extreme,
we ￿nd continental and southern Europe where a series of rigid rules guide the ￿ring
decisions. The question is: Why are the political preferences for Employment Protection
Legislation so diﬀerent in the United States than in most European countries? There are
three essential key features in the model: (1) employment protection is determined by
the median voter, who is most likely employed, (2) the labor market is modelled within a
matching framework, which implies that employment protection reduces both job creation
and job destruction, i.e. makes it harder for an unemployed to ￿nd a job and easier for
an employed worker to keep his job even in bad times, (3) migration and employment
protection are (the only) two competing income protection devices for the workers against
negative shocks. In a country with low migration costs, the median voter is more likely
to prefer no employment protection (and so a high job ￿nding rate once unemployed)
so that he can move quickly to the best productive places. Given these three features,
Chapter 3 shows that assuming that the US and European countries diﬀer in essential
characteristics such as the migration costs (within country), the most mobile country
will prefer a lower level of EPL. European countries have lower migration opportunities
such that workers prefer safe jobs even if this means being maintained in low productive
activities and longer unemployment spells. Once in place EPL reduces even further the
incentives to migrate which suggests that there is a two-way relationship between EPL
and migration. Migration opportunities determine the preferences for EPL and EPL
determines the pro￿tability of migration.44 1. Introduction
The question treated in Chapters 4 and 5 is the following: Does employment protec-
tion make sense? Again, the focus is on Employment Protection Legislation. Chapter
4 looks at the eﬀect of Employment Protection on the accumulation of human capital
prior to the entrance into the labor market. One conclusion of Chapter 3 was that when
one must incur high migration costs in order to work in his best job opportunity, em-
ployment protection may increase his welfare. Chapter 4 elaborates the argument by
introducing heterogeneity among agents. It assumes that the high-skilled workers are
probably more confronted with this migration problem than low-skilled workers. The rea-
son is that high-skilled workers often acquired specialized skills and the demand for these
skills varies across space and time. The existence of high migration costs would therefore
harm high-skilled workers more than low-skilled ones. This would consequently discour-
age investments in specialized human capital that is usually acquired through tertiary
education. The existence of these migration costs reduce the size of labor reallocation
on the high-skilled market relatively to the low-skilled market where workers can remain
in their region to search for an equivalent job. In other words, there are proportionally
less matches dissolved on the high-skilled market than in the low-skilled market. But
these particular matches are also the ones which would be the most hit by employment
protection, that represent not only insider gains for the workers but also a direct cost at
separation. This means that employment protection would have a more damaging eﬀect
on the low-skilled market than on the high-skilled market. Therefore, employment pro-
tection could be considered as a possible policy to stimulate investments in specialized
human capital in countries where there are high migration costs. The problem of such a
policy is that it would probably be not be politically feasible as low-skilled workers would
oppose to it. Similarly, direct subsidies to education have a similar eﬀect on specialized
human capital accumulation. Hence, this could explain why European countries devote
much more public funds at tertiary education than the United States does. It would also
suggest that given the high exogenous migration costs present in Europe, employment1.3. Summary and conclusions 45
protection is a good thing to stimulate investments in specialized human capital.
Chapter 5 analyzes the bene￿ts of employment protection for the quality of an em-
ployment relationship. Indeed, we see that even in the US, contracts are designed with
speci￿cations on the termination terms, i.e. that the eﬀective employment protection is
larger than the legal employment protection (see Nickell and Layard (1999)). So what
t h i sm e a n si st h a tb o t ht h e￿rm and the worker may ￿nd it pro￿table to have a contract
that protects the relationship against negative shocks. Why is the question addressed in
Chapter 5. Employment protection is a way for the ￿rm to commit to the worker that
it will not ￿re him in case of (not too) negative shocks. It guarantees that the relation-
ship will last longer (in expectations) than without employment protection legislation. A
longer relationship is interesting for the ￿rm if the worker can improve the quality of the
relationship by making match-speci￿c investments, i.e. investments that are sunk and
that do not mean nothing for other employment relationships. Of course employment
protection is also a direct cost at separation and, therefore, discourages job creation. The
conclusion of Chapter 5 is that there is an optimal (from a welfare point of view) level
of employment protection. Employment protection makes sense if one believes that there
are potential match-speci￿c investments than can be made by the worker in order to im-
prove the quality of the match, and that one cannot design a contract in advance linking
a wage payment to the investment. Furthermore, Chapter 5 shows that this optimal level
of employment protection also depends on exogenous characteristics of the workers, such
as their education level. Hence, it is optimal to protect high-skilled workers more than
low-skilled workers. In conclusion, Chapter 5 establishes a two-way relationship between
human capital and employment protection. First, employment protection favors human
capital investments on-the-job and second, the education level (or human capital of the
worker at the beginning of the employment relationship) determines the optimal level of
employment protection.
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The broad message of this thesis is that institutions play an important role in deter-
mining the labor market performance and the welfare of societies. Furthermore, these
institutions interact with each other and with essential characteristics of the countries,
such as the cultural and economic homogeneity, the mobility costs within and between
countries, etc. There is therefore not one successful recipe but a careful and clever design
of the institutional framework, taking these interactions into account. Hence, employment
protection has often being blamed for the poor labor market performance in European
countries. However, this dissertation shows that it can be potentially very valuable. Chap-
ters 3 and 4 suggest that the institutions should be shaped to the characteristics of the
countries or the type of individuals, i.e. that maybe employment protection should diﬀer
for example across levels of education.
This dissertation has been written in such a way that all Chapters can be read inde-
pendently of each other. However, given that the themes treated in the diﬀerent Chapters
are very much related to each other, the reader of the complete manuscript will ￿nd some
overlap between them. The author apologizes for this inconvenience.Chapter 2
Institutions and Unemployment
Rates in OECD Countries: An
Empirical Analysis
This Chapter is based on two papers: "Does the Recent Success of some OECD Countries
Lie in the Clever Design of their Labor Market Reform" (Belot an Van Ours (2000)) and
"Institutions and Labor Markets Institutions: An Empirical Analysis" (Belot and van
Ours (2001))1.
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between unemployment and labor market institutions has been the topic
of several studies. In their overview Nickell and Layard (1999) conclude that the main
institutions in￿uencing unemployment are unions and social security systems. In order
1The authors of the related papers would like to thank Jan Boone, AndrØ Hoogstrate, Michael Krause,
Steve Nickell, Arthur van Soest for their comments on a previous version of the paper, and Shin￿ichi
Fukuda, Yuji Genda, and participants to seminars at OSA, CentER (Tilburg, the Netherlands), the
Institute for Advanced Studies (Vienna), the University of Toulouse, and participants to the conferences
of the EEA in Lausanne, of the EALE in Regensburg and of the EALE-SOLE and to the December 2000
NBER-CEPR-TCER conference in Tokyo for stimulating comments. They also thank David Blanch￿ower
and Andrew Oswald for making their data on home ownership rates available.
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to reduce unemployment, governments should encourage product market competition to
eliminate the negative eﬀect of unions and governments should link reforms of unemploy-
ment bene￿t systems to active labor market policies in order to move people from welfare
to work. Their overview is based on a number of cross-country studies like for example
Nickell (1998), Scarpetta (1996) and Daveri and Tabellini (1997).2
The search for relationships between labor market institutions and unemployment is
motivated by the fact that across countries there are substantial diﬀerences in the level
and evolution of unemployment. As shown in Table 2.1 in 2000 the unemployment rates
range from below 4% in Austria, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland to above 9% in
Finland, France and Italy. On average unemployment rates have increased from a low 2-
3% in the 1960s to around 7% in the 1980s and 1990s. Here too, there are also substantial
diﬀerences across OECD countries that are illustrated in Table 2.1, which compares the
situation in the early 1960s, the early 1980s and the late 1990s. Countries like Austria,
Japan and Norway have had a low - though slowly rising - unemployment rate over a
period of 40 years. Countries like Finland, Germany, France, New Zealand and Sweden
have experienced a strong rise in unemployment over this period. Countries like Australia
and Canada have an unemployment rate in the early 1980s that was substantially higher
than in early 1960s, but in the late 1990s the unemployment rate is about the same as
in the early 1980s. Finally there are countries like Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands,
United Kingdom and the United States where the unemployment rate in the early 1980s
was much higher than in the early 1960s, but the unemployment rate in the late 1990s
was much lower than in the early 1980s. So, within this context of globally rising or at
most stabilizing unemployment rates, in recent years some countries have managed to
reduce their unemployment rates substantially. Examples are the United Kingdom (12%
in 1986, 5.5% in 2000), Ireland (17.8% in 1987, 4.2 in 2000), the Netherlands (12.2% in
2Recently, Garibaldi and Mauro (2001) did a cross-country analysis claiming that high employment
growth is related to low taxation and low dismissal costs.2.1. Introduction 49
1984, 2.8% in 2000), Denmark (10.1% in 1993, 4.7% in 2000) and the USA (7.5% in 1992,
4.0% in 2000).
It could be that some countries have a better labor market performance than other
countries because they have a particular type of institutions or they changed some of the
institutions in a favorable way. If this is the case, then countries with high unemployment
rates could learn from successful countries by imitation. Interactions between institu-
tions have been studied by Calmfors (1993), Coe and Snower (1997) and Elmeskov et al.
(1997)3. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) argue that similar economic shocks can have very
diﬀerent eﬀects on unemployment depending on the labor market institutions. Bertola
et al. (2002) ￿nd a similar interaction between shocks and labor market institutions.
Fitoussi et al. (1998) underline that all recently successful countries have in common the
implementation of a set of comprehensive reforms.
The objective of this Chapter is to investigate the existence of complementarities
in more detail. It presents a stylized theoretical model that illustrate the mechanisms
through which institutions interact and in￿uence unemployment. It investigates whether
there is empirical evidence on the existence of complementarities, based on data from
eighteen OECD countries over the period 1960-1995.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2.1 presents a theoretical model of
employment and wage determination. Section 2.3 discusses the labor market performances
of OECD countries and relate these in a stylized way to labor market institutions. Section
2.4.1 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 2.5 concludes.
3A recent study by Checchi and Lucifora (2002) considers interactions between labor market institu-
tions in the sense that they perceive institutions such as employment protection as substitutes for union
services.50
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2.2 Labor markets and institutions, theory
2.2.1 The model
The model proposed here is simple and fairly standard. It shows how labor market insti-
tutions may interact with each other, stressing their role in bargaining and employment
setting. The institutions included here are the labor taxes, ￿ring costs, the unemploy-
ment bene￿t system, and the degree of coordination and centralization in the bargaining
process4. The analysis starts with the traditional right-to-manage model of wage bar-
gaining (Nickell and Andrews (1983)). The wages are set so as to maximize the relative
rents of both actors. The model follows closely the line of reasoning in Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (1991) and Booth (1995).
The economy is constituted of N perfectly symmetric ￿rms (i =1 ,2...N)a n dN
unions. Each of the unions negotiates wages in one ￿rm and bargains independently
of the other unions5. Time is discrete but only steady state conditions are considered.
Firms determine the level of employment given the negotiated wage. The actors are
perfectly informed about ￿rm￿s behavior, in particular of the labor demand function.
Since bargaining occurs before, the actors consider the level of employment in the ￿rm
as endogenous in the bargaining process. The ￿rst logical step consists in describing
the ￿rm￿s behavior. Wage bargaining occurs at diﬀerent levels (￿rm, sector, national).
What the bargaining partners need to predict is the behavior of a representative ￿rm
included in the bargaining. Indeed, when bargaining at a more centralized level, unions
and ￿rms know that all the ￿rms included in the same negotiation will set the same wages.
Consequently, what matters here is the conditions in which a representative ￿rm included
in the bargaining operates when determining its labor demand.
4Because of lack of data some important institutions like for example the minimum wage and active
labor market policies are ignored.
5The case where N =1represents the situation in which wage negotiations are centralized.52
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Labor demand
Capital is ignored and it is assumed that a representative ￿rm i has a production function
with a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation, Yi = Lκ
i , where Yi is the production level, Li the
employment level6 and κ is the parameter of the production function, κ ∈]0,1[.T h e
inverse demand function faced by the ￿rm on the product market is given by Pi = Y
−η
i ,
where Pi the product price of ￿rm i and η ∈ [0,1] is the degree of monopoly power on
the product market where ￿rm i operates7. Hence, when bargaining at the decentralized
level, a representative ￿rm faces a ￿erce competition with all the other ￿rms not included
in the bargaining. On the contrary, when bargaining at a more centralized level, the
representative ￿rm faces less competition from the ￿rms not included in the bargaining.
Indeed, since the level of bargaining is de￿ned with respect to the proximity in terms
of product markets, bargaining at the sector level includes by de￿nition the most direct
competitors and bargaining at the national level include all national competitors. Hence,
a decentralized bargaining level will be featured by η =0 , and more centralized levels by
η>0. Introducing a product market power leads to rents that can be shared between
￿rms and unions. Separations of workers and ￿rms occur only when ￿rms take a unilateral
￿ring decision. They incur a cost per ￿red worker that is proportional to the wage. The
proportion factor is denoted cf. Firms are subject to negative shocks. Old jobs become
less productive. Firms then ￿re workers when a new job is suﬃciently productive to cover
the ￿ring cost associated with separation. For simplicity, the proportion q of workers ￿red
at each period is independent of the employment level.8
6We normalize the labor force to 1. The employment level is then also the employment rate. The
unemployment rate is simply its complement (1 − Li)
7η is the absolute elasticity of this inverse demand function. η = 0 corresponds to the perfect compe-
tition case.
8Jobs are subject to productivity shocks. Hence, the productivity of all existing jobs falls each period
by a factor δ. For any given wage, it is more pro￿table for ￿rms to ￿re some workers, pay the ￿ring cost
and hire new workers. It is pro￿table for the ￿rm to do so until the marginal productivity of the last new
job is suﬃcient to cover the productivity loss and ￿ring cost by ￿ring an old worker. This implies that
when the ￿ring cost is high, the ￿rm waits longer to ￿re a worker, so that the productivity loss is smaller.2.2. Labor markets and institutions, theory 53
The pro￿ts of ￿rm i are equal to PiYi(Li)−wiLi (1 + qcf + τ), where r is the exogenous
discount rate, wi the negotiated (net) wage which is exogenous to the employment decision
of the ￿rm, τ the labor tax rate and qfwi is the ￿ring cost per worker. The ￿rst order
condition is L−µ =
w(1+qcf+τ)
(1−µ) , where µ =1− κ(1 − η) can be interpreted as the eﬀective








This is a traditional labor demand function, depending negatively on the wage. Insti-
tutional parameters also determine labor demand. Labor taxes τ and adjustment costs
qcf reduce labor demand and the degree of monopoly power decreases the labor demand
at any wage. The institutional parameters also determine the slope of the labor demand
curve. Labor taxes, the ￿ring cost and the degree of monopoly power unambiguously
reduce the labor demand response to changes in the wage.
Wage bargaining
Let us now turn to the wage bargaining process. The chronology in decisions is the
following. At the beginning of each period wage bargaining takes place, when a wage
agreement has been reached, ￿rms start producing and paying wages and at the end of
the period ￿rms incur ￿ring costs (Cahuc and Zylberberg (1994)).9 Wage bargaining is
Firms ￿nd it pro￿table to replace a proportion q of workers such that δ ∂Yi
∂Li(1−q) = wi(1 − cf), where δ






, which has as interesting implication
that the stricter the employment protection regulation (represented by the parameter cf) the smaller
the proportion of workers ￿red every period. Although this de￿nition is quite mechanical, it features a




∂cf < 0, i.e. an increase in the ￿ring cost unambiguously increases the total adjustment
costs.
9In case of failure, workers are ￿red immediately at no cost. They get a chance of being employed in
another ￿rm or are unemployed for that period at least. When the bargaining procedure failed, ￿rms do
not produce anything.54
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based on the maximization of rents. Both actors are assumed to be risk neutral10, i.e.
their expected utility corresponds exactly to the expected monetary payments and costs
they incur.
The bargaining outcome is the solution to the following Nash bargaining program:





where β is the relative bargaining power of the union in ￿rm i, URi and FRi are respec-
tively the union and ￿rm rents. The rents of a union are equal to the diﬀerence between
the utility in case of agreement and the fall-back utility level. In case of bargaining failure,
the ￿rm does not produce nothing and separates from all workers at no cost. Workers
then get the opportunity to be employed in another ￿rm (except in the centralized case)
or become unemployed. The utility of the union in case of agreement
UR
A
i = LiWi +( 1− Li)(Σ
j6=i
LjWj +( 1− Σ
j6=i
Lj)U), (2.3)
where the value of working Wi = wi + 1
1+r ((1 − q)Wi + qU). In each period, the worker
bene￿ts from the wage paid by the ￿rm. Then, with a probability (1 − q) he is ￿red and






pi)U). Unemployed workers receive an unemployment bene￿te q u a lt oa￿xed amount
b11. Then, with an exogenous probability pi they get a job next period at ￿rm i. The latter
probability is exogenous from the unemployed￿s perspective. In general equilibrium, the
￿ows into unemployment equal the ￿ows out of unemployment. The probability of getting
10The assumption of risk neutrality can seem rather strong. However, unions are organizations com-
posed of a large number of members and, therefore, it is likely that they ￿nd some way to insure the
individuals (risk averse) internally. Furthermore, risk aversion is often introduces in models where agents
make decisions about savings (consumption smoothing), which is de￿nitely beyond the scope of this
paper. The reason why risk neutrality is assumed here is to make the model tractable.
11One could easily assume that unemployment bene￿ts are linked to average wages. They could be of
the following form: b = ρe w + c,w h e r eρ and c are ￿xed parameters and e w is the average wage in the
economy. This would not change the implications of the model.2.2. Labor markets and institutions, theory 55
a job is consequently linked to the ￿ring rate q and the employment level L =
P
i Li. The
utility of the union in case of no agreement URF
i = Σ
j6=i
LjWj +( 1− Σ
j6=i
Lj)U.
















Expression (2.4) shows that unions care about employment in the ￿rm they represent
and about the relative welfare of a worker in ￿rm i. The latter depends on the value of
working in the given ￿rm and on the value of the alternatives (working in another ￿rm
or being unemployed).12
The rents of the ￿rm are de￿ned as follows. Assuming that in case of bargaining
failure, there is no production, nobody is hired13 but the ￿rm still expects a pro￿ti nt h e
future, the rents of the ￿rm are equal to:
FRi = PiYi(Li) − wiLi(1 + qcf + τ), (2.5)
Plugging the expressions for the union rents and the ￿rm rents in the Nash bargaining,






Ljwj +( 1− Σ
j6=i
Lj)b + φi), (2.6)
where φi = −(1 − q)(Wi − Σ
j6=i
LjWj). Expression (2.6) immediately shows that the
wage in ￿rm i is set as a mark-up on the alternative income (wage in the other ￿rm
and unemployment bene￿t). It is also clear that this mark up depends on institutional
parameters.








12Note that in the centralised case (superscript C), the union rents can be expressed as URC
i =
Li(Wi − U). This expression results from the absence of alternatives other than unemployment both in
case of non-employment in ￿rm i or in case of bargaining failure.
13In case of bargaining failure, all workers are assumed to be ￿red at no cost.56
















. Equation (2.7) establishes a positive rela-
tionship between the bargained wage and the employment level by two channels. First,
the higher the employment level the larger the number of employment alternatives the
workers have, at any given N, and so the better the bargaining position of the unions.
Second, the higher the employment level, the higher the probability unemployed ￿nd a
job next period. This again improves the bargaining position of workers.
The institutional framework determines the relative bargaining position of the workers.
The better their relative bargaining position the higher the bargained wage. Hence, the
unemployment bene￿t b, the number of other ￿rms N bargaining independently, the
degree of monopoly power of the ￿rms on the product market µ and the proportion
q of workers ￿red each period improve the bargaining position of unions and therefore
push the wage up, at any employment level. With respect to the latter parameter q,
one should remind that it is negatively correlated with the strictness of the employment
protection regulation. The story is then that a stricter employment protection weakens
the bargaining position of the unions, by improving the future rents of workers in the
current period.14
2.2.2 Complementarities
The equilibrium of the economy is determined by the labor demand (2.1) and bargaining
condition (2.7). Formally, there are two functions with two endogenous variables:
L = g(w,Ψ)
w = h(L,Θ)
where Ψ and Θ are vectors of institutional parameters.
These two functions are traditionally represented in a two-dimension space (w,L).
The labor demand is then downward-sloping and the bargaining curve is upward sloping.
14Workers do not receive any severance payment. It would be straightforward to show that any payment
to the workers would weaken further their bargaining position.2.2. Labor markets and institutions, theory 57
This simple framework is useful to understand the mechanisms of complementarities. gw
is negative and hL is positive.15 Let us denote by χ any institutional parameter (present
in the at least one of the vectors Ψ or Θ). The objective is to predict its net eﬀect on
employment and identify the institutions determining the magnitude of the eﬀect. The





The eﬀects of various reforms on employment depend on four derivatives: gχ is a the
￿labor demand shifting eﬀect￿, gwhχ is a ￿bargaining shifting eﬀect￿, (1 − gwhL) is an
￿adjustment eﬀect￿, which depends on the slopes of the two curves.
What is particularly interesting here is that these three eﬀects depend on the institu-
tional framework as a whole. Let us distinguish between interactions within the system
of ￿nancial incentives, labor taxes, and unemployment bene￿ts and interactions within
the structure of union bargaining. The focus is on two interactions between the level of
bargaining and institutions determining what could be called the ￿insider power￿ of the
workers: the employment protection legislation on the one hand and the union density on
the other hand. These interactions play an important role in explaining the diﬀerences in
unemployment rate paths.
Let us ￿rst start with the eﬀect of an increase in the replacement rates. An increase




Hence, the ￿rst derivatives are:
Lχ = gwwχ + gχ, (a)
wχ = hLLχ + hχ, (b)
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in the replacement rate shifts the wage curve upwards causing the wage to increase and
employment to fall. The magnitude of the shift depends on the institutional framework.
Since labor taxes and replacement rates are highly positively correlated, two situations
are compared: a situation in which a country has high taxes and high replacement rates
with a situation in which a country has low taxes and low replacement rates. Conditional
on the demand curve a equal sized shift of the bargaining curve will lower employment
more in case of low tax rates due to the curvature of the labor demand curve (note that
∂2L
∂w2 < 0). However, the size of the shift may also depend on the level of the taxes. If
the shifting eﬀect is suﬃciently large, the (negative) employment eﬀect is larger under
a ￿generous social security system￿. So, on the basis of theoretical considerations it is
impossible to predict whether the reduction of employment due to an increase in bene￿ts
under high taxes is larger, smaller or equal to a situation with low taxes.
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of an increase in union density, as a function of the
bargaining level. A decentralized bargaining system is characterized by a relatively low
bargaining power (since the monopoly power is close to 0). This means that the wage curve
is relatively ￿at. On the other hand, the labor demand curve is also ￿at since a low degree
of monopoly power increases the labor demand￿s response to wage changes. A centralized
bargaining system has also a relatively low bargaining power but the corresponding labor
demand curve is more steep since the monopoly power is high. This implies that a shift in
the wage curve is likely to have the largest employment eﬀects in the decentralized case,
where the ￿adjustment eﬀect￿ is the smallest. So, an increase in union density is likely to
have the largest impact in the decentralized case.
Finally, let us consider the eﬀect of an increase in the employment protection legis-
lation, i.e. an increase in the ￿ring cost. This shifts both curves. First, the wage curve
shifts downwards (i.e. the bargaining position of the workers falls). The employment
eﬀect is likely to be the largest when the labor demand curve is the most ￿at (i.e. in
the decentralized case). Second, the labor demand shifts to the left. This has a negative2.3. Unemployment and institutions; developments 59
eﬀect on employment. The overall eﬀect is ambiguous but the ￿atter the curves are the
larger the employment eﬀects are likely to be.
All in all, with respect to the direct employment eﬀect of institutional changes it is
easy to derive predictions from the theoretical model. Higher taxes and higher union
density cause labor demand to fall due to the shift of the labor demand curve, higher
bene￿ts cause labor demand to fall due to the shift of the bargaining curve. Only for
the relationship between ￿ring costs and employment the situation is not clear. When it
comes to interactions between institutions it is more diﬃcult to make clear predictions
from theory. The empirical study should enlighten on which eﬀect dominates.
2.3 Unemployment and institutions; developments
The empirical study of eighteen OECD countries is based on ￿ve-year averages over the
period 1960-1995. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America. The introduction
has already given a brief description of relevant developments in the unemployment rates.
This descriptive information is expanded here.
Table 2.2 compares the unemployment rates in 1983 - the year in which the average
unemployment rate was at its average - with 2000, the last year of which data were
available. The table shows to which extent countries changed their relative position
by comparing countries below and above average unemployment rates in both years. As
shown Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and Italy had an above average unemployment
rate in both years. Austria, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland on the
other hand had a below average unemployment rate in both years. Finland and Germany
faced a deteriorating position with a below average unemployment rate in 1983 and an
above average unemployment rate in 1999. Finally, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands,60
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Table 2.2: Relative positions in terms of unemployment rates
Change in unemployment Countries
Rise 4% or more Finland, France, Sweden, Switzerland
Rise 0-4% Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand
Fall 0-4% Australia, Belgium, Canada
Fall 4% or more Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, UK, USA
Table 2.3: Change in unemployment rate 1983-2000
UK and USA are the countries that successfully reduced their unemployment rate going
from an above average to a below average unemployment rate. Note that if one would
compare ￿ve-years averages of the period 1980/85 and 1995/99 the table would look the
same apart from one country. Ireland would then be in the top-left position indicating
that their unemployment rate was above average all the time. This is caused by the fact
that the recovery of the Irish economy is a quite recent phenomenon.
Table 2.3 gives a diﬀerent overview of developments by illustrating absolute changes in
the unemployment rate between 1983 and 2000. At the one extreme in Finland, France,
Sweden and Switzerland the rise in unemployment rate was 4%-points or more, at the
other extreme in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, UK and USA the fall in unemploy-
m e n tr a t ew a s4 % - p o i n t so rm o r e .T h el a t t e rg r o u pw a sa l s oi nt h eu p p e rr i g h tc o l u m n
of Table 2.3. This group is therefore considered as the group of the successful countries
in terms of their large absolute and relative reduction in their unemployment rates.
Now, let us turn to the variables that re￿ect the institutional framework. The the-2.3. Unemployment and institutions; developments 61
oretical model suggests that the unemployment rate depends on various institutional
parameters, which are proxied by indicators17 in the following way. The union bargaining
power is proxied by union density, the level of bargaining is measured by the degree of
centralization of the economy (privileged level of bargaining: ￿rm, industry or national).
The indicator for labor taxes, is the sum of the direct tax rate and the employment tax
rate, measuring the ￿scal pressure respectively on workers and employers. The generosity
of the unemployment bene￿t system is proxied by a summary indicator of the replacement
rate, averaging the replacement rates in various time, family and working conditions. Fir-
ing costs are summarized by an employment protection summary indicator that consists
of three types of employment protection indicators: protection of open-end contracts,
restrictions on the use of ￿xed-term contracts and restrictions on the use of temporary
work agencies. These three indexes have been built following a method described in the
appendix, consisting in grading regulations in the ￿eld of working contracts.18
Table 2.4 gives a summary overview of the development of the average values of these
indicators19.T h e￿rst column of this table shows the evolution of the average unemploy-
m e n tr a t ef o re a c ho ft h e￿ve years periods considered. The average unemployment rate
was roughly constant in the 1960s and the early half of the 1970s. Then there was an
increase, but since the beginning of the 1980s not much happened on average. As shown
in the second column of Table 2.4, taxes continuously increase from 23.1% in the early
1960s to 39.4% in the early 1990s. The average replacement rate, shown in the third
column, also increases continuously from 16.2% in the early 1960s to 27.5% in the early
1990s. The fourth column shows that average employment protection did not change
17Details on these indicators are presented in the appendix.
18The introduction of additional labor market institutions like union coverage or the existence of a min-
imum wage into the analysis was considered. However these institutions do not have suﬃcient variation
over time and across countries once calendar time and country ￿xed eﬀects are introduced.
19Ur: Standardized unemployment rate, Tax: Overall average labor tax rate, Rrate: Gross replacement
ratio, EPL: strictness of the employment protection legislation, Udens: Union density, Cen: Centralization
index62
































































Table 2.4: Five-year averages of institutional indicators
much until the early 1980s to decline substantially in the remainder of the 1980s. The
￿fth column of Table 2.4 shows the average union density, which was slowly increasing
from 43.6% in the early 1960s to 47.3% in the early 1980s and then decreased to 42.6%
in the early 1990s. Finally, the last column of Table 2.4 shows that the average level of
centralization decreased since the second half of the 1970s.
Now, let us turn to the institutions as potential determinants of the recent develop-
ments. What one wants to know is if there is any relationship between institutions and
the development of the unemployment rates. In this respect, diﬀerences between countries
m a yb ec a u s e db yt i m ei n v a r i a n td i ﬀerences in institutions or by the diﬀerences in the
evolution of institutions.
Table 2.5 gives an overview of the value of the diﬀerent institutional indicators in the
￿rst half of the 1980s20. T a xr a t e sw i t ha na v e r a g ev a l u eo f3 7 %v a r yf r o mal o w1 9 %
in Australia to a high 57% in Sweden. Replacement rates with an average value of 25%
vary from a low 1% in Italy to a high 56% in Denmark. Employment protection with an
average value of 44% (on a scale from 0 to 100) vary from a low 0% in the USA to a high
20Ur: Standardized unemployment rate, Tax: Overall average labor tax rate, Rrate: Gross replacement
ratio, EPL: strictness of the employment protection legislation, Udens: Union density, Cen: Centralization




























































































































Table 2.5: Averages of institutions 1980-84
93% in Sweden. Average union density is 47%, with a range from 17% in France to 81%
in Sweden. Finally, the last column of Table 2.5 shows the levels of centralization in the
early 1980s, the average level being equal to 1.9 (on a scale from 1 to 3).
At ￿rst sight, there is no apparent link between institutions and unemployment rates
in the diﬀerent countries. Still, some interesting patterns can be sketched out. The group
of countries with a large increase in their unemployment rates since the early 1980s is
characterized by a relatively high tax burden, Switzerland being the exception. The suc-
cessful countries have a relatively low tax burden, with the exception of the Netherlands.
What is surprising is that countries that managed to reduce their unemployment rates64
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over the last decade also have relatively high replacement rates, the exception being the
UK and USA. At the other extreme, countries with a sharp rise in their unemployment
had low replacement rates in the early 1980s, the exception being France. Furthermore, it
is clear that except for Switzerland the group of countries that experienced a big increase
in their unemployment rate have a relatively high indicator of employment protection. On
the other hand the group of successful countries all have employment protection below
average. The relationship between the change in unemployment rates and union density
is less clear. Both in the group of countries with a big increase in their unemployment rate
and in the group of successful countries there are high and low union density countries.
With respect to the degree of centralization there are no obvious diﬀerences between the
groups of countries.
Of course, this descriptive information on cross-sectional diﬀerences between institu-
tions does not tell the whole story. Instead of comparing diﬀerences between institutions
one by one a multivariate analysis would be better. And, averages of institutional indica-
tors can be misleading because they do not tell nothing about the evolution of institutions.
It may be that the exact level of an indicator variable is not important but the change
is. Table 2.6 shows changes in institutional indicators from the early 1980s to the early
1990s21. If one relates these changes to the development of the unemployment rates then
there are some indications of the relevance of these changes but for every indicator there
are exceptions. The group of countries with a strong increase in their unemployment rates
had an increase in their taxes and their replacement rates (the latter with the exception of
Finland, which had a slight decrease in the replacement rate). In the group of successful
countries taxes went down a lot in the Netherlands and the UK, but not in the other
countries in this group. In the UK and the USA the replacement rate went down, but not
i nt h eo t h e rc o u n t r i e s .E m p l o y m e n tp r o t e c t i o nw e n td o w nb o t hi nt h eg r o u po fc o u n t r i e s
21Ur: Standardized unemployment rate, Tax: Overall average labor tax rate, Rrate: Gross replacement
ratio, EPL: strictness of the employment protection legislation, Udens: Union density, Cen: Centralization




























































































































Table 2.6: Change in institutions: 1980-84 - 1990-94 (￿ve-year averages)
that faced a big increase in unemployment as well as in the group of successful countries.
For every successful country union density went down, while except for the UK nothing
happened with the level of centralization.
In conclusion, this descriptive approach of the institutional frameworks gives an in-
tuition of why some countries were more successful than others were. The reductions in
the tax burden and replacement rates seem to be important ingredients. Furthermore,
the reduction in the union bargaining power is present in most of the successful coun-
tries, combined with a deeper reform of the entire bargaining system. It also seems that
most of the successful countries changed a lot in the same time, the two most obvious66
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examples being The Netherlands and United Kingdom. The theoretical ideas seem to
be supported by the stylized facts. The empirical study investigates more closely the
mechanisms through which success and failure happened.
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Econometrics of panel data
In order to investigate the eﬀects of labor market institutions on economic performance,
the empirical labor economist often uses panel data sets. The panel used in this disser-
tation is based on macro data, and is therefore diﬀerent from traditional micro data sets,
since the number of time periods is larger than the number of individuals. The countries
can be referred to as ￿individuals￿ j , j = [1, 18] and the years as time periods t, t =
[1960, 1995]. One should therefore be careful when using techniques designed for panels
with an in￿nite number of individuals and a short number of time periods. Furthermore,
the model is probably more relevant when speci￿ed dynamically. The estimation of a dy-
namic model based on this kind of data set is also subject to potential biases. As Swamy
(1971) underlines it, ￿the problem of estimating an economic relationship from the com-
bined time series and cross-country data poses a serious challenge to econometricians￿.
This was written in 1970. Since then, an important work has been done. Pesaran and
Smith (1995) oﬀer a good overview of the problems that can arise when estimating long
run relationships with this type of panel data set.
What has usually been done in the literature is to estimate the eﬀects of institutions
using the following econometric speci￿cation:
uj,t = αj + αt + βpyi,t + γkZk,,j,t + εj,t, (2.9)
where αi and αt are country-speci￿ca n dt i m e - s p e c i ￿ce ﬀects, yi,t is a driving macro-
economic variable (GDP growth, change in in￿ation, etc.) and Zk is an institutional
indicator.2.4. Empirical analysis 67
Two basic assumptions are necessary.
Assumption 1. Eεi =0and Eεiεj = σ2
i if i = j, =0if i 6= j.
Assumption 2. Exitεit =0 ,
where xi,t = {yi,t,Z k,j,t}.
The second assumption can be tested by the Hausman test. Suppose that the country-
speci￿ce ﬀects are uncorrelated with the independent variables (such as the institutions),
then one may consider them as part of the random term. If this is not true, one should
consider them as "￿xed eﬀects", i.e. responsible for country-speci￿c intercepts of the
regression "lines".
A third important assumption made when estimating this model is that the coeﬃcients
of the institutional indicators and the macroeconomic variable are equal over time and
across individuals, i.e. that the coeﬃcients are homogenous. Obviously the unrestricted
speci￿cation that would allow for diﬀerent coeﬃcients both across time and individuals
would not make sense as there would be as many coeﬃcients to be estimated as there are
data points. However, one can test for the homogeneity of these coeﬃcients across coun-
tries or over time separately and the null hypothesis (coeﬃcient homogeneity) is always
rejected. This is the point where the theory comes in. Indeed, the theory suggests that
the eﬀect of a particular institution is likely to vary according to the rest of the institu-
tional framework. Hence, the heterogeneity problem can be partly solved by introducing
interaction variables between institutions.
Concerning the macroeconomic variable, the change in in￿a t i o ni sc h o s e n( c f r .N i c k -
ell, 1998), so as to explain deviations of the unemployment rate from its natural non-
accelerating level.
Consequently, the empirical analysis regresses the standardized unemployment rate
in country j at time t, uj,t on k institutional variables denoted Zk,j,t and the change in
in￿ation denoted by ∆2pj,t. To simplify notation it is assumed that k =2 .T h e m o s t68
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general model can be speci￿ed as follows:
uj,t = αj + αt + βp∆
2pj,t + γ1Z1,j,t + γ2Z2,j,t + γ12Z1,j,tZ2,j,t + εj,t, (2.10)
where there error term εj,t is assumed to be i.i.d. Apart from the ￿rst order eﬀects dis-
cussed in the theoretical section there is only have a clear expectation of the sign of βp,
which is expected to be negative. Increasing in￿ation has a negative eﬀect on unem-
ployment, decreasing in￿ation a positive (see for example Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991)).
The conclusion in Pesaran and Smith (1995) is that in order to estimate long-run
relationships, one should probably concentrate on the pooled estimation approach, i.e.
averaging for each individual the data over time and then regressing on the resulting
cross-section. However, given that the number of individuals is rather small as well
(J =1 8 ) , the estimates are not signi￿cant. Therefore, the compromise proposed here is
to average the data over periods of ￿ve years instead of over the entire available period.
2.4.2 Parameter estimates
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.722.T h e￿rst column of Table 2.7 presents
the estimation results if country or time period ￿xed eﬀects are not included. Then, one
￿nds that the unemployment rate is positively in￿uenced by taxes, replacement rates and
union density. Employment protection and centralization have a negative in￿uence on
unemployment. The eﬀects are straightforward. A 10%-point higher tax rate is related to
a 1.2%-point higher unemployment rate. A 10%-point higher replacement rate is related
to a 0.7%-point higher unemployment rate. Employment protection is a variable that
ranges from 0 to 1. Therefore, the estimation results in the ￿rst column of Table 2.7
would imply that the diﬀerence in unemployment rates caused by employment protection
22The estimates are based on 119 observations; absolute t-values (based on heteroskedastic-consistent
standard errors) in parentheses. The coeﬃcients over the replacement rate and union density should be
divided by 10, the coeﬃcient on centralization should be multiplied by 10.2.4. Empirical analysis 69
is at most 3%-points. A 10%-point increase in union density is related to a 0.6%-point
increase in the unemployment rate. Finally, since the centralization variable ranges from
1 to 3, the unemployment rate under a system of ￿rm bargaining is 6%-points higher than
it is under centralized bargaining23.T h ee ﬀect of the change in in￿ation is signi￿cantly
negative, according to the expectations.
The parameter estimates in the ￿r s tc o l u m no fT a b l e2 . 7a r eb a s e do nam i x t u r eo f
cross-sectional and time series variation. It is therefore possible to control for unobserved
country and time speci￿ce ﬀects. The Hausman Test always rejects the null hypothesis
of randomness of these speci￿ce ﬀects, so there are introduced "￿xed" eﬀects. The sec-
ond column of Table 2. 7 shows the new parameter estimates country ￿xed eﬀects are
included. Then the eﬀect of the replacement rate, employment protection is no longer
diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels of signi￿cance. Furthermore, there is an oppo-
site sign for union density. The third column of Table 2.7 shows the parameter estimates
with time period ￿xed eﬀects. Now, taxes and employment protection no longer aﬀect
unemployment signi￿cantly. The fourth column shows the parameter estimates with both
country and calendar time ￿xed eﬀects. Now, none of the labor market institutions has
as i g n i ￿cant eﬀect on the unemployment rate. The coeﬃcient of the change in in￿ation
is hardly aﬀected by the introduction of ￿xed eﬀects. The results with respect to the
relationship between labor market institutions and unemployment in the ￿rst column
seem to be caused by ￿xed diﬀerences between countries and time periods and not by
within country changes in labor market institutions. This does not necessarily mean that
the parameter estimates in the ￿rst column of Table 2.7 are wrong. They could mea-
sure the true eﬀects of institutions on the unemployment rate. One cannot identify them
because the eﬀects are identi￿ed through cross-sectional variation which is removed by
introducing country ￿xed eﬀects. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that the
23Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) suggest that there is a hump-shape relationship between centralization
and unemployment. This hypothesis has been tested here but not supported.70
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apparent relationship between labor market institutions and the unemployment rate is
caused by a third unknown factor, which in￿uences both unemployment and labor mar-
ket institutions while there is no direct causal relationship from labor market institutions
to unemployment.
Column (5) of Table 2.7 shows what happens if one allows for interactions between
labor market institutions. In particular, it is investigated whether replacement rate and
taxes interact, whether employment protection and centralization interact and whether
union density and centralization interact. Signi￿cant coeﬃcients are found for all inter-
action terms but the direct eﬀects for taxes, centralization and employment protection
are no longer signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. When further investigating the interac-
tion between employment protection and centralization and between union density and
centralization it is found that employment protection and union density only aﬀect un-
employment when bargaining is at the decentralized level. The theory suggests indeed
that the employment eﬀects were likely to be the largest at the decentralized level because
wage and employment respond more to each other and to change in institutional parame-
ters. Column (6) of Table 2.7 shows ￿nal parameter estimates. It shows a direct positive
eﬀect on unemployment or the replacement rate, positive interaction eﬀects between taxes
and replacement rates and between union density and centralization. Finally, there is a
negative interaction eﬀect between employment protection and centralization.
2.4.3 Calendar time and country ￿xed eﬀects
The main estimation results presented in Table 2.7 do not reveal the size of the calendar
time and the country ￿xed eﬀects. Yet, from a comparison of the ￿rst four columns of
Table 2.7 it is clear that they are important. When instead of the country ￿xed eﬀects
average values of the institutional indicators are introduced (Table 2.4) one by one it turn
out that the ￿xed eﬀects are correlated with developments in replacement rates and tax
rates. The increase of replacement rates and tax rates over the period of analysis coincide2.4. Empirical analysis 71






















































































































Table 2.7: Estimation results72
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with the overall increase in unemployment rates.
An additional analysis replaces all the country ￿xed eﬀects by country averages of
institutional indicators. Then, tax rates and centralization have negative eﬀects, while
replacement rates, union density and employment protection have a positive eﬀect. Ap-
parently a lot of the ￿xed diﬀerences between countries have to do with diﬀerences in
replacement rates, union density and centralization where the eﬀects are according to the
theoretical predictions. The cross country eﬀect of taxes on unemployment is negative,
which is somewhat surprising. However, this could have to do with diﬀerences in active
labor market policies since countries with high tax rates are likely to spend more money
on these types of measures. Employment protection has a positive cross country eﬀect.
Since the previous results based on changes in employment protection and changes in un-
employment indicate a negative relationship it is obvious that the positive cross country
eﬀect has to do with spurious correlation. Apparently there are cross country diﬀerences
which seem to indicate that countries with a lot of employment protection have high
unemployment rates while in fact there is no such positive relationship.
2.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
The home ownership rate has been advocated by Oswald (1996) as an explanation for the
rise in unemployment in many European countries. A high home ownership rate may be
responsible for a high unemployment because homeowners are relatively immobile.
Column (7) of Table 2.7 reports the results when introducing the home ownership
variable as a regressor. Although it was found to have a signi￿cant positive eﬀect on the
unemployment rate, it does not aﬀect the other coeﬃcients of interest.
2.4.5 Simulations
To illustrate the empirical ￿ndings the parameter estimates are used to perform some
simulations. Taking the institutional structure of each country in the ￿r s th a l fo ft h e2.4. Empirical analysis 73
1980s (Table 2.5) as given and then simulating what would have happened if the eﬀects
of institutional changes (Table 2.6) were according to the parameter estimates (column
(6) of Table 2.7) leads to Table 2.8. The novelty is that the simulations not only show
how institutional changes within a particular country aﬀected the unemployment rate but
also what would have happened if the institutions would have changed according to the
actual changes in a diﬀerent country.
Take for example France and The Netherlands. According to the parameter estimates
and their own institutional changes unemployment in France would have gone up with
2.2% and unemployment in the Netherlands would have gone down with 1.2%. If one
imposes the Dutch institutional changes to France unemployment would have gone down
with 0.3%. If French institutional changes were imposed to the Dutch labor market
unemployment would have gone up with 2.4%. So, the Dutch institutional changes are
better for both France and the Netherlands. But, the Dutch changes are more eﬀective in
the Dutch situation than they would have been in France. These calculations were done
for each pair of countries. Table 2.824 shows the simulation results indicating the change
in unemployment rate due to the country￿s own institutional changes and the optimal
change if the institutional changes from a diﬀerent country would have been adopted.
For reasons of comparison the ￿rst column of Table 2.8 shows the actual changes in
unemployment rate from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. The second column shows
the simulated change in unemployment over this period. As is clear from a comparison
of the columns there is variation in accuracy in the simulations. For some countries like
Austria, France, Germany, Japan and the UK the simulations are close to the actual
developments. For other countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy and
Sweden there is a substantial diﬀerence between simulations and actual developments.
Apparently country speci￿c developments not captured by the model are important. The
24The simulations are based on the parameter estimates of Table 2-8, including the time ￿xed eﬀect
due to which the unemployment rate in the early 1990s was 1%-point higher than in the early 1980s.
Because of missing observations no simulations are presented for New Zealand.74
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third column of Table 2.9 shows the unemployment rates if the optimal actual policy
mix had been implemented. The diﬀerences between the second and the third column
indicate that some countries could have performed much better than they actually did.
The fourth column shows that this optimal policy mix is from the Netherlands in most
cases and from the UK in some cases. The main reason is that the decline in the tax rate
and the decline in union membership are important elements of the changes in the Dutch
and UK labor market. Labor market changes in the UK and the Netherlands are studied
by Nickell and Van Ours (2000a, 2000b). They conclude that much of the recent decline
in equilibrium unemployment in both countries is due to a combination of changes in the
wage bargaining structures, the tax bene￿t system and active labor market policies.2.5. Conclusion 75
2.5 Conclusion
Cross country studies that relate unemployment rates to labor market institutions have
limitations in the sense that institutions do not change frequently and cross-sectional
variation only is insuﬃcient to catch the true eﬀect of institutions. Also, there are many
country speci￿ce v e n t st h a tm a ya ﬀect unemployment but which cannot all be taken into
account. Part of this criticism also applies to the study presented here. This Chapter
studies the eﬀect of institutions on unemployment rates, but it does not take country
speci￿c events into account such as the German uni￿cation, the large growth of part-
time labor in the Netherlands, the big EU subsidies for Ireland or the loss of Eastern
Europe exports for Finland. Nevertheless, this study provides valuable insights because
it shows that particular combinations of changes in labor market institutions are impor-
tant in lowering unemployment rates. The ￿ndings are that for a lot of countries it is
the interaction between tax rates and replacement rates that is driving the evolution of
their unemployment rates. If ￿nancial incentives have been enforced unemployment was
lowered, if ￿nancial incentives have been weakened unemployment deteriorated. For other
countries changes in the bargaining structure have been more relevant.
The main conclusion is that institutions matter and that institutions interact. In this
respect, countries with high unemployment rates could learn from successful countries by
imitation. On the basis of simulations that used the parameter estimates from the cross-
country analysis, one can conclude that the Netherlands and the UK have had institutional
changes that would have been bene￿cial to other countries too. However, even in a
successful country like the Netherlands where unemployment rates went down rapidly
over the course of the 1990s it is not clear that the policy instruments that brought the
success were based on a clever design (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Only with hindsight
there was a Dutch ￿model￿. So, countries can learn from each other but as Freeman (1998)
stresses, countries cannot just borrow some features from successful countries and expect76
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the unemployment rate to decline since a particular institutional feature may perform
diﬀerently depending on the overall institutional framework.
2.6 Data appendix
2.6.1 De￿nition and sources
- Change in in￿ation: Absolute annual change in in￿ation, the latter de￿ned as the
relative increase in consumer prices. Source: Consumer price index, Luxembourg Income
Study
- Tax rate (%): Employment tax rate + Direct tax rate
- Employment tax rate (%) : Indicator previously computed by the Centre for
Economic Performance (London School of Economics), de￿ned as the ratio between the
sum of employers￿ contributions to social security contributions and contributions to pri-
vate pension schemes (when applicable) and the compensation of employees net of these
contributions. Source: CEP (1960-1992), OECD, National Accounts (1993-1996)
- Direct tax rate (%) : Indicator previously computed by the Centre for Economic
Performance (London School of Economics), de￿ned as the ratio between the sum of
households￿ contributions to social security net the employers￿ contributions and the in-
come taxes, and the households￿ current receipts. Source: CEP (1960-1992), OECD,
National Accounts (1993-1996)
- Replacement rate (%) : Ratio between the unemployment bene￿ta n dt h em e -
dian wage. The indicator used for the unemployment bene￿t is a summary indicator,
taking into account various durations and family situations. The ratio has been directly
computed by OECD. Only odd years were available. Even years are computed by linear
interpolation
- Employment protection: Built index indicating the strictness of employment
regulation with respect to open-ended contracts, ￿xed-term (FT) contracts and temporary2.6. Data appendix 77
work agencies (TWA) (see blow)
- Centralization index: Index (1-3) characterizing the degree of centralization of the
collective bargaining system, according to the privileged level of bargaining: 1:￿rm level,
2:industry level, 3:national level. Source: Bratt (1996), OECD, Employment Outlook
(1997), Elmeskov et al. (1997). Some countries have changed bargaining regime in the
period of analysis. On an annual basis this is a discrete jump between 1, 2 or 3. However,
because ￿ve-year periods are used the value of the centralization variable may be between
two discrete values. If that was the case the value has been rounded to 1,2 or 3.
- Union density (%): union density using OECD data, source CEP.
2.6.2 Building the employment protection legislation indicator
Protection of open-ended contracts
Administrative procedure
The marks are added up according to the presence of the mentioned factors.
1-N o t i ￿cation required (verbally or by letter)
1 - Grounds noti￿cation required (verbally or by letter)
1-N o t i ￿cation to a third party required
2 - Authorization of a third party
Noticing period
0-N on o t i ￿cation period required
1-< 2m o n t h s
2-> 2m o n t h s
Severance payment
0-N on o t i ￿cation period required
1-< 2m o n t h s
2-> 2m o n t h s
Special provisions78
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1 - Tighter protection of special categories of workers
2 - Companies must provide retraining courses
De￿nition of unfair dismissals (and provisions with respect to it)
0 - Discrimination and no economic grounds
1 - when social considerations have not been taken into account
1 - when discrimination in the selection procedure of dismissals
1 - when no consultation with the workforce has been undertaken
2 - when re-training the labor force must be attempted
3 - when worker capability cannot be a basis for dismissal
-1 - when a ceiling apply to appeal against unfair dismissal
Collective dismissals (special provisions)
1 - Conciliation with workforce / third party required
1 - redundancies must be accompanied by a social plan
2 - authorization of a third party required
2 - when speci￿c conditions must be ful￿lled
Regulation of ￿xed-term contracts
Purpose
0 - No limit
1 - Speci￿c restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 - Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary replacement
of a worker)
2 - Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 - Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4 - Not allowed
-1 - If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist otherwise)
Duration2.6. Data appendix 79
0 - No limit
1 - Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2 - no renewal possible
Temporary work agencies regulation
Purpose
0 - No limit
1-S p e c i ￿c restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 - Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary replacement
of a worker)
2 - Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 - Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4 - Not allowed
-1 - If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist otherwise)
Duration
0 - No limit
1 - Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2 - no renewal possible
The evolution of the employment regulation has been graded for all the countries, over
the period 1960-1996 . Three indicators have then been computed, averaging the grades
related to each component described above. The highest value for each indicator has
been normalized to 1, so as to re-scale the indicators in a range [0,1]. The average of the
t h r e ei n d i c a t o r sh a st h e nb e e nc a l c u l a t e dt oo b t a i nt h es u m m a r yi n d e xo fe m p l o y m e n t
protection80








Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
0.02 -3.90 3.60 1.07
0.33 0.06 0.58 0.12
0.22 0.00 0.63 0.14
0.43 0 1 0.29
0.45 0.09 0.87 0.16
1.94 1 3 0.64
Table 2.9: Basic statistics on the variablesChapter 3
Political Economy of Employment
Protection Legislation
This Chapter is based on the paper "Why is the Employment Protection Stricter in
Europe than in the US?" (Belot (2002))1.
3.1 Introduction
Employment protection is on average stricter in Europe than in the US. Long being
blamed for the poor European labor market performance, together with other rigid labor
market institutions, employment protection has recently, to some extent, been freed of
charges. The role of the employment protection on the unemployment rate would be
minor. However, employment protection has a signi￿cant negative eﬀect on the labor
market in￿ows and, in particular, unemployment in- and out￿ows (Nickell and Layard
1While remaining responsible for any errors, the author thanks Jan van Ours, Dale Mortensen, Michael
Wallerstein, Gady Barlevy, Michael Krause, Jan Boone, Jeroen van de Ven, Siwan Anderson, seminar
participants at Northwestern University (2001) and in Tilburg (2002), conference participants of the
ENTER Jamboree in Toulouse (2000) and the IZA workshop on Job Stability and Security in European
Labor Markets (2002), and participants to the IZA Summer School in Labor Economics (2002) for their
useful comments. The author also gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from the Dutch National
Scienti￿c Research Institute (NWO) and thanks the Department of Economics at Northwestern University
for its hospitality and support.
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(1999) and OECD (1999)).
Most of the European countries have been reforming their employment protection
legislation (EPL) over the last decade, towards more ￿exibility essentially. Reforming
these institutions might however be limited by the lack of political support. Saint-Paul
(2000) has provided a major contribution with respect to the political economy of labor
market institutions. He argues that these institutions bene￿t to a well-organized part of
the population so that the implementation of a reform would be diﬃcult. Rigid labor
market institutions in Europe have given birth to large rents on the worker￿s side, and
the median voter is supposed to belong to that category.
While the consequences of the diﬀerences in institutions between the US and Europe
are relatively well identi￿ed, their origins are more obscure. These countries are democ-
racies and these institutions can be considered as the outcome of a democratic political
process. The question is then: Why do Europeans need employment protection while
Americans do not? Answering this question will help to identify more clearly the role of
employment protection and hopefully contribute to the large current debate on the reform
of the EPL.
This Chapter relates the diﬀerences in observed EPL to exogenous and fundamental
diﬀerences in two dimensions: the economic heterogeneity and the migration costs. When
a country is composed of economically heterogenous regions, it is very likely that once
a region is hit by a negative shock, other regions in the same country are doing better.
Hence, employment protection and migration between economically diﬀerent regions can
be seen as two alternative instruments at the disposal of the workers to protect their
income2. The argument is that migration is more attractive in America because exogenous
migration costs are lower and migration gains are larger than in Europe. Americans prefer
2The term "insurance" is not used here as the aim of this paper is to show that migration and
employment protection are competing instruments aﬀecting the "average" income of the workers. We do
not concentrate here on the protection against income ￿uctuations. Workers will therefore are assumed
to be risk neutral.3.1. Introduction 83
not having their jobs protected so that the job ￿nding and ￿ring rates are high and they
can move fast to better horizons so as to maintain a high average income. In Europe
migration is costly and countries are small so that migration between regions makes less
sense. Employment protection legislation is a way for the median voter (most likely an
employed worker) to protect his income and job in case of negative shocks, since without
it, their chance of becoming and staying unemployed in their region (they do not ￿nd it
pro￿table to migrate) is higher.
O n en e e d st or e a l i z et h a tw o r k e r sn e e dt ochoose between the two instruments, i.e. they
cannot have the best of both worlds. Indeed, as soon as employment protection exists, the
eﬃciency of migration as an income protection device is reduced, as EPL reduces the job
￿nding and ￿ring rates, i.e. the speed of reallocation from low productive places to better
ones. Hence, the relationship between employment turnover and employment protection
should go in both directions and should be negative, as observed in the empirical facts.
Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora (1999) also suggest this type of relationship but then between
employment turnover and unemployment insurance. Their argument however is diﬀerent
from the one presented here. In particular, employment turnover determines how saving
and borrowing are good substitutes for the unemployment insurance. Hence they show
that a low turnover increase the persistence of income shocks and makes unemployment
insurance relatively more attractive.
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents some stylized facts and a brief
review of the literature on employment protection and migration. Section 3.3 introduces
the model and discusses the equilibria. Section 3.4 illustrates the mechanisms of the model
with a numerical example. Section 3.5.1 discusses the results and assumptions. Finally,
section 3.6 concludes.84 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
3.2 Employment protection and migration - Evidence
and theory
Section 1.2.2 (Table 1.11) describes the evolution over time and the diﬀerences in EPL
across OECD countries. The relevant aspect for this study is that the United States have
am u c hm o r e￿exible regulation than most European countries.
There is a huge literature on the eﬀects of employment protection on labor market
performance. There seems however to be a consensus on the following: Employment pro-
tection does not have much eﬀect on the level of unemployment but does have an eﬀect on
the labor market ￿ows and, in particular, on the unemployment in- and out￿ows (Nickell
and Layard (1999), OECD (1999)). In other words, the empirical evidence suggests that
it is easier for an unemployed person to ￿nd a job in a ￿e x i b l ec o u n t r yt h a ni nar i g i do n e
(see for example Schettkat (1997)). This point is crucial for the argument of this Chapter.
A population which does not support employment protection chooses high job ￿nding and
￿ring rates, which guarantee that workers can move quickly from low productive places
to high productive ones. Employment protection reduces the gains from migration of
unemployed looking for better jobs in other regions of the country.
This raises the question of why such rigidities exist in the ￿rst place. These countries
are democracies and this type of institution is the outcome of a political process. Saint-
Paul (1997) suggests that the reason why EPL is stricter in Europe than in the US relies
on other existing rigidities, such as powerful union organizations. This Chapter proposes
an alternative (but not rival) explanation relying on the diﬀerence in the gains and costs
from migration. The United States are usually thought of as the country where people
move fast and to a large extent. Europe on the other hand shows a lower degree of labor
mobility, even within countries (see Thomas (1994), Decressin and Fatas (1995)).
Given that the objective of this Chapter is to understand the mechanisms leading to
the political support of employment protection legislation and that this type of policy is set3.2. Employment protection and migration - Evidence and theory 85
at the country level, one should compare essential characteristics of individual European
countries and the United States. Indeed, this Chapter suggests that when determining
their political preferences with respect to employment protection, workers make a trade
oﬀ between the gains and costs from migration and the gains and costs from employment
protection. Since employment protection is chosen at the country level, workers need to
consider migration opportunities corresponding to this particular political entity. They
cannot take the general equilibrium eﬀect of employment protection on job ￿nding and
￿ring rates into account with respect to other migration opportunities (between countries).
However, given the progress of the European uni￿cation process, it is interesting to make
predictions about what would happen to the political support of EPL if it would be set
at the European level. The relevant migration opportunities to consider then would be
the ones between all regions of Europe.
There is a lack of reliable statistical material on migration between regions of nation
states of Europe. Puhani (2001) summarizes studies on labor mobility in OECD countries.
These studies consider both migration between countries and within countries. What is
usually observed is that migration as a share of the total population is lower in Europe
than in the United States. The OECD (1986) shows that interregional migration is the
highest in the USA, Australia and Canada and the lowest in Europe. A study by De
Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) shows that interregional mobility also diﬀers across
European states. Hence, interregional mobility in the Southern countries (Spain, Italy) is
less than half as large as in the Northern and continental ones (Denmark, Finland, France,
the Netherlands and UK). These observations are very interesting for the purpose of this
study since this ordering corresponds precisely to the one presented above, reporting the
degrees of strictness of employment protection legislation. Hence, the empirical facts show
that lower mobile countries have a stricter employment protection. However this is only
an observed correlation, that does not tell nothing about the direction of the causality. It
could be that strong employment protection actually reduces labor mobility rather than86 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
the other way around.
Stark (1991) introduces migration as a risk-diversi￿cation device in the context of
rural-urban migration in developing countries. Migration can work as a risk diversi￿cation
device in the presence of economic heterogeneity. One should investigate two elements.
First, labor mobility could be lower in Europe because there are less asymmetries, a larger
economic homogeneity. Second, labor mobility could be lower in Europe because there
are large migration costs. In that case, the responses to these asymmetries would be lower
in Europe than in the US.
Regarding the ￿rst point, it is certainly true if one compares the United States with
each European country in particular. The size of the United States is indeed such that the
economic heterogeneity is larger than in any particular European country. This means
that all else equal, Americans have more opportunities in their country to maintain their
income than Europeans do. Looking on the other hand at the economic heterogeneity of
Euro-Land as a whole, the empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Hence, Bentivogli
and Pagano (1999) note that asymmetric shocks are more likely to occur in Europe than in
the US. This means that one should observe relatively more migration between European
countries than within them, which is not supported by the empirical facts.
Concerning the second point, the facts show that the reason why people do not move
in Europe is not due to the absence of migration opportunities. In other words, there are
diﬀerentials in economic variables that could theoretically determine migration (such as
unemployment diﬀerentials, wage diﬀerentials) but that do not stimulate labor mobility in
practice. Studies by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Gros (1996) show that European
migratory responses to unemployment and wage diﬀerentials between and within nation
states are indeed lower in Europe than in the United States. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) estimate the elasticities of net migration into a region with respect to economic
variables such as the per capita income in that region. They ￿nd a signi￿cant positive
coeﬃcient for the United States: A 10 percent diﬀerential in income per capita raises3.2. Employment protection and migration - Evidence and theory 87
net-in-migration to bring the region￿s population growth rate up by 0.26 percent per
y e a r . T h i si sa p p a r e n t l yn o ts u c has t r o n ge ﬀect but it is still stronger than the ones
estimated for the European countries (where most of them are even insigni￿cant). De
Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) show that interregional migration is relatively low in
Southern European countries, despite the existence of higher income diﬀerentials in the
South. In the same line of studies, Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) ￿nd that the response
of wage and unemployment diﬀerentials is much stronger in the US than in the European
regions taking part to the launching of the Euro-zone. They ￿nd that unemployment
diﬀerentials stimulate population ￿ows 10 times as much in the US than in Euro-Land
and that wage diﬀerentials give rise to ￿ows that are double the size in the US than in
Euro-Land. This means that even in the presence of migration opportunities, Europeans
do not migrate much.
The question is then: why do people not migrate to better horizons? The obvious
answer is that there are large social and cultural barriers. But this is not a very strong
argument to explain low mobility within countries. Oswald (1996) and Gros (1996) men-
tion the role played by the regulation of the housing market. Gros observes in Europe
a strong correlation between the rate of inter-regional migration and the proportion of
houses occupied by their owners in 1991 and 1992. Oswald shows that diﬀerences in the
home ownerships across OECD countries can explain part of the diﬀerences in observed
unemployment rates. Another reason could be that European rigid labor market institu-
tions make its workers relatively more attached to their roots. A recent paper by Hassler
et al. (2001) argues that there is a circular relationship between the unemployment insur-
ance system and the geographic attachment of the labor force (and so the low mobility).
The more generous the unemployment system the more likely you are attached to your
region and the more attached you are the stronger you support unemployment insurance.
They ￿nd under certain conditions that two self-reinforcing equilibria can exist: one with
high insurance, low mobility and high unemployment (typically the European case) and88 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
the other one with low insurance, high mobility and low unemployment (typically the
American case). The reason why relatively unattached populations prefer a lower level of
insurance lies in the existence of a ￿scal distortion (unemployment bene￿ts are ￿nanced
by taxes raised on labor). In the same line of reasoning, it is argued here that these
institutions, and in particular employment protection, have been chosen because of the
existence of moving costs related to more essential barriers such as the regulation of the
housing market, the cultural and social barriers, etc. Once in place these institutions re-
duce even further the incentives to migrate but this Chapter argues that they ￿rst should
be thought as the consequence of a malfunctioning income protection device (migration).
3.3 The model
The objective of this Chapter is to show that migration costs and gains determine the
preferences of the population with respect to employment protection. Employment pro-
tection plays two important roles for the workers. First, it protects their job and gives
them some insider power (enables them to bargain higher wages). Second, it reduces both
job creation and job destruction. This has two implications. It means ￿r s tt h a ti ti sm o r e
diﬃcult for an unemployed worker to ￿nd a job and, second, that some low productive jobs
are maintained although they would disappear if there was no employment protection.
Suppose the workers can choose between a ￿xed ￿ring cost and no ￿ring cost. One
crucial aspect determining his choice is the exogenous migration gains and costs he has to
incur when he wants to move to better horizons. Hence, if these gains are high (because for
example of a large economic heterogeneity) and these costs are low (because for example of
a large cultural homogeneity), the median voter may be willing to trade the insider gains
from employment protection for a better outside option. Indeed, without employment
protection, job creation is high and it is relatively easy for an unemployed worker to
￿nd a job. If migration is not very attractive (high costs and/or low gains) on the other3.3. The model 89
hand, this worker prefers his job to be safe even if this means it to be maintained at low
productivity levels. The model will now be described in detail.
3.3.1 Basic framework
To formalize the argument, several elements are needed. First, one needs a framework
formalizing the determinants of migration, which are the economic heterogeneity within
the country and the exogenous migration costs incurred when migrating across these
economically diﬀerent regions.
The simplest way to model the economic heterogeneity is to introduce a country with
two regions which diﬀer by a region-speci￿c productivity diﬀerential denoted here by ε.
In other words, the regions can be in two possible states of the world, a good state (g) or a
bad state (b). The states of the world are not necessarily permanent. Hence, a parameter
λ is introduced and denotes the probability that the regions switch states of the world (the
good region falls then into a slump and the bad region enters a boom)3.T h ee v o l u t i o no f
the regional productivity element can therefore be represented by a symmetric two-state
Markov chain, with λ being the transition probability from a bad (good) state to a good
(bad) state. The stochastic transition matrix associated with it is:
ˆ
(1 − λ) λ
λ (1 − λ)
!
,
If λ is close to 0, one can say that the diﬀerentials are persistent.
Next a parameter cm is introduced, that measures the cost of migrating between these
two regions. This cost is assumed to be exogenous and constant. In particular, it does not
depend on the number of migrants or on a ￿xed factor such as land. This is not crucial
for the essence of the results.
3This assumption of perfect negative correlation simpli￿es the model a lot but is not necessary for the
results. What is needed is a country where at one moment in time, there is another region in the same
country that is doing better of worse than yours. The most simple way to model this is to assume that
there are only two regions which are perfectly negatively correlated with respect to their state of nature.90 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
Hence, ε and cm are the essential parameters that will be played with to explain dif-
ferences in political preferences for employment protection between the US and European
countries4.
Second, one needs a parameter featuring the employment protection legislation and one
needs endogenous job creation and job destruction that are directly aﬀected by this EPL.
Furthermore, workers (or matches) should be diﬀerent (so that employment protection
modi￿es the proportion of low productive workers ￿red when a negative aggregate shock
occurs). Hence, ￿rms and workers are assumed to form matches with a match-speci￿c
productivity x, that corresponds to a random draw from a uniform distribution f(x)
de￿n e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,1]. The match-speci￿c productivity is revealed as soon as a
match takes place. xb and xg denote the productivity ￿o o r sa b o v ew h i c ht h ew o r k e ra n d
the ￿rm ￿nd it pro￿table to establish an employment relationship. The match-speci￿c
productivity element of a match remains constant over time, so that one can identify at
the beginning of the relationship which matches will be dissolved by a negative regional
shock. Then low productive matches are destroyed and workers become unemployed. e x
denotes the productivity threshold under which matches are destroyed once hit by an
aggregate negative shock. Hence, in a boom, two types of jobs can be de￿ned: surviving
jobs (that will survive even if the region is hit by a negative productivity shock) that are
such that e x ≤ x ≤ 1 and dying jobs (that will not survive to the slump) that are such that
xg ≤ x<e x. In a slump, there are on the other hand only surviving jobs since the regional
aggregate shock would only improve the productivity of the matches (xb ≤ x ≤ 1).T h e
parameter cf is introduced as the ￿ring cost incurred by ￿rms at separation. This ￿ring
cost will change the chance of being hired and ￿red.
4One could argue that ε should be endogenous, as migration probably reduces the economic diﬀer-
entials between regions. This is true and would imply in this model that migration would become less
pro￿table at some point. But what is relevant to explain the political preferences here are the migra-
tion opportunities existing before migration takes place. The model implies that the attractiveness of
migration does not change with migration, but this is not crucial for the results.3.3. The model 91
Third, one needs matches that can also be destroyed for other reasons than aggregate
regional shocks5. Hence, it is assumed that jobs are destroyed for exogenous reasons with
probability δ. This translates the idea that some turnover is eﬃcient.
Fourth, an adequate model of labor reallocation should take search frictions into ac-
count. Therefore, the labor market is modelled within a matching framework, that as-
sumes that ￿nding a new partner costs time and resources. In particular, a worker and
a ￿rm meet at a rate determined by a matching function m(u,v),t h a te x e r t sc o n s t a n t
returns to scale. θ is de￿ned as v
u, the labor market tightness, i.e. the number of vacancies
(v) available per unemployed worker (u being the total number of unemployed workers).
The probability that an unemployed worker matches with a vacancy is then equal to
m(θ)=
m(u,v)





θ . Only unemployed workers migrate6. Unemployed workers
can either search for a job in their own region or in the neighboring one. If they decide
to look for a job in the neighboring region, they incur the migration cost cm.
The sequence of events goes as follows. First, unemployed workers choose the region
in which they prefer searching for a job. Firms post vacancies. Matches take place and
their corresponding productivity is revealed. Matches with too low productivities do not
lead to an employment contract and separation occurs immediately and at no cost. With
probability λ, the state of the world changes and the lowest productive employed workers
are ￿red (when the state of the world changes from good to bad). With probability δ
matches are dissolved for exogenous reasons. Firms incur a ￿ring cost cf. Wages are
bargained at the beginning of the contract and as soon as there is a productivity change7.
5If this would not be the case, all workers would in the long run end up in high productive jobs that
can never be destroyed. The unemployment rate would in the long run tend to 0, which is not realistic.
6This is a simplifying assumption that imposes a transition via unemployment in order to ￿nd a job
in another region, which does not seem unrealistic. This implies that in equilibrium only unemployed
workers will ￿nd it pro￿t a b l et od os o .
7This assumption is not crucial. One could for example assume that wages are some average of the
wages in a good and in a bad state. But given that workers are risk neutral, wage ￿uctuations do not
matter at all, only the average income does.92 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
The next section presents the Bellman equations used in the model and then, given that
agents are perfectly foresighted, the model is solved by backward induction.
3.3.2 Bellman equations
Values of searching for a job
The asset values of searching for a job in the state of the world s,Us is de￿ned as follows:
rUs = b + m(θs)(E(Ws(x) − Us)) + λ(Ut − Us), (3.1)
with s 6= t,
where b is the unemployment bene￿t, E(Ws(x)) is the expected value of working in a
region s, s = g,b. While being unemployed in the region in state of the world s,aw o r k e r
bene￿ts from an unemployment income (that might as well be the value of leisure or other
non-market activities); he ￿nds a job with probability m(θs), for which the corresponding
expected gain is equal to E(Ws(x) − Us). Furthermore, he faces the risk λ of his region
switching to the other state of the world. In the latter case, he might either stay in
his region or migrate to the other region and incur the migration cost cm. Migration
takes place only if it is pro￿table to do so. Consequently, the option value of becoming
unemployed in a region that is in the state of the world t is Ut =m a x {Ut,U s−cm}. What
are the main diﬀerences between the values of being unemployed in a bad and in a good
region? First, the respective probabilities of ￿nding a job may diﬀer. It is easier to ￿nd a
job in a tighter labor market. The tightness of the labor market is here determined by the
job creation condition that is described below. Second, once he ￿nds a job, the expected
value of this job may diﬀer according to the state of the world. The intuition suggests
that the expected value of working in a good region is higher than in a bad region. This
will indeed be the case.3.3. The model 93
Values of working
The value of working in a surviving job Ws
g(x) in a good region is de￿ned as a function















g(x) is the corresponding wage, Wb(x) is the value of working in a (surviving)
j o bi nab a dr e g i o n .
The value of working in a dying job Wd







g (x) − Ub) − δ(W
d
g (x) − Ug), (3.3)
where wd
g(x) is the corresponding wage. A worker in a dying job loses by de￿nition
his job when the regional shock arises. Being unemployed, he has the choice to stay
unemployed in the stagnating region or move to the booming neighboring region (and
then incur the migration cost).
Finally, the value of working in a bad region is:







where wb(x) is the corresponding wage.
Vacancy posting
Firms post vacancies on the labor market. The value of posting a vacancy Vs in a region
s, s = g,b,i sd e ￿ned as follows:
rVs = −cr + q(θs)(E(Js(x) − Vs)) + λ(Vt − Vs), (3.5)
with s 6= t,
where cr is the recruitment cost (or ￿ow cost of posting a vacancy), q(θs) is the
probability of matching with an unemployed worker, E(Js − Vs) is the expected surplus
when ￿lling a vacancy in region s.94 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
A s s u m i n gt h a tt h e r ei sf r e ee n t r yo nt h ev a c a n c ym a r k e t ,￿rms post vacancies until
the value of doing so is equal to 0:
rVg = rVb =0 . (3.6)
This implies that vacancy posting is such that the expected cost of posting a vacancy






Condition [3.7] is usually referred to as the job creation condition. It implies here that
the market tightness is the highest, in equilibrium, in the region that has the highest
expected value of ￿lling a vacancy (this means even after migration). It is also worth
noting that the job creation condition remains satis￿ed after migration, meaning that the
market tightness does not change with migration ￿ows.
Values of ￿lling a vacancy
The respective values Js
g(x),Jd
g(x) and Jb(x) of ￿lling a vacancy with a match with idio-
syncratic productivity x are de￿ned as follows:
rJ
s





















g(x) − Vg − (−cf)
¢
, (3.9)
rJb(x)=x − wb(x) − λ(Jb(x) − J
s
g(x)) − δ (Jb(x) − Vb − (−cf)), (3.10)
where Vb is the value of posting a vacancy in a bad region.
The basic diﬀerence between the valuations of the jobs is that when ￿lling a vacancy
with a dying job, the ￿rm knows that it will have to ￿re the worker with probability
λ+δ, while the probability of having to ￿re a worker in a surviving job is δ. The job then
becomes vacant and the ￿rm has to pay the ￿ring cost cf.
Let us now turn to the formal description of the model.3.3. The model 95
3.3.3 Wage bargaining
Workers and ￿rms bargain over wages through a Nash bargaining process so that the wage






















g (x) − Ug)
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d
g(x) − Vg − (−cf))
1−β, (3.12)





(Jb(x) − Vb − (−cf))
1−β , (3.13)
where β is the worker￿s relative bargaining power and Us =m a x [ U∗
s,U∗
t − cm], with
s 6= t,d e ￿nes the outside option of a worker: it is either being unemployed in the region
where he is now or being unemployed in the other region but then incurring the migration
cost in order to move there.













b)) + β (x + ε + rcf), (3.14)
wb(x)






b)) + β (x + rcf), (3.15)
At a given match-speci￿c productivity level x, the equilibrium wage is the same in a
dying and in a surviving job. In both bad and good regions, the wage increases with the
outside option Us, with the total productivity of the match and with two types of insider
power coming from the ￿ring cost and the diﬀerence between the two outside options.
The ￿rst type is usually referred to as the worker insider power, i.e. the power of being
already inside the ￿rm. The second type is what is called here the region insider power,
i.e. the power or weakness of being in the region. Suppose that workers in the good region
are better oﬀ than workers in the bad region. If there is no migration cost, one should
expect that the outside options in both regions should converge to each other. If there
is a migration cost however, workers in a good region are better oﬀ because they do not
suﬀer so much from the competition of migrant workers. Workers in a bad region, on the96 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
other hand, are ￿trapped￿ in their region. Therefore, this regional insider power pushes
the wages up in a good region and down in the bad region (it is then more a weakness
than a power).
3.3.4 Thresholds
This section determines two types of match-speci￿c productivity thresholds. First, the
thresholds at which the ￿rm is indiﬀerent between oﬀering a contract or not (xb and xg)
and second, the threshold at which the ￿rm is indiﬀerent between a surviving job and a
dying job.
In order to determine these thresholds, it is necessary to calculate the equilibrium
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The value of ￿lling a vacancy increases in all jobs with the match-speci￿c productivity,
the regional productivity increment and decreases with the outside option, the regional
insider power and the ￿ring cost.
Lemma 3.1 The value of ￿lling a vacancy with a dying job has a steeper slope than the




































x g x b x x ~
J(x)
Figure 3.1: Values of ￿lling a vacancy as a function of the match-spec￿c productivity x.
This implies that dying jobs could exist in the circumstances represented in Figure
3.1. The intuition for the existence of dying jobs is the following. The higher productivity
diﬀerential between good and bad states and the lower the ￿ring cost the more likely it
is worth it to have jobs existing only in good times and destroyed as soon as bad times
occur. High productive jobs are worth maintaining independently of the state of the world
if the match speci￿c productivity x is suﬃciently high to make these matches pro￿table,
even in bad times.
Let us now turn to the determination of the productivity thresholds.
The lowest productivity level acceptable for the ￿rm to employ the worker in a booming







g is such that Jd
g(xd
g)=0 ,x s
g is such that Js
g(xs
g)=0 . In words, the minimum
level of productivity required to start an employment relationship in a booming region
is the productivity level such that the corresponding value of matching for the ￿rm is
equal to 0. When xd
g <x s
g, dying jobs exist and the lowest productive job is dying. When
xd
g ≥ xs
g, dying jobs do not exist and the lowest productive job is surviving.98 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
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g is such that:
x
d
g = −ε + rUg + λ(Ug − Ub)+
rβ + δ + λ
1 − β
cf, (3.21)
The lowest match-speci￿c productivity level acceptable for a ￿rm to start an employ-
ment relationship in a stagnating region, denoted xb, is such that Jb(xb)=0:
xb = −
ελ
(r + δ +2 λ)
+ rUb −
δλ(r + δ)





Expressions [3.20], [3.21] and [3.22] establish a positive relationship between the out-
side option in one region (Us) and the minimum productivity required at entry. This
is the second step in job creation (after vacancy posting, that is analyzed in the next
section). The higher the outside option, the higher the productivity required at entry.
A high productivity diﬀerential stimulates job creation, while the regional insider power
reduces it.
The threshold between a dying and surviving job e x is de￿ned as follows:
e x =m i n {x
s
g,e xd,s}, (3.23)










which leads to the following expression for e xd,s:
e xd,s = −
ελ
(r + δ +2 λ)
+( r + δ)rUb −
δλ(r + δ)
r + δ +2 λ
(Ug − Ub) − rcf (3.26)3.3. The model 99
Equation [3.26] determines the productivity limit for job destruction. Under this
productivity limit, jobs are destroyed once the region falls into slump: these jobs are
dying jobs. Hence equation [3.26] can be interpreted as the job destruction condition.
Note that the share of dying jobs (F(e x)−F(xg)) depends on the economic heterogene-
ity (+) and the migration costs (-). The intuition is that a high economic heterogeneity
has a larger positive eﬀect on the value of a dying job than on the value of a surviving
job (as the latter alternates between good and bad states). Also the migration cost in-
creases the hiring productivity ￿oor and decreases the ￿ring productivity threshold. This
is because a migration cost hits more dying jobs than surviving jobs (for which the wages
alternate regional insider gains and losses, while there are only regional insider gains in
dying jobs). Furthermore, it has been shown that the value of ￿lling a vacancy with a dy-
ing job is more sensitive to changes in the employment protection than the value of ￿lling
a vacancy with a surviving job. It will appear that this eﬀect determines the preferences
with respect to employment protection.
3.3.5 Vacancy posting
Let us now come back on the vacancy posting decision. Since there is free entry on the





















Equation [3.27] establishes a negative relationship between the outside option Us and
the market tightness θs. The outside option pushes the wages up and the values of ￿lling100 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
a vacancy down, and so reduce the pro￿tability of posting a vacancy. This equilibrium
condition is the ￿rst step in job creation. Hence, the outside option reduces job creation
through two channels: ￿rst, by reducing the pro￿tability of vacancy posting and, second,
by increasing the productivity required at entry.





Proof. Given that for all x ∈ [0,1] : Js
g(x)=Js
b(x + ε), and that
∂Js
g(y)









b i nt h ec a s ew h e r e
no dying jobs exist. If dying jobs exist, we have:
For all x<e x,i th o l d st h a tJb(x) < −cf and for all xg <x<e x it holds by de-
￿nition that: Jd
g(x) ≥ 0, and therefore that
R e x
xg Jd













Proposition 3.2 Given Ub and Ug, an increase in the employment protection has a
negative eﬀe c to nv a c a n c yp o s t i n g .
Proof. Using Leibniz rule:










r+δ+λ (F(e x) − F(xd
g)) −
rβ+δ
r+δ (1 − F(e x))
⁄
< 0;






∂cf =[ −(1 − F(xb)β] < 0.
Interesting for the purpose of this study, the negative eﬀect on vacancy posting is
larger the larger the share of dying jobs.
3.3.6 Migration decision
Let us now turn to the migration decision. All workers can migrate but in equilibrium
only unemployed workers ￿nd it pro￿table to do so. The reason is that an unemployment
spell is imposed to migrating workers. Given that the outside option (being unemployed)3.3. The model 101
is taken into account while bargaining over wages, employed workers will never ￿nd it
pro￿table to migrate.
Before migration takes place, the labor market in a region s is composed of vs vacancies
and us,s resident unemployed. [U∗
g]z and [U∗
b]z are de￿ned as the equilibrium values of
being unemployed if no migration would take place (the superscript z stands for ￿zero











Let us now consider the migration decision. An unemployed worker in a region s,w i t h
s = b,g, migrates to the neighboring region when the value of being unemployed there
[U∗
t ]z, with t 6= s minus the migration cost cm is larger or equal to the value of being








Condition [3.30] is identical for all unemployed workers, since they are homogenous.




z − cm ≥ [U
∗
t ]







else us,t =0 , (3.31)
where [U∗
t ]m is the equilibrium value of being unemployed in a region t (after migra-
tion).
Proposition 3.3 There are two possible migration equilibria (depending on the con￿g-
uration of parameters): a zero-migration (ZM) equilibrium where no one migrates and
a full-migration (FM) equilibrium where all the unemployed workers migrate from one
region to the other.
The reasoning is the following: If it is too costly for one unemployed worker to migrate,
it is too costly for all of them since they are homogenous. Hence, there is a ZM equilibrium.
When, on the other hand, migration is pro￿table for one worker, it will be pro￿table for102 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
all of them to migrate. The reason lies in the vacancy posting decision. Indeed, a tighter
labor market means that it is more attractive for the unemployed workers to migrate
over there. But each migrant stimulates again vacancy posting in the region where he
is migrating by reducing the market tightness. And, similarly, each migrant leaving his
region discourages vacancy posting in his originating region by making the market less
tight there. Hence, if migration is pro￿table for one unemployed worker, there is full
migration of all unemployed workers from the one region to the other region and vacancies
a r ep o s t e di nt h a tg o o dr e g i o no n l y 8.
Therefore, the equilibrium values of being unemployed are (substituting with the job
creation condition, using Nash bargaining ￿rst order condition):






























































































Proposition 3.4 In equilibrium, migration occurs only from the bad to the good region.
Proof. Straightforward.
8This property is the consequence of the constant-returns-to-scale of the matching function. Further-
more, the expected marginal product of an extra match does not decrease with the employment of the
corresponding region. One could have a less extreme implication by introducing a ￿x e df a c t o ro fp r o d u c -
tion (e.g. land) that introduces a decreasing marginal return to the value of posting an extra vacancy.











Figure 3.2: Equilibrium on the labor market
3.3.7 Equilibrium on the labor market








b} can now be determined. They solve the
system of equations formed by the job creation condition (equation [3.27]), the search
condition (equations [3.32], [3.33] and [3.34]) and the thresholds conditions ([3.19],[3.22]
and [3.23]).
The eﬀect of employment protection can be pictured in a graph representing the
job creation and search conditions (Figure 3.2). Employment protection has a negative
eﬀect on vacancy posting, i.e. it pushes the job creation condition downwards but it
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the search condition. Furthermore, the migration cost and
the economic homogeneity decrease the share of dying jobs, which are the most aﬀected
by employment protection. Therefore, the lower the migration costs and the larger the
economic heterogeneity, the larger the downward shift of the job creation curve. And
therefore, the most likely the value of being unemployed decreases with employment
protection.
Given the Markov process inherent to the economy, the values of unemployment and
employment ￿uctuate. However they have some important properties. First, their evolu-104 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
tion is stationary and, second, the stationary values are independent of the initial condi-
tion. The next paragraphs provide the details.
In the full migration equilibrium, all unemployed workers are searching for a job in the
good region. The expected evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate is therefore:





s(t)+( λ + δ − δλ)l
d(t), (3.35)
where œ u(t) is the evolution of unemployment rate at time t, ls(t)=ls(t,g)+ls(t,b) is
the total employment in surviving jobs (sum of the surviving employment in the region
that is in a good state at time t and in the region that is in a bad state at time t)a n d
ld(t) is the dying employment at time t. T h ee v o l u t i o no ft h ea g g r e g a t ed y i n ge m p l o y m e n t







g)) − (λ + δ − δλ)l
d(t), (3.36)
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In the zero migration equilibrium unemployed workers remain in their region, even if
it is in a bad state. This means that ￿rms create vacancies also in this region. Let us
denote u(t,w) as the regional unemployment rate of a region that is in the state of the
world w at time t (y(t)=y(t,b)+y(t,g)) The evolution of the regional unemployment
rate has therefore the following expectation:
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where ls(t,g) is the employment rate in surviving jobs in a region that is in the good
state at time t.












where ls(t,g) is the employment rate in surviving jobs in a region that is in the bad
state at time t.
The evolution of the dying employment rate has the same expectation as in the full
migration equilibrium, except that the unemployment pool is reduced to the number of
unemployed present in the region that is in a good state, so that the unemployment rate
in the expression must be replaced by u(t,g).
Let us denote by lR,s(t,w) the regional employment rate in surviving jobs in a region
that is in state w at time t. The evolution of the surviving regional employment rate has
the following expectation:
Et[œ l
R,s(t,g)] = (1 − λ)u(t,g)m(θ
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g(t))(1 − F(e x
∗)) − δl
R,s(t,b), (3.44)
An important property of these variables is that they are stationary. This means that
there exists a unique set {u(t),ls(t),l d(t)} such that Et[œ u(t)] = Et[œ ls
g(t)] = Et[œ ld
g(t)] = 0
such that:
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b ,ug,ub are respec-
tively the stationary values of the employment in a region that is in a good state, the
employment in a region that is in a bad state, the unemployment in a region that is in a
good state and the unemployment of a region that is in a bad state.
3.3.8 Voting for employment protection
The tools
The values of working and the values of being unemployed determine the preferences of
the workers. It is interesting to compare the roles of migration and employment protection
on these preferences.
Let us ￿rst look at the equilibrium values of being unemployed.
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In both equilibria, unemployed workers face a trade-oﬀ between a high job ￿nding rate
(with presumably low employment protection) and future insider gains. It is expected that
the larger the economic heterogeneity and the smaller the migration costs, the more likely
unemployed prefer high job ￿nding rates to insider gains.
Let us now turn to the values of being employed. First, consider the case of employed










(r + δ)(r + δ +2 λ)
, (3.56)
Employment protection gives them some insider power but also reduces the value of
their outside option.
In bad regions, surviving jobs lead to the following values of being employed:
Wb(x)=






(r + δ)(r + δ +2 λ)
,
Employment protection plays the same role as in the surviving jobs in a good region.






r + δ + λ
, (3.57)
Here, the outside option of the unemployed workers matters for the bargaining at the
beginning of the employment relationship but more than the other workers, for the future,
since these workers know their jobs will be destroyed as soon as the region falls into a
slump.
Let us now turn to the numerical example.108 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
3.4 A numerical example
This section solves the model explicitly for several con￿gurations of parameters. The
easiest way to illustrate the mechanisms of the model is to choose two con￿gurations of
parameters where the only diﬀerence between them lies for example in diﬀerent migration
costs (basic example) or in diﬀerent economic heterogeneity (sensitivity analysis) gener-
ating a full migration equilibrium (featuring the American case) and a zero migration
equilibrium (featuring the European case). Then one can show that these two migra-
tion equilibria generate diﬀerent political equilibria, or at least, diﬀerent preferences with
respect to employment protection legislation.
3.4.1 Basic example
Our basic numerical example is based on the following assumptions. First, f(x) is assumed
to be a uniform distribution de￿n e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,1]. The model is solved under
two diﬀerent systems: without employment protection (cf =0 )and with employment
protection (cf =0 .2),t h i sf o rt w od i ﬀerent values of the migration cost (one where
cm =0such that all unemployed workers ￿nd it pro￿table to migrate and the other one
where cm =[ U∗
g]z − [U∗
b]z such that workers do not ￿nd it pro￿table to migrate) The
matching function is assumed to take the following form: m(θ)=aθ
α. The parameters
are summarized in Table 3.1.
Remember that 1 is the maximum match-speci￿c productivity. To understand what
these parameters mean, it is useful to translate the model into a discrete time equivalent
with a period being equal to half a year. The expected duration of a boom would then
be around 5 years. The diﬀerential between the region is equal to the maximum speci￿c
productivity. The two migration costs used are cm =0and cm =1 .64 such that migration






Worker￿s relative bargaining power β
Probability of a transition λ
Probability of job-speci￿cs h o c k
Regional productivity increment εg
Value of leisure / unemployment bene￿t b











































Table 3.2: Characteristics of the economy110 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
Table 3.29 describes the characteristics of the economy under each system and then
looks at the preferences of the workers. In this example, the share of dying jobs is larger
in the FM equilibrium. This means that there is much more eﬃcient labor reallocation in
the FM equilibrium than in ZM equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium ￿ows out of and into
unemployment are larger in the country that has the lowest migration cost. Employment
protection reduces job creation (through its negative eﬀect on vacancy posting and its
positive eﬀect on the productivity required at entry) and job destruction (through its
negative eﬀect on the ￿ring productivity ￿oor e x). It therefore reduces the equilibrium
￿ows out of and into unemployment. These diﬀerences do not take other institutional
diﬀerences into account, such as the unemployment bene￿t system, the unions or the
labor taxes. These institutions are usually considered as the one responsible for the high
unemployment rates in Europe. What Table 3.2 means is that a more turbulent economy
has a larger equilibrium unemployment rate than a relatively stable economy.
The economy is simulated over time. The evolutions of dying and surviving employ-
ment, and unemployment are shown in Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. It is clear that the
￿uctuations are much larger in the FM equilibrium. The respective shares of dying,
surviving bad and good employment rates are stable in the ZM equilibrium while they
experience large ￿uctuations in the FM equilibrium. Let us now turn to the political
preferences of the individuals.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 plot the value functions for the workers in both systems, against
the match-speci￿c productivity x. The dashed line corresponds in all graphs to the asset
value being in a given state of the labor market (unemployed or employed in a dying or
surviving job, depending on the value of s), in the absence of employment protection (i.e.
cf =0 ), as a function of his position on the labor market (his position changes with x
from unemployed to employed in a dying job and, ￿nally, employed in a surviving job).
T h ec o n t i n u o u sl i n eo nt h eo t h e rh a n dp l o t st h ea s s e tv a l u eo fb e i n gi nag i v e ns t a t eo f





















































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Unemployment rates
the labor market in the presence of employment protection (cf =0 .2). They include all
categories of workers, except the unemployed who did not match with any ￿rm. The
asset value for these unemployed corresponds however exactly to the asset value of the
unemployed who did get a match but not productive enough to lead to a contract.
Figures 3.6 and 3.8 present to the value functions in the good region in the FM and
ZM equilibria respectively and Figures 3.7 and 3.9 present the value functions in the
bad region for both equilibria again. It is clear that unemployed are better oﬀ without
employment protection, in both equilibria. Unemployed workers care more about ￿nding
a job in the present than enjoying insider gains in the future. Employed workers who
would be in a dying job without employment protection and unemployed if there was
employment protection also prefer no employment protection in either equilibrium. All
other employed workers on the other hand diﬀer in their preferences in the two situations.
In the FM equilibrium, they all would vote against employment protection, while in
the ZM equilibrium, the most productive workers in dying jobs and all the workers in
surviving jobs would vote in favor of it. Since the median voter is most likely employed
in a surviving job, one expects that these two economies, diﬀering only through their3.4. A numerical example 113







Figure 3.6: Values in good region - ZM equilibrium










Figure 3.7: Values in bad region - ZM equilibrium
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Figure 3.9: Values in bad region - FM equilibrium
migration cost will support diﬀerent political equilibria.
This example shows then that the same con￿guration of parameters can lead to very
diﬀerent preferences with respect to the employment protection system depending on the
migration possibilities. In this example, if the migration cost is higher than 1.64 workers
do not ￿nd it worthwhile to migrate to the neighboring region in order to ￿nd a job.
Hence, if the migration cost is somewhat larger than the productivity diﬀerential it is not
pro￿table to move and the majority of workers prefers employment to be protected by a
￿ring cost.
Furthermore, the two sides of the relationship between migration and employment
protection are established: The diﬀerence between the two equilibria indicate that a
lower migration cost makes employment protection less attractive. The diﬀerence between
the two last columns of Table 3.2 shows that a stronger employment protection reduces
the number of workers migrating (since the proportion of dying jobs is the lowest with
employment protection and all ￿red workers migrate).3.4. A numerical example 115
3.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Modifying parameters λ and ε
In addition to the migration costs, it is argued that the degree of economic heterogeneity
plays an important role in determining the preferences of the workers. In the model,
this would be interpreted as a high ε. As mentioned before, a high degree of economic
heterogeneity increases the share of dying jobs, which are the most hit by employment
protection legislation. The simulations show that a higher degree of economic heterogene-
ity increases the share of dying jobs and therefore, decreases the support for employment
protection in the ZM equilibrium.
Also interesting for the purpose of this Chapter, the parameter λ determines the po-
litical preferences. In some European countries (as Italy, Spain or Germany), persistent
productivity diﬀerentials are observed (together with wage and unemployment diﬀeren-
tials). In this model this would imply that λ becomes close to 0, i.e. that regions remain
permanently in the same state of the world. This implies that the distinction between
dying and surviving employment does not mean nothing anymore. All employed workers
are in surviving jobs. In the ZM equilibrium, the steady-state share of surviving jobs
of reaches 97.8%, leaving 2.2% workers unemployed. In the FM equilibrium, 99.9% of
workers are employed and 0.1% workers unemployed. The political preferences remain in
essence the same as in the previous paragraph. This means that countries with large and
persistent diﬀerentials, where it is not pro￿t a b l et om i g r a t e ,a r el i k e l yt op r o v i d eas t r o n g
support to employment protection.
Modifying the political choice
The example assumed a simple choice between no employment protection and employ-
ment protection. The political choice in the real world is certainly more complex than
that. What is important is that this simple example leads to the following conclusion:
Ceteris Paribus (i.e. given a con￿guration of parameters), countries with a relatively116 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
low migration cost demand a lower level of employment protection than countries with a
high migration cost. The con￿guration of parameters determine the level of employment
protection that is preferred. Hence, it was shown that when the regional productivity
diﬀerentials were low some workers would prefer to have some employment protection.
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Negatively correlated shocks and political entity
Migration and employment protection are inter-related to the extent that one considers
the same entities for one and the other, i.e. what determines the preferences of workers
with respect to employment protection is the extent to which migration is pro￿table within
the country (if one supposes that the country is the level at which employment protection
is set). What the model can tell concerning the European Union is that if employment
protection would be ￿xed at the European level rather than at the country level there
would probably be no desire for lower protection. Indeed, Europe is a larger economic
space with a larger economic heterogeneity which would tend to reduce the support for
EPL. However the cultural and language diﬀerences between European countries are even
more important than at the country level, which implies that the migration costs would
probably be much higher. This would tend to increase the support for EPL.
3.5.2 Interaction with other institutions
Saint-Paul (1997) argues that the reason why Europeans desire a higher level of employ-
ment protection lies in the existence of other institutions, such as powerful unions. One
may displace the question one step back and ask why do the Europeans have stronger
unions? Indeed, the forces leading to the existence of powerful unions are likely to be
similar to the forces leading to the existence of employment protection. The argument
used in this Chapter could be used to justify diﬀerences in institutions in￿uencing job3.6. Conclusion 117
creation and insider gains in the same way as employment protection. Hence, generous
unemployment insurances (leading to high taxes on labor through a social security bud-
get constraint) and strong unions can also be thought as institutions deterring vacancy
posting while providing workers with insider gains. There are number of studies pointing
out the diﬀerences between the US and Europe from these perspectives (see Hassler et al.
(2001) for a recent contribution on the diﬀerences in unemployment insurance systems
and Wallerstein (1989) for a contribution on the diﬀerences in unions structure). Waller-
stein observes that there is a negative relationship between the size of the country and the
degree of unionization. His argument is that the proportion of the labor force unionized
determines the gains from unionization while the size of the labor force determines the
costs of unionization (organizational costs). Hence, smaller countries are characterized by
stronger unions.
3.5.3 Firing costs and severance payments
This Chapter considers the ￿ring cost as a pure waste for the ￿rm and the society. How-
ever, employment protection also includes rules guiding the severance payments from the
￿rm to the worker (see OECD (1999)). Adding this type of ￿ring cost would not change
nothing to the results. The reason is that a severance payment reduces the bargained
wages and constitute therefore a kind of forced saving. In this framework, the worker
would be completely indiﬀerent between a system with or without severance payment.
3.6 Conclusion
The objective of this Chapter was to explain the observed diﬀerences in employment
protection between the United States and European countries. The explanation provided
here is that migration does not work as well as an income protection device in Europe
than in the United States. There are two reasons for that: First, the United States form a118 3. Political Economy of Employment Protection Legislation
large country, with a high degree of economic diversity. Most European countries are small
and de￿nitely more homogenous than the United States. Second, even in the presence
of economic incentives to migration within their country, Europeans do not respond with
migration. This suggests that there are important migration costs, that can be linked to
institutional structures (such as housing regulations or other welfare support systems) or
social and cultural barriers.
The argument is that economic heterogeneity and migration costs play a crucial role in
determining the preferences of workers with respect to employment protection. Employ-
ment protection typically reduces the job ￿nding and ￿ring rates and therefore increases
the eﬀective migration costs. Hence, when the structure of the country is such that mi-
gration would be attractive, workers are likely to support a system without employment
protection. If it is not, on the other hand, workers prefer enjoying insider gains and safe
jobs.
The model provides an interesting prediction with respect to the European Union.
According to the empirical evidence, Euro-Land is more heterogeneous than the United
States. This means that if employment protection would be decided at the European
level, it could be that it is not as strongly supported by the workers as before. However,
as long as some large social and cultural diﬀerences would subsist, it would be maintained
strong. Similarly, the implementation of a reform of the employment protection system
(if one would be convinced that is welfare-improving) would be much easier to implement
in a society made more mobile than in a society where workers are very much attached
to their local roots.Chapter 4
Employment Protection, Migration
and Tertiary Education
This Chapter is based on the paper "Migration, Skill acquisition and Employment Pro-
tection" (Belot (2002))1.
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 reported facts showing that countries with a relatively strict employment pro-
tection are also relatively less mobile. This Chapter completes the argument of Chapter 3
by introducing heterogenous agents. Indeed, the facts show that migration rates vary a lot
across individuals and, in particular, between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. This
indicates that the migration opportunities or the pro￿tability of migration vary across
skill types. Furthermore, the facts also show that high-skilled and low-skilled workers are
not shared equally across contract types (with low employment protection and with high
employment protection). This suggests that diﬀerent skills call maybe for diﬀerent types
of contract. Chapter 3 focused on the diﬀerences between the US and Europe. Also from
the point of view of skill acquisition, they diﬀer a lot. The United States have an educa-
1While remaining responsible for errors, the author would like to thank Jan van Ours for his valuable
comments.
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tion system that relies much more on private funds and have a relatively better educated
education. This Chapter proposes an explanation of why this could be the case.
This Chapter argues that institutions and regulations should be designed as a set of
interacting elements. It shows that the eﬀects of employment protection legislation on
labor market performance or welfare depend on essential characteristics of the countries
and individuals it is applied to. The conclusion is that employment protection legislation
can be justi￿ed in some countries and for some individuals. Of course, the characteristics
of these countries and these individuals (for example, skills) are also part of public policy.
Therefore, this Chapter provides also an illustration of how public policies should be
designed together, and shaped to each other.
Employment protection legislation (EPL) has been developed so as to protect workers
against negative shocks. The consequence is that some low productive activities are
(ineﬃciently) maintained and the duration of jobs is much longer in countries with EPL
than without EPL. In Chapter 3, it is argued that the political support of EPL in Europe
comes from the unattractiveness of migration as an income protection device, compared to
the United States. In short, Europeans have nowhere to go and therefore the median voter,
who is most likely an employed worker, prefers his job to be protected even if it means that
his average wage is lower than otherwise (because of being maintained in low productive
activities) and that the unemployment spells are longer. This argument is elaborated
here, by assuming that all individuals are not equal with respect to their migration needs.
Indeed, high-skilled workers often have specialized skills (Wildasin (2000)) which implies
that they probably need to migrate more often. Low-skilled workers can much more
easily ￿nd an equivalent low-skilled job without having to move out of their region. This
implies that employment protection legislation should maybe shaped to the characteristics
of the individuals in countries where migration is not so pro￿table. The next step is then
to investigate how employment protection and migration opportunities determine the
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having to bear a migration cost relatively often, it may not be very attractive to invest
in this type of education in countries where this migration cost is high. Employment
protection legislation, subsidies to migration and direct subsidies to investments in tertiary
education are the most obvious public policies that could be used to stimulate this type of
investments (supposing that it has some positive social returns). And indeed, European
countries are the ones with the strictest EPL and the largest share of public funding of
tertiary education.
Hence, this Chapter investigates further some linkages between three elements: Em-
ployment protection, migration and skill acquisition (see also Table 1.14 for an overview
of the links covered in this manuscript). The literature and this dissertation in particular
has already investigated some linkages between these elements. First, employment pro-
tection has a negative eﬀect on the migration rates (Chapter 3 but also Schettkat (1997)
for an empirical assessment). Second, migration opportunities have a negative eﬀect on
the preferences and needs for employment protection (Chapter 3). Third, high-skilled
and low-skilled workers call for diﬀerent types of employment protection (Chapter 5 for a
link between skills and optimal employment protection, this Chapter for a link between
skills and the political support for EPL). Fourth, skills are attached to diﬀerent types
of migration behaviors. High-skilled workers migrate much more than low-skilled ones
(this Chapter, the literature on the brain drain and a more recent literature for migration
rates within or between developed countries). Fifth, employment protection and migra-
tion opportunities determine the acquisition of skills (this Chapter and the literature on
the brain "gain").
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents facts on these three elements
and then relate the literature on the relationships that have already been investigated.
Section 4.3.1 presents the model designed so as to study the eﬀects of migration costs
on the investments in education, and the eﬀects of three possible policies (employment
protection legislation, public ￿nancing of tertiary education and subsidies to migration).122 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
Section 4.5 discusses the essential assumptions of the model. Finally, Section 4.6 con-
cludes.
4.2 Employment protection, education and migra-
tion : Theory and empirical studies
Employment protection legislation is a set of regulations that makes it harder for a ￿rm
to get rid of its workers. Section 1.2.2 (Table 1.11) describes the evolution over time and
the diﬀerences in EPL across OECD countries. The relevant aspect for this study is that
the United States have a much more ￿exible regulation than most European countries.
Chapter 3 argues that geographic labor mobility determines the preferences for EPL.
Countries with high migration costs and low economic heterogeneity would make migra-
tion less attractive as an income protection device and would therefore support a stricter
employment protection legislation. The causality goes also in the other direction, as em-
ployment protection reduces migration incentives (Schettkat (1997), Chapter 3). Hence,
we usually observe that countries with the strictest employment protection legislation are
also the ones with the lowest inter-regional migration rates (Thomas (1994), Decressin
and Fatas (1995)). Interesting for the purpose of the Chapter, workers seem to be un-
equally spread across contract types. Bentolila and Dolado (1994) argue that temporary
employment prevails among individuals with a low attachment to the labor force. De Grip
et al. (1997) note that sixty-three percent of all temporary employed are in low-skilled
occupations. Chapter 5 of this dissertation proposes an explanation for this. By intro-
ducing investments in speci￿c human capital, it shows that employment protection can
be welfare improving. Furthermore, it shows that high-skilled workers are more likely to
invest in this speci￿c human capital than low-skilled ones. This means that the optimal
employment protection (from a welfare point of view) depends on the skills of the workers.























































































a)Share of the population 25-64
Table 4.1: Public expenditures in tertiary education (in percent)
workers who have acquired a tertiary education before entering the labor market and in
particular, that this education has brought them a comparative advantage in the perfor-
mance of a given task. This de￿nition goes in the same direction as Wildasin (2000).
Again, we ￿nd that the United States have on average a better educated labor force (see
Table 4.1). When one looks at the respective public and private contributions to the edu-
cational system, one ￿nds that the United States rely much more on private investments
than on public subsidies (see Table 4.1). In particular, the private contribution in tertiary
education is almost 50%, against 10% for France, 20% for Spain or 0% for Sweden.
Human capital theory (Mincer (1974), Becker (1964)) says that the decision of in-
vesting in human capital depends on the gains and costs associated with human capital
investments. The gains are the improvements in terms of labor market performance and
the costs are direct (tuition, fees) and indirect (foregone earnings) (see also McKenna
(1996) for a uni￿ed model on education and unemployment). The improvements in terms124 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
of labor market performance are usually thought as twofold: Higher earnings (due to the
higher productivity) and higher employability (in particular, high skilled workers can also
apply to low-skilled jobs while low skilled workers cannot perform high skilled tasks, e.g.
McKenna (1995)). Coming back to the theme of this Chapter, there is some literature
showing how employment protection and migration determine the investments in educa-
tion. This Chapter and Chapter 5 show indeed that employment protection stimulates
investments in human capital prior to the entry into the labor market (Chapter 4) and
on-the-job (Chapter 5). Also there is a literature in development economics showing that
migration opportunities stimulate the investments in education. Stark and Wang (2001)
for example rely on the assumption that the returns to private investments in human
capital depend on the average level of human capital of the country in which the worker
is working. Hence, in poor countries, the level of human capital is low and so are the re-
turns to human capital investments. The opening of these countries to migration towards
countries with higher levels of human capital stimulate investments in education. As long
as migration policies limit the extent to which workers can migrate, opening the country
to migration can be welfare-enhancing (since all workers including the ones staying will
invest more in human capital). This Chapter suggests that this causality also exist in the
developed world but based on another argument: High-skilled workers need to migrate
more often and therefore, migration opportunities stimulate investments in education.
Let us now ￿nally turn to the migration decision. It is easier to relate facts on ge-
ographical labor mobility than on migration between diﬀerent job types. However this
Chapter applies to both types of migration. Spatial migration should be understood here
as a change in residence between two regions. Migration rates vary enormously between
countries. As mentioned above, inter-regional migration rates are much larger in the
United States than in European countries. The reason could be that there are higher mi-
gration costs in Europe than in the United States. It could also be that these migration
costs are linked to the institutional framework (see Chapter 3, Hassler et al.(2001)).4.2. Employment protection, education and migration : Theory and
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The literature and this dissertation in particular have explored the relationships be-
tween employment protection, skills on the one hand and migration on the other hand.
Hence, when relating skills to migration rates in the developed world, what is usually
observed is that high-skilled workers are relatively more mobile than low-skilled workers2
(e.g. Wildasin (2000) for the United States, Mauro and Spilimbergo (1998) for Spain and
Gianetti (2001) all mention the relatively low migration rates of low-skilled workers and
the relative high response of high-skilled workers to regional shocks). Why do high-skilled
workers ￿nd it more pro￿table to migrate than low-skilled workers? It could be that they
diﬀer in migration costs. Indeed, high-skilled workers are also often the ones who speak
another language or have better qualities of adaptation. It could also be that the costs in
absolute terms do not diﬀer between the two types of workers but only in relative terms.
High-skilled workers are relatively richer and so are less constrained by this migration
cost. It could also be that low-skilled workers are limited in their migration incentives
by borrowing constraints. The second explanation could be that there are important dif-
ferences in the migration gains. Gianetti (2001) shows that when one assumes that skills
are complementary, i.e. that the return to high skills is higher when the average level
of human capital is high, high-skilled workers migrate towards regions where the level of
human capital is already high. Given their wages, high skilled workers are also the only
ones who ￿nd it pro￿table to do so. A related literature shows that the labor mobility
of high-skilled workers may present disincentives for local authorities to ￿nance higher
education as they are not guaranteed to bene￿t from their investment (see Justman and
Thisse (1997)).
Furthermore, as already mentioned earlier, employment protection has been empiri-
cally found as reducing the probability of migrating. And with respect to labor mobility
in general, employment protection would indeed reduce the labor market ￿ows between
2We observe to some extent a similar trend in the migration rates from developing to developed
countries (the brain drain) but the proportion of low-skilled workers migrating to developed countries is
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various states of the labor market, slowing the reallocation process down.
4.3 The model
4.3.1 Basic framework
The objective of the model is to emphasize the eﬀects of migration costs on the educa-
tion decision, when acquiring education means acquiring a comparative advantage in the
performance of a given task, for which the demand ￿uctuates across time and space. A
particularity of this model is that one job is de￿ned by a given task and that once this
task is hit by a negative demand shock, the ￿rm and the worker can ￿nd it eﬃcient to
separate.
We assume that there is only one high-skilled task and an in￿nity of low-skilled tasks.
T h ed e m a n df o rt h ed i ﬀerent tasks can either be in a good or in a bad state. There are
two regions that are de￿ned by their perfect negative correlation with respect to the state
of the demand for the high-skilled task3.
Workers can migrate across these regions. For each move, they incur a migration
cost cm. These costs can be thought of as the costs of buying and selling a house, the
psychological cost of leaving the family and familiar surroundings, etc. The cost is ￿xed
and exogenous. In particular, the migration cost is the same for every level of education4.
3This assumption guarantees that at any point in time, a high-skilled worker living in a region for
which the demand for the high-skilled task is in a bad state has the opportunity to emigrate from that
region and apply in the other region to a high-skilled job for which the demand is in a good state. The
diﬀerence with low-skilled workers the model should capture is that the latter do not have to incur this
migration cost in order to apply to vacancies for good low-skilled jobs. The easiest way to do this is to
assume that there is an in￿nity of low-skilled tasks so that as soon as one low-skilled task is in a bad
state, the low-skilled workers can apply to another low-skilled task (in a good state) without having to
incur the migration cost. Therefore, it is not necessary to assume any kind of relationship between the
states of the world of the low-skilled task in one region and the other.
4This seems a strong assumption. In particular, it is sometimes argued that low-skilled workers have
lower migration costs than high-skilled workers. In the model, low-skilled workers do not have incentives
to migrate, no matter how high the migration costs are, as by assumption they can ￿nd an equivalent
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Low-skilled tasks can be performed by anyone while the high-skilled task can only
be performed by high-skilled workers. The high-skilled task requires special skills or
knowledge that can only be acquired through tertiary education. The essential diﬀerence
between low-skilled and high-skilled workers is that the latter have acquired specialized
knowledge enabling them to perform the high-skilled task5.A t e a c h p o i n t i n t i m e , n
new workers enter the labor force and n workers die. The labor force is therefore con-
stant and normalized to 1. The participation decision or retirement decision are ignored.
Among these new workers a share S decides to invest in tertiary education. The model
presents a simpli￿ed version of traditional models of human capital investments: First,
education is instantaneous, second, investments in schooling only are considered (we omit
post-schooling human capital investments such as on-the-job training, etc.6) and, third,
investments in education are an all-or-nothing investment, implying that all individuals
bearing the cost of this investment reach the same level of education and are therefore
homogenous from the point of view of the employer. The assumption that education
takes time often enables to emphasize the role of the skill premium, i.e. the shadow cost
of education is lower when the skill premium is high. The reason for these radical assump-
tions is that the focus here is on the eﬀect of migration opportunities on the education
decision prior to the entrance on the labor market. The objective is not of having pre-
cise predictions with respect to individual earnings. The focus is on another aspect that
distinguishes high-skilled jobs from low-skilled jobs: the migration cost associated with
changing jobs. High-skilled jobs are assumed to be specialized so that moving to another
5This de￿nition of skills goes in the same direction as Albrecht and Vroman (2002) or McKenna
(1996). Others argue that high skilled have an absolute advantage in the performance of all tasks and a
comparative advantage in the performance of complex tasks (Teulings (1995)).
6For a recent contribution proposing a model with investment in education (made by workers) and
investment in training (made by ￿rms) in a framework with matching frictions, see Brunello and Medio
(2001). In their model, they show that, assuming that the United States are characterized by a larger
matching eﬃciency and a larger separation rate, the proportion of ￿rms investing in training is smaller.
The reason is that ￿rms prefer to hire trained workers directly and that the period to recoup a training
investment is relatively short (consequence of a high separation rate).128 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
high-skilled job involves paying a migration cost (in a broad sense).
A simplifying assumption is that workers need to choose the market on which they
will apply7. Hence, high-skilled workers only apply to high-skilled tasks and low-skilled
workers only apply to low-skilled jobs. The two markets interact with each other via the
education decision. Then only, diﬀerences in market performances induce changes in the
behavior of workers. Once they entered the labor market, there is no way back anymore,
and workers evolve on one type of labor market only.
Firms and workers search for each other with a constant intensity. They meet at a
rate determined by a matching function m(u,v),w h e r eu is the number of unemployed
searching for a job and v is the number of vacancies posted by the ￿rms. One implication
of this way of modelling is that the supply stimulates its own demand, as additional
workers searching on a given market increase the pro￿tability of posting a vacancy (since
it is easier to ￿nd a match) and therefore stimulates vacancy posting8.F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h e
￿rm advertises for a particular job, i.e. for a particular task. The decision of the ￿rm
with respect to the type of task is irreversible. Workers cannot be reallocated to diﬀerent
tasks, once they have been hired. Firms on the low-skilled market will only advert for
tasks that are in a good state. All low-skilled workers and all low-skilled vacant jobs form
a pooled market from which matches will arise. On the high-skilled market, things may
look diﬀerent. If high-skilled workers do not ￿nd it pro￿table to migrate in order to chase
the good job opportunities, there might be a market for "bad high-skilled tasks" in their
region of origin. Some ￿rms may ￿nd it pro￿table to compete for these non-emigrating
workers and post vacancies on a market for the high-skilled task despite that it is in a
7Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and McKenna (1996) assume that high-skilled workers also apply to
low-skilled jobs. With such an assumption, the incentives to invest in education therefore also depend on
the performance on th low-skilled market. This is not assumed here because the focus is on the relative
diﬀerences between the low-skilled and high-skilled markets.
8This may seem as a strong limitation, apparently not giving any role to technology determined
demand (such as suggested in the literature on skill-biased technological change). However, the model
does allow for this type of change, for example by playing on the parameter determining the productivity
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bad state. This point will get more attention in a later section. Finally, ￿rms and workers
have perfect information on their type (low-skilled or high-skilled worker, low-skilled task
or high-skilled task).
Once a match occurs the ￿rm and the worker observe the quality of their match given
by x that corresponds to a random draw from a uniform distribution f(x) de￿n e do nt h e
interval [0,1]. The demand for the tasks performed by high-skilled and low-skilled workers
varies across space and time. In this model, the regional demand for a particular task is
either good (g) or bad (b). The state of the world changes with probability λ. Ab o o m i n g
state shifts the price of one unit of output by ε relatively to the stagnating state (εg = ε,
εb =0 ). The diﬀerence between a high-skilled and low-skilled worker is that the former
needs to incur a migration cost to apply to an equivalent job as the one they have been
￿red from, while the latter can stay in his region.
Hence the general structure of the productivity of a match is the following:
yi,k,s = pi,k,sx + εs, (4.1)
where i is the worker type (low-skilled, high-skilled), k is the job type (low-skilled,
high-skilled) and s is the state of the world of the region.




Low-skilled task p p
High-skilled task 0 σp
,
with σ>œ 1. Hence, high-skilled workers are assumed to have a comparative advantage
on low-skilled workers regarding the performance of the high-skilled task. This is the
only diﬀerence between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. This will determine diﬀerent
migration behaviors. Furthermore, it is assumed that σp > p+ ε, i.e. that a high-skilled
job in a bad state is more productive than a low-skilled job. This implies that high-skilled
workers never ￿nd it pro￿table to apply to low-skilled tasks and it is therefore possible to130 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
completely isolate the two markets from each other. In the remaining of the Chapter, the
subscript i is used to refer indiﬀe r e n t l yt ot h ej o bt y p eo rw o r k e rt y p e(i = h (high-skilled),
l (low-skilled)).
4.3.2 Bellman equations
Let us determine the values of searching and matching for each partner.
The value for a ￿rm of forming a match of type j in the state of the world s,d e n o t e d
by Ji,s(x), is a function of the match-speci￿c productivity x is determined as follows:
rJi,s(x)=yi,s(x) − wi,s(yi,s(x)) + λmax[Ji,t(x),V − cf] − (λ + n)Ji,s,
with s 6= t, (4.2)
where w is the wage, V is the value of a vacancy and cf is the ￿ring cost. Once
the match has occurred, the random productivity component x is revealed. Productivity
changes then exogenously, i.e. depending on the regional demand for a given task. This
means that at the beginning of the match, one can identify the matches that will survive
negative aggregate shocks. An important assumption here is that the ￿rm cannot real-
locate the worker to other tasks, i.e. that there is some irreversibility in the decision to
allocate the worker to a given task. Hence, when there is a negative shock (towards the
region) the lowest productive matches will be destroyed. The ￿rm then incurs a ￿xed ￿r-
ing cost cf. This ￿ring cost is not a severance payment, but simply a pure administrative
cost. Finally, note that workers retire with probability n.
It is useful for the remaining of the Chapter to talk about dying and surviving jobs.
There are de￿ned as follows:
A job with random productivity x is dying if and only if:
Ji,b(x) <V− cf, (4.3)
A job with random productivity x is called surviving if and only if:
Ji,b(x) ≥ V − cf, (4.4)4.3. The model 131
We will use the superscript d and s respectively for dying and surviving jobs.
O nt h ew o r k e r ￿ ss i d e ,o n eh a s :
rWi,s(x)=wi,s(yi,s(x)) + λmax[Wi,t(x),Ui,t] − (λ + n)Wi,s,
with s 6= t, (4.5)
where Ui,t is the value of being unemployed i nar e g i o ni nt h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l dt.
Ui,t =m a x [ Ui,t,U i,s − cm], i.e. unemployed workers can choose where to actively search
for a job. The assumption is that they have to incur the migration cost beforehand.





This implies that more vacancies are posted on the most pro￿table market, i.e. with
the highest expected value of matching.
Let us now analyze the searching decision of the worker. The value of searching is, for
a low-skilled worker, de￿ned as follows:
rUl,g = b + m(θl,g)E(Wl,g(x) − Ul,g) − nUl,g, (4.7)
where b is the value of leisure.
The value of searching for a job is, for a high-skilled worker, described as follows:
rUh,b = b + m(θh,b)E(Wh,b(x) − Uh,b)+λ(Uh,g − Uh,b) − nUh,b, (4.8)
rUh,g = b + m(θh,g)E(Wh,g(x) − Uh,g)+λ(Uh,b − Uh,g) − nUh,g, (4.9)
With a probability λ the state of the world changes and the unemployed worker faces
a similar choice as the one he has when he is being ￿red.
4.3.3 Wage bargaining
Wages are bargained through a Nash bargaining process.132 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
In low-skilled jobs, the equilibrium wages are simply:
w
∗
l,s(yl,s(x)) = β(yl,s(x)+( r + n)cf)+( 1− β)(r + n)Ul,s, (4.10)
In high-skilled jobs, the equilibrium wages are:
w
∗
h,s(yh,s(x)) = β(yh,s(x)+( r + n)cf)+( 1− β)((r + n)Uh,s + λ(Uh,s − Uh,t)), (4.11)
There are two diﬀerences between the wage on the low-skilled market and on the
high-skilled market. For a given worker type, state of the world and random productivity
x, ￿rst, the productivity leads to higher wages on the high-skilled market and, second,
the workers on the high-skilled market bene￿t from a regional insider power or weakness
depending on the sign of (Uh,s−Uh,t). Finally, note that, at equal productivity levels, high-
skilled workers earn relatively more in low-skilled jobs than low-skilled workers. Indeed,
as the next paragraph will show, high-skilled workers bene￿t from a better outside option.
4.3.4 Search and migration decision
Migrating to the neighboring region implies bearing a migration cost cm. Low-skilled
workers never have an incentive to migrate since they can always apply to good low-
skilled jobs. High-skilled workers on the other hand migrate to the neighboring region if
and only if:
Uh,g − cm ≥ Uh,b, (4.12)
One should realize here that if one high-skilled worker ￿nd it pro￿table to migrate, all
high-skilled workers of the same type also do. The reason is that the migration cost does
not depend on the population migrating, neither the cost of posting a vacancy. Hence,
job creation on the vacancy market implies that the respective values of searching for a
j o bi nar e g i o nw h e r et h et a s ki si nag o o ds t a t ea n di nab a ds t a t ed on o td e p e n do nt h e
migration ￿ow. Let us denote by c∗
m the migration cost at which the high-skilled workers





z, (4.13)4.3. The model 133
where [Uh,s]z denotes the value of searching for a job in a region where the demand
for the high-skilled task is in state s and such that no migration has taken place yet.
Finally, new workers are supposed to enter the market on the good side.

















crθh,b + cf(1 − F(xh,b))m(θh,b)
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crθh,g + cf(1 − F(xh,g))m(θh,g)
¢
+ λ(Uh,b − Uh,g)
r + n
, (4.16)
On the high-skilled market, in the full migration equilibrium (where all unemployed
high-skilled workers ￿nd it pro￿table to migrate to the region where the demand for the





















4.3.5 Hiring and ￿ring thresholds
Similarly the values at which the ￿rm and the worker start to ￿nd it worthwhile to produce
together can be determined. Remember that if high-skilled workers ￿nd it pro￿table to
migrate (cm <c ∗
m) then there are no vacancies posted for tasks for which the demand is
in a bad state. This is a consequence of the migration and job creation conditions. The
worker is hired if the surplus of the ￿rm is positive. Once an employment relationship is
established, separation is costly. The ￿rm indeed needs to incur a ￿xed ￿ring cost cf at
separation (exogenous or endogenous).134 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
Hiring productivity ￿oor
The hiring productivity ￿oor is the minimum productivity level at which the ￿rm ￿nds
it pro￿t a b l et oh i r et h ew o r k e r .H e n c e ,f o rcm <c ∗
m : Then, the productivity threshold is
de￿ned as follows:






i,s is such that Jd
i,s(xd
i,s)=0 ,and xs
i,s is such that Js
i,s(xs
i,s)=0 ,
which leads to the following productivity ￿oors:
On the low-skilled market:
px
d
l,g = −ε +( r + n)Ul,g +






r + λ + n
r +2 λ + n




On the high-skilled market:
σpx
d
h,g = −ε +( r + n)Uh,g + λ(Uh,g − Uh,b)+






r + λ + n
r +2 λ + n




And if high-skilled workers do not ￿nd it pro￿table to migrate, vacancies are posted
for bad high-skilled tasks as well and the corresponding hiring productivity ￿oor is:
σpxh,b = −
λ
r +2 λ + n




The ￿ring cost cf pushes in all cases the hiring thresholds up.
Firing thresholds
Let us now determine the ￿ring threshold, i.e. the point where the ￿rm and the worker
are indiﬀerent between separating and continuing together.
e xi =m a x [ xi,g,e x
d
i] (4.25)4.3. The model 135
where e xd
i is such that Ji,b(e xi)=−cf.
On the low-skilled market:
pe x
d
l =( r + n)Ul,b −
λ
r +2 λ + n
ε − (r + n)cf, (4.26)





r +2 λ + n
ε +( r + n)Uh,b − (r + n)cf (4.27)
The ￿ring cost pushes all ￿ring thresholds down, reducing thereby job destruction.
Equations determining the job creation condition ([4.6]), the values of searching ([4.14],
[4.15], [4.16], [4.17] and [4.18]) and the hiring and ￿ring thresholds ([4.19] and [4.25]) form







Now let us turn to the education decision. Education here is an all-or-nothing investment.
Individuals having acquired education are then identical when they enter the labor market.
At each period, n new workers take the decision, right before entering the labor force, to
invest in education or not. Education does not take time and is instantaneously acquired
at a cost that is individual speci￿c. Individuals are distributed uniformly on a scale of
costs of education de￿n e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,1], with the least able people being the ones
with the highest costs of acquiring education.
New high-skilled workers enter the labor market on the good side, i.e. start searching
for a job in the region where the high-skilled task is in a good state. Hence, there is a
threshold cost level e c under which workers ￿nd it pro￿table to invest in education:
U
∗










Given that workers are uniformly distributed on the education cost scale de￿ned on
[0,1], e c corresponds to the share of workers investing in education.136 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
Proposition 4.1 For cm <c ∗
m : Investments in education decrease with the migration
cost (Proof in the Appendix)
To show this, it is useful to picture the equilibrium on each labor market separately
by two curves: the job creation curve and the search curve (see Figure 4.1), which are
de￿ned respectively by the following equilibrium conditions:
























l,g and e xl (as determined by equations [4.19] and [4.25]).

























h,g and e xh (as determined by equations [4.19] and [4.25]).
Following an increase in the migration cost, nothing changes on the low-skilled market.
On the high-skilled market, both curves shift downwards. On the job creation side, an
increase in the migration cost has a negative eﬀect on the value of ￿lling a vacancy with
a dying job. Indeed, for these jobs, it holds that the migration cost provides them with
a regional insider power that never turns into a regional insider weakness as these jobs
are by de￿nition destroyed in bad times. On the search side, an increase in the migration
cost has a negative eﬀect on the value of being unemployed only if employment protection
exists. In that case, the migration cost reduces the probability of being hired and therefore













Figure 4.1: Job and search conditions on the high-skilled market
This means that the equilibrium value of being unemployed on the high-skilled market
unambiguously falls while the value of being unemployed on the low-skilled market remains
unchanged. This implies that investments in education are reduced.
Proposition 4.2 For cm <c ∗
m : T h ep r e s e n c eo fa￿ring cost can reduce the negative
eﬀect of migration on the investments in education
A change in the migration cost has no eﬀect on the low-skilled market. On the high-
skilled market on the other hand, it pushes both curves downwards. On the job creation
side, employment protection reduces the size of the shift as it reduces the share of dying
jobs which are hit by an increase in the migration cost. Hence, the presence of a ￿ring
cost reduces the negative eﬀect of the migration cost on job creation. On the search side,
employment protection increases the losses associated with not matching, i.e. increases
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of the migration cost on the value of being unemployed.
4.3.7 Equilibrium






Let us now characterize the evolution of labor market stocks over time. u(t) is de￿ned
as u(t)=ul(t)+uh(t),u l (t) being the unemployment at time t on the low-skilled market138 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
and uh(t) t h eu n e m p l o y m e n ta tt i m et on the high-skilled market. These can be subdivided
according to the state of the jobs to which the unemployed workers are applying to: ul(t)=
ul,b(t)+ul,g(t) for bad and good state respectively, and similarly, uh(t)=uh,b(t)+uh,g(t).
On the low-skilled market only jobs with tasks that are in the good state are oﬀered:
ul(t)=ul,g(t),a n dul,b(t)=0 . When high-skilled ￿nd it pro￿table to migrate across
regions, uh(t)=uh,g(t), and uh,b(t)=0 . When they do not: uh(t)=uh,g(t)+uh,b(t).
Total employment at time t is denoted by l(t). ll(t) is the employment of low-skilled
workers at time t, lh(t) is the employment of high-skilled workers at time t. Both can be
subdivided into the employment in tasks that are in a good and bad state of the world:
lh(t)=lh,g(t)+lh,b(t),l l(t)=ll,g(t)+ll,b(t).







In the long run, the shares of low-skilled and high-skilled markets are fully determined
by e c∗ :
lh(t)+uh(t)=e c
∗, (4.38)
ll(t)+ul(t)=1 − e c
∗, (4.39)
On the low-skilled market, there is an in￿nite number of low-skilled tasks which are
either in a good or in a bad state. Newly formed matches are allocated to good tasks.
Therefore the equilibrium is such that the ￿ows into unemployment equal the ￿ows out4.3. The model 139
of unemployment (and ul(t)=u∗
l):











l,g(1 − n), (4.40)
where ld∗
l,g is the equilibrium employment in dying jobs. The left-hand side is the total
unemployment in￿ow. It is composed of the new workers entering the labor market and
the proportion of living workers employed in a dying job and hit by a negative shock. On
the right-hand side, one ￿nds the unemployment out￿ow. A proportion n unemployed




￿nds a suitable match.
Furthermore, the respective shares of dying and surviving jobs should also be constant
over time. Therefore, one has:
m(θ
∗


















l,g is the employment in surviving jobs.
Let us now turn to the high-skilled market. When migration is pro￿table, the following
happens. High-skilled unemployed workers migrate to the region in which the high-skilled
task is in a good state. The region switches to a bad state with a probability λ. All the
dying jobs are destroyed as soon as the shock arise and the unemployed workers migrate
to the neighboring region where new matches are progressively formed.
In the full migration equilibrium, all unemployed high-skilled workers are searching
for a job in the good region. The expected evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate
is therefore:




g)) + λ(1 − n)l
d
h(t), (4.43)140 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
where
.




the total employment in surviving jobs (sum of the surviving employment in a bad and in
ag o o dr e g i o n )a n dld
h(t) is the dying employment at time t. The evolution of the aggregate
dying employment rate has the following expectation:
Et[œ l
d






h,g)) − (λ + n − nλ)l
d
h(t), (4.44)




h,g(t)] = uh(t)(1 − n)m(θ
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In the zero migration equilibrium high-skilled unemployed workers remain in their
r e g i o n ,e v e ni fi ti si nab a ds t a t e . T h i sm e a n st h a t￿rms create vacancies also in this
region. Let us denote by uh(t,w) the regional unemployment rate of a region that is in
the state of the world w at time t. The evolution of the regional unemployment rate has
therefore the following expectation:






























The evolution of the dying high-skilled employment rate has the same expectation as
in the full migration equilibrium, except that the unemployment pool is reduced to the4.3. The model 141
number of unemployed present in the region that is in a good state, so that the high-skilled
unemployment rate in the expression must be replaced by uh(t,g).
Let us denote by l
R,s
h (t,w) the regional high-skilled employment rate in surviving jobs
in a region that is in state w at time t. The evolution of the surviving regional high-skilled
employment rate has the following expectation:
Et[œ l
R,s
h (t,g)] = (1 − λ)(1 − n)u(t,g)m(θ
∗

















g(t))(1 − F(e x
∗)) − nl
R,s(t,b), (4.50)
An important property of these variables is that they are stationary. This means that
there exists a unique set {uh(t),l s
h(t),l d
h(t)} such that Et[œ uh(t)] = Et[œ ld
h(t)] = Et[œ ls
h,g(t)] = 0
such that (where y is the stationary value of y):
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h + uh = e c
∗, (4.53)
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Parameter Value
Probability of dying n
Discount rate r
Probability of regional transition λ
Productivity diﬀerential ε
Skill premium σ






























h,b and uh = uh,g + uh,b.
4.4 Numerical example
To illustrate the argument, here is a simple numerical example. The parameters chosen
are the presented in Table 4.2.
To give a rough idea of what these parameters mean, one could translate the model
into a discrete time equivalent where one period of time is a year. The probability of dying
corresponds to a life expectancy of around 75 years old, which is roughly what is observed
in the developed world (averaging women and men). The discount rate corresponds to a
yearly interest rate of 5%. There is some freedom regarding the parameter λ as nothing
in this model suggests that it should picture structural or cyclical changes. The same
holds for the productivity diﬀerential. The value chosen here is ε =1 , that implies























































Figure 4.2: Investments in education and migration costs
skilled match could have in a good region. The skill premium is set to 1.1. This may
seem quite small. But one should remind that the ambition of this model is to capture
the mechanisms underlying investments in tertiary education, relative to lower levels of
education. Therefore, the diﬀerence in productivity is not expected to be too large.
Finally, note that the migration cost and the ￿ring cost vary between 0 and 1.
The next section considers the eﬀects of migration costs and employment protection on
the investments in education and welfare. It looks at equilibrium values associated with
various parameter con￿gurations and does not consider the transition eﬀects of parameter
changes.
4.4.1 Migration costs and investments in education
Let us ￿rst consider the eﬀect of a change in the migration costs on the investments in
human capital. Given that they have a negative eﬀect on the value of being unemployed
on the high-skilled market, these investments decrease with the migration cost. However,
the theory mentions a potential role for the ￿ring cost that, by reducing the share of dying
jobs, reduces the negative eﬀect of the migration cost on job creation.





































Figure 4.3: Value of being unemployed and ￿ring cost
ing in tertiary education decreases. But the higher the ￿ring cost, the lower this eﬀect.
Employment protection deteriorates the value of being unemployed for all workers, but
relatively more for low-skilled workers than high-skilled workers. The explanation for that
is the existence of the migration cost. The migration cost reduces the share of dying jobs
on the high-skilled market relatively to the low-skilled market and therefore reduces the
share of jobs that are particularly hit by employment protection.
Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of the equilibrium value of being unemployed on each
market (in good times), for a migration cost ￿xed at 0.7 that gives a share of educated
workers that correspond more or less to the share of tertiary educated in the developed
world. The ￿ring cost reduces both values but has a larger negative eﬀect on the high-
skilled unemployed workers than on the low-skilled ones. This implies that employment
protection indeed stimulates investments in human capital.
4.4.2 Welfare eﬀects of employment protection
Now let us turn to the welfare eﬀects of employment protection in the presence of a
migration cost cm =0 .7. For that purpose, one should have an idea of the distribution
of workers across job types and regions. The equilibrium values of employment and







































Figure 4.4: Regional high-skilled employment rates in best and worse scenari
one can compute the stationary values of employment and unemployment and simulate
the economy to have a rough idea of how large the ￿uctuations can be around these
stationary values. This is what this section does.
A ￿rst exercise simulates the economy with a ￿ring cost equal to 0. On the low-skilled
market, the equilibrium values of unemployment and employment are calculated, in each
job type. On the high-skilled market, a ￿rst simulation is for a benchmark case, showing
what would happen if the state of the world would never change. Not surprisingly all the
employment and unemployment would be concentrated in the good region. The national
unemployment rate converges to 1.5% and the employment rate to 98.5% from with 40.3%
in dying jobs and 59.7 % in surviving jobs The employment rates of the two regions should
t h e r e f o r ee v o l v eb e t w e e n0 and these upper limits. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
The next step is to simulate using the Markovian transition matrix. The results of the
simulations for the employment rates are presented in Figure 4.5.
Important for the calculation of welfare is to have an estimate of how high-skilled
workers are distributed across tasks. Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the simulated evolution
of the employment rates in dying tasks, surviving tasks and bad tasks in total (adding
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Table 4.3: Employment and unemployment rates without EPL











Figure 4.9: Values of being unemployed and employed in good tasks - Low-skilled market
Table 4.3 presents the steady-state values for the low-skilled market and stationary
values for the high-skilled market of the employment rates. We see that the average
proportion of workers in dying tasks is much larger for low-skilled workers than high-
skilled ones.
We now analyze what happens when introducing a ￿ring cost (cf =0 .2).L e tu sl o o k
at what happens to the values of being unemployed and employed as a function of the
productivity level (which determine the individual welfare). Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and
4.12 represent them. On the low-skilled market, only the most productive workers (in
surviving good tasks) would be better oﬀ with employment protection. On the high-
skilled market, workers in surviving jobs (bad or good) prefer employment protection.4.4. Numerical example 149











Figure 4.10: Values of being employed and unemployed in bad tasks - Low-skilled market








Figure 4.11: Values of being employed and unemployed in good tasks - High-skilled market










Figure 4.12: Values of being employed and unemployed in bad tasks - High-skilled market150 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
The second implication is that the market share of high-skilled workers increases as
now 45.2% of the population ￿nd it pro￿table to invest in education.
This means that the vast majority of high-skilled workers would be better oﬀ in a sys-
tem with EPL, while low-skilled workers would be better oﬀ without EPL. For illustrative
matters, the change in total welfare (measured in the utilitarian way) is calculated on the
basis of the simulation results. The results are reported in Table 4.4. It suggests that
even if low-skilled workers are worse oﬀ,t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect on the high-skilled workers (in-
cluding the eﬀect on the proportion of workers choosing to invest in education) dominates
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the low-skilled workers. However, given that high-skilled workers
are in minority in the population, such a reform might not be politically feasible. It is
therefore tempting to implement an asymmetric employment protection system, where
high-skilled workers would be protected and low-skilled workers would not. Suppose that
employment protection is positive for high-skilled workers and equal to 0 for low-skilled
ones. What happens then is that, comparing with a situation with no ￿ring costs, the
investments in tertiary education decrease. In this example, the share of people investing
in tertiary education falls to 72.0%.
What happens to welfare? The welfare of low-skilled workers with the new market
share is equal to 0.70 and the total welfare of high-skilled workers becomes 0.63.T h e
drop in total high-skilled welfare is due to the fall in their market share. This type of
reform would however be politically feasible as the majority of high-skilled workers and
low-skilled workers would be in its favour.
To prevent welfare from falling so much, other policies could be considered such as a
subsidy to tertiary education and a subsidy to migration. A complete welfare analysis is
beyond the scope of this Chapter, as one should probably introduce external eﬀects of
investments in education (such as complementarity between low-skilled and high-skilled
workers, or the unemployment income as a function of the average wage). A subsidy to
tertiary education would, in this simple framework, where workers are uniformly distrib-4.5. Discussion 151
cf =0 cf =0 .2
(1) Low-Skilled workers
(1b) Welfare LS * market share
(2) High-skilled workers









Total Welfare (1b+2b) 1.25 1.45
Table 4.4: Welfare
uted with respect to the cost of acquiring education, imply an upward parallel shift of the
distribution of workers investing in education. The basic diﬀerence with employment pro-
tection legislation being that the value of being unemployed does not decrease. Of course,
this subsidy to education should be ￿nanced, for example by taxes levied on labor. In
this framework, introducing a lump-sum tax levied on all the workers would stimulate in-
vestments in education without deteriorating labor market performance. However again
this framework is too simple to consider the overall welfare gains.
Finally, a subsidy to migration could also be a potential candidate for stimulating
investments in tertiary education. The eﬀect of such a policy can be read directly from
Figure 4.2.
4.5 Discussion
The results derived in this Chapter rely on the assumption that the migration needs of
high-skilled and low-skilled workers may be diﬀerent, due to the fact that high-skilled
workers are more specialist than low-skilled workers. The focus was therefore on shocks
that are task-speci￿c. Of course, the real world is much more complex than that and, in
particular, it could be that a whole region falls into a slump, meaning that there are no
good jobs available anymore in that region, even for low-skilled workers. In that case, the
migration cost is relevant for both activities and it is therefore not so clear what would
happen to the investments in tertiary education if this migration cost would happen to152 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
be high. In this Chapter, the focus is rather on the consequences of this migration cost
on the situation of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled ones.
However it is interesting to realize that in such a situation, the recommendations in
terms of employment protection legislation might be diﬀerent than the ones proposed here.
Especially if one considers the possibility of higher migration costs among the lower skilled
workers. This situation is investigated in Chapter 3. It is shown that countries with large
migration costs (or low-skilled workers in this particular case) are more likely to support
employment protection than countries with low migration costs. The essence of the result
is the same as in this Chapter: The people who need to incur costs in order to ￿nd good
jobs are more likely to support safe jobs, large unemployment spells, and large insider
gains that the people who can move easily between good job opportunities. If low-skilled
workers face higher migration costs (relatively to their income or in absolute terms (they
do not speak a foreign language, etc.)), it would maybe be welfare improving to implement
employment protection for low-skilled workers. However, it is hard to be convinced by
this inequality in migration costs. Even if it is observed in the facts that high-skilled
workers maybe have less diﬃculties with adapting to new environments (because they for
example speak the language of destination), it is hard to believe that at birth, talented
people have lower migration costs than untalented ones. It could be that investing in
education reduces the migration cost but since education is costly, at the end of the
day, all workers face a cost that is more or less equivalent. Furthermore, the type of
migration considered here is between regions, and therefore the migration cost represents
the psychological cost of moving, the cost of selling and buying a new house, which are
not very clearly skill speci￿c.4.6. Conclusion 153
4.6 Conclusion
This Chapter analyzes the interactions between geographical labor mobility, employment
protection and investments in education. It shows that if investing in education means
acquiring specialized human capital for which the demand ￿uctuates across time and
space, obstacles to geographical labor mobility will discourage this type of investments.
However several policies can be thought of so as to stimulate investments in human
capital. One of the candidate is employment protection. The reasoning is the following.
The migration cost is a bad thing for ￿r m se m p l o y i n gh i g h - s k i l l e dw o r k e r sa st h e yp r o v i d e
them with a ￿regional insider power￿. However, in jobs that alternate good and bad
times this regional insider gain is compensated for by a regional insider weakness as soon
as there are bad times. This is not true for jobs that exist only in good times and are
destroyed in bad times. Therefore, the migration cost hits ￿rst of all, only the high-skilled
market and, second of all, particularly the jobs that exist only in good times. Employment
protection reduces the share of these jobs, and therefore reduces the negative eﬀect of the
migration cost on job creation. The simulations showed that introducing an employment
protection legislation would make the high-skilled workers better oﬀ and the low-skilled
workers worse oﬀ. The general welfare eﬀect could however be positive. The problem is
that introducing a ￿ring cost would not be politically feasible as the majority of workers
is low-skilled. To overcome this problem, one may think of an asymmetric regulation
system that protects high-skilled workers and do not protect low-skilled workers. The
disadvantage of such a policy is the negative eﬀect on the total share of workers investing
in education. Policies such as public subsidies to education and subsidies to migration
could therefore be adequate complements to the employment protection legislation. The
facts seem to support this idea. Indeed, European countries with typically high migration
costs are also the ones with the strictest employment protection legislation and the largest
shares of public subsidies to tertiary education.154 4. Employment Protection, Migration and Tertiary Education
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of proposition 7
We focus on the case where dying jobs exist. Using the three equilibrium conditions on
the high-skilled market, the eﬀect of a change in the migration cost on θh,g,x h,g and Uh,g
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∂cm > 0.Chapter 5
Employment Protection and
On-the-job Investments
This Chapter is based on the paper "Welfare Eﬀects of Employment Protection" (Belot,
Boone and Van Ours (2002))1.
5.1 Introduction
When Europe with its on average high unemployment is compared with the United States
where unemployment is substantially lower, European rigidity and American ￿exibility
are often emphasized. One of the institutions that is potentially incompatible with labor
market ￿exibility is employment protection. There is a diﬀerence in employment pro-
tection between the US and Europe but also within Europe there is a big variety across
countries. From an OECD (1999) overview it appears that Southern European coun-
tries stand out for having relatively strict employment regulation, along with France and
Germany. At the other extreme, regulation is least restrictive in the United States, the
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada. Diﬀerences in employment protection across
1The authors of the related paper thank participants to the ENTER Jamboree in Mannheim March
2001, to the European Economic Association Congress 2001 in Lausanne, to the European Association
of Labour Economists Conference 2001 in Jyvaskyla and seminar participants at Uppsala for useful
comments and suggestions.
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countries are not very much related to diﬀerences in unemployment rates. However, as
far as employment protection is concerned, it is not only unemployment that matters but
also economic growth. Employment protection may have an eﬀect on labor productivity
through the slowing down of the reallocation from old and declining sectors to new and
dynamic sectors. Still, as Nickell and Layard (1999) indicate, this eﬀect will most likely be
limited because quits already allow for a substantial downward adjustment of the work-
force of a ￿rm without any costs. They emphasize that instead of having a negative eﬀect
on labor productivity, employment protection may stimulate growth. The explanation
they provide is that productivity improvements depend on the cooperation of workers,
while also substantive participation requires training. Therefore, employment protection
stimulates growth because it increases job tenure and thus provides an incentive for job
training.2 To illustrate this they present cross-country estimates of productivity growth
from which it appears that employment protection is the only institution that has a pos-
itive eﬀect whereas the other labor market institutions do not seem to have any eﬀect on
growth.
Employment protection involves costs for employers that want to adjust their work-
force. Employment protection is also a commitment device for the employer, which stimu-
lates workers to make productivity enhancing investments in ￿rm speci￿ch u m a nc a p i t a l .
This trade-oﬀ between adjustment costs and productivity growth is the focal point of
this study. If employers would not oﬀer employment protection, workers can be ￿red on
the spot. Without employment protection workers severely underinvest in relationship-
speci￿c capital due to a hold-up problem. Employment protection reduces the probability
that workers are dismissed after they have made an eﬀort. Hence, employment protection
might be desirable both from the point of view of the worker (job stability and wage
gains) and of the ￿rm (productivity gains). No contract is ever-lasting in the sense that
2Employment protection may be provided through labor laws but also through the private market,
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employers oﬀer workers contracts that ensure the workers of a job until they retire. On
the arrival of negative productivity shocks employers may decide to ￿re a worker despite
of the costs involved. Even if employers would oﬀer all workers ex ante the same contract,
i.e. a contract with the same ￿ring costs there may be diﬀerences in job tenure related to
the productivity of the worker. Low productivity workers are more vulnerable to negative
external shocks. Conditional on a particular shock high productivity workers may keep
their job while low productivity workers are made redundant.
This Chapter investigates the relationship between employment protection and in-
vestments in human capital. This relationship goes in both directions: Employment
protection stimulates investments in human capital on-the-job but the human capital of
the workers at the beginning of an employment relationship determine the optimal em-
ployment protection from a welfare point of view. Chapter 4 studies also the relationship
between human capital and employment protection but from a diﬀe r e n ta n g l e .I ts h o w s
that employment protection stimulates investments in specialized human capital prior to
the entry into the labor market and the human capital determines the political preferences
with respect to employment protection (see Table 1.14 for an overview).
The Chapter is set up as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of stylized facts
on employment protection regulation. There are substantial diﬀe r e n c e sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .
Many countries have substantially changed their employment protection regulation to-
wards more ￿exibility. Section 5.3 oﬀers an overview of the most relevant theoretical
and empirical studies on employment protection legislation. From the empirical stud-
ies it appears that employment protection does not aﬀect unemployment much but may
have eﬀects on labor market dynamics and economic growth. Theoretical studies analyze
employment protection from diﬀerent angles. Most of the theoretical studies consider
employment protection as a cost incurred by the ￿rm. Productivity is present in some of
them but is treated exogenously. The trade-oﬀ between costs and productivity gains from
employment protection constituted the originality of this Chapter. Section 5.4 presents158 5. Employment Protection and On-the-job Investments
a theoretical matching model, where initially employment regulation is introduced with
one type of contract. Productivity is uncertain while there is some information about
the potential suitability of the worker for the job at the time ￿rm and worker meet. On
the basis of this potential suitability employers decide whether or not to oﬀer a contract
and conditional on the oﬀered contract workers decide whether or not they will make a
productivity enhancing investment. Employment protection enhances the incentives of
the workers to invest in human capital in order to reduce the probability of being ￿red.
Hence, when the ￿rm oﬀers a contract with high separation costs, it commits itself to
a stable employment relationship, i.e. it oﬀers a guarantee to the worker that he won￿t
be easily ￿red. Before production starts the productivity of the match is fully revealed.
Then, either the ￿rm and the worker ￿nd it eﬃcient to separate or production starts.
It is shown that for a given productivity there is an optimal degree of employment pro-
tection. If there is a productivity distribution it is welfare improving if diﬀerent types
of contracts, i.e. contracts with diﬀerent ￿ring costs, are oﬀered. Section 5.5 presents a
numerical example to illustrate the main characteristics of the model. It shows that the
optimal employment protection depends on the productivity of the workers. Section 5.6
concludes.
5.2 Employment protection - stylized facts
Employment protection refers both to regulations concerning hiring and ￿ring. It may
concern rules favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or ￿xed-
term contracts, training requirements but also redundancy procedures, mandated pre-
noti￿cation periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals
and short-time work schemes (see OECD (1999) for an overview). The common element
in these rules is that they increase adjustment costs and thus job tenures.
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esting to look at diﬀerences between countries in terms of the strictness of employment
protection and the range of contracts oﬀered in terms of temporary or more or less perma-
nent nature.3 Section 1.2.2. (Table 1.11) presents the indicators relative to the EPL and
a description of its evolution over time and diﬀerences across countries. It also reports
the incidence of temporary employment in most OECD countries.
There are several reasons for the existence of temporary contracts. First, temporary
employment is often considered as a way of providing ￿exibility to the ￿rms, i.e. allow-
ing them to adjust employment with relatively low costs to the variations in demand
(Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). The most traditional and broadly accepted reason for us-
ing temporary contracts remains linked to the type of activity (seasonal or limited in
duration). Temporary contracts may also be used as a step in the screening process to-
wards a permanent employment relationship, or as a form of active labor market policy
(OECD, 1999).4 The growth of temporary employment may also have been stimulated by
changes in the labor supply. The increased participation of women in the labor force is
often considered as an important factor in the growth of temporary employment (OECD
(1999)). Finally, there are studies focusing on the role of other institutional character-
istics, e.g. Golden and Appelbaum (1992) who suggest that a reduction in the union
bargaining power has enhanced the growth of temporary contracts. Their argument is
that when labor￿s bargaining strength is high, ￿rms are hindered to add temporary rather
than permanent employees.
3Temporary employment covers in general two categories of contracts: ￿xed-term contracts and tem-
porary work agency (TWA) contracts. Fixed duration contracts are employment relationships concluded
directly between the employer and the worker. TWA contracts are employment relationships between
a temporary work agency and the worker, the latter working for and under the control of a user ￿rm
(Peeters (1999)). See Delsen (1995) for an overview of the various de￿nitions of temporary employment
across OECD countries.
4The majority of temporary employed was employed the year before (OECD, 1996). However there
is a reasonable part (varying between 8.7% in Spain and 31.9 % in Luxembourg, 1994) that was not
participating to the labor market. When one looks at the status of temporary employed one year later, it
appears that two-thirds are still under a temporary contract in Spain and Germany, while an important
proportion of them bene￿ts from a permanent contract in France (31.7%) and Great Britain (25.3%).160 5. Employment Protection and On-the-job Investments
Interesting for the purpose of this study, temporary employment is unequally spread
among the population and sectors of activities. Bentolila and Dolado argue that tem-
porary employment is prevalent among people with an unstable attachment to the labor
force. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers are over-represented in this type of employment.
De Grip et al. (1997) note that sixty-three percent of all temporary employed are in low-
skilled occupations. Temporary matches would therefore be less productive. One of the
explanations suggested by Bentolila and Dolado is that ￿xed-term contracts would be
associated with low investments in human capital and less eﬀort from the workers. This
Chapter argues that the relationship between productivity and temporary employment
goes also the other way around: It would be optimal to oﬀer short duration contracts to
low productive matches.
5.3 Related literature
5.3.1 Empirical studies on employment protection
The relationship between employment protection and unemployment has been studied fre-
quently in the context of an international comparison of labor market institutions. Nickell
(1998) for example concludes on the basis of a comparison of 20 OECD countries that em-
ployment protection has no eﬀect on the unemployment rate. Scarpetta (1996) ￿nds that
employment protection increases unemployment and extends the period of employment
adjustment. Bertola (1992) ￿nds no relationship between employment adjustment costs
and the level of unemployment. Elmeskov et al. (1998) ￿nd that employment protection
increases unemployment in countries with an intermediary level of corporatism. Chapter
2 of this manuscript shows that employment protection has a negative eﬀect on unemploy-
ment when bargaining is at the ￿rm level. Nickell and Layard (1999) scrutinize empirical
evidence on the relationship between labor market institutions and economic performance.
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systems. The negative eﬀect of unions can be reduced by encouraging product market
competition. Social security systems can be improved by linking bene￿ts to active labor
market programs that move people from welfare to work. Nickell and Layard conclude
that time spent worrying about strict labor market regulations, employment protection
and minimum wages is probably time largely wasted. The OECD (1999) also concludes
that employment protection has little or no eﬀect on overall unemployment. Employment
protection regulation does seem to in￿uence the dynamics of the labor market and in
particular unemployment ￿ows (Bentolila and Bertola (1990)). The rates of job creation
and job destruction on the other hand seem to be less sensitive to employment protection.
They do not diﬀer strongly between North-America and European countries, suggesting
that the role of employment protection regulation is small.
As indicated in the introduction Nickell and Layard (1999) conclude from a cross-
country comparison of the eﬀects of labor market institutions on economic growth that
only employment protection matters. This is in line with a cross-country analysis in
OECD (1999), which shows that workers on temporary contracts are less likely to be
trained.
5.3.2 Theoretical studies on employment protection
The relationship between employment protection and labor market performance has been
studied from diﬀerent angles.5 Bentolila and Dolado (1994) for example suggest an ex-
tension of the insider-outsider model to analyze the case of Spain. The basic idea is that
unionized permanent workers, dominating the wage bargaining of all workers, see their
bargaining power increasing with the share of temporary employment. Indeed, the pres-
5This overview is limited to the direct eﬀects of employment protection. There are some studies
that consider the interactions of employment protection with other labor market institutions. Coe and
Snower (1997) analyze systematically all kind of theoretical interactions between various labor market
institutions. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) suggest that the eﬀects of employment protection depend on
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ence of a buﬀer of ￿exible employees lowers the likelihood that insiders will lose their jobs
and thereby increases their bargaining power. The consequence is a widespread increase
in wages damaging labor market performance.
Other studies analyze the eﬀect of employment protection in the context of labor
market ￿ows. Boeri (1999) attempts to reconcile the empirical evidence of relatively
high destruction rates and low unemployment in￿o w si nE u r o p ew i t ht h et h e o r e t i c a l
implications of the equilibrium labor market ￿ows literature. He argues that employment
protection actually increases the proportion of job-to-job shifts, i.e. a large number of
workers move directly to another job, without experiencing unemployment. Holmlund
and Linden (1993) consider a similar model where employed have a chance to avoid
unemployment at the end of a long-term employment relationship, by ending up in a
temporary public job. From this job they search for another job and compete with
unemployed.
Wasmer (1999) argues that the share of temporary contracts relative to the share of
long-term contracts depends on the productivity growth rate. High growth rates make
long-term contracts attractive to ￿rms. Downturns are associated with a shift towards
temporary contracts. The coexistence of two types of contracts is guaranteed by a de-
creasing matching eﬃciency of the vacancies of one type when the number of vacancies of
this type is rising. There is a threshold for the growth rate, above which the productivity
of the match is so high there are only long-term vacancies posted. Employment protection
makes sense here because it enables ￿rms to protect high productive matches. Produc-
tivity determines therefore the optimal contract the ￿rms should oﬀer. But it enters the
model exogenously. Employment protection enables the ￿r m st ok e e ph i g hp r o d u c t i v e
matches but does not have a direct eﬀect on productivity itself. This eﬀect also occurs
in the model, but its originality is that the relationship also goes the other way around:
The protection of contracts stimulate the productivity of the corresponding matches.
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The provision of job security is de￿ned as the proportion of ￿rms oﬀering a secure contract
rather than a risky contract, where risky contracts are characterized by a higher layoﬀ rate.
They use a matching function with increasing returns-to-scale which generates multiple
equilibria. On the one hand, when the proportion of ￿rms oﬀering job security is small,
￿ows into and out of unemployment are large and so is the arrival rate of an unemployed
to a vacancy. This reinforces the attractiveness of risky contracts. On the other hand,
a lot of employment protection generates a relatively small arrival rate, which makes it
more attractive for ￿rms to oﬀer secure contracts.
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) focus on the relationship between employment protection
and skills. Employment protection gives workers incentives to invest in ￿rm-speci￿c
skills, while the absence of employment protection would stimulate investments in gen-
eral, portable skills. Wasmer (2002) has the same argument and suggests that American
workers invest more in general skills while European workers invest more in ￿rm-speci￿c
skills.
In conclusion most of the theoretical studies consider employment protection as a cost
incurred by the ￿rm6. The gains for the worker associated with employment protection
concerns the stability of the employment relationship and the increased wage (insider
eﬀect). As the next subsection describes in more detail, the productivity enhancing eﬀect
is added to this insider eﬀect. Productivity is present in other studies on employment
protection but is then not directly in￿uenced by the type of employment protection. It
can be an aspect determining the contract choice (as in Wasmer (1999)) but basically once
the ￿rm and the worker have met, the future of their relationship depends on exogenous
events. The model combines the cost-aspect of employment protection with its in￿uence
on the behavior of the partners (in particular of the workers) within the employment
relationship. This introduces a trade-oﬀ between productivity gains and costs.
6Welfare eﬀects of severance payments and notices of termination are investigated in Pissarides (2001)
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5.3.3 Investments in general and speci￿cs k i l l s
This paper introduces endogenous investment decisions by the workers so as to enhance
the productivity of the match. There is a larger literature on on-the-job investments.
Becker (1964) in his seminal work introduced the crucial diﬀerence between general and
speci￿c investments. The latter are lost when separation between the ￿rm and the worker
occurs while the worker takes the bene￿ts from the general investments with him as soon
as he leaves the ￿rm. The conclusion reached by Becker was then that workers should
bear the costs of general investments. But his reasoning was made within a frictionless
framework. Recent contributions (Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)), show that in a market
with search frictions, it may be pro￿table for the ￿rms to ￿nance general investments as a
worker cannot ￿nd immediately another equivalent partner. In the same line of reasoning,
Wasmer (2002) shows that the American market (with its fast mobility between jobs)
favours rather general investments by the workers than speci￿co n e s . O nt h eE u r o p e a n
market on the other hand (characterized by high mobility costs), workers would prefer
to invest in speci￿c skills, so that the duration of their job is longer. The consequence
is then that American workers experience lower losses when becoming unemployed than
European workers.
5.4 The model
This section presents a model formalizing the idea that ￿ring costs stimulate ￿rm speci￿c
training by the employee and hence can be welfare enhancing. To make this point most
forcefully, ￿ring costs are assumed to be a pure waste (e.g. paper work involved in ￿ring
an employee). Subsection 5.4.5 considers ￿r i n gc o s t sa sat r a n s f e r( e i t h e rt oe m p l o y e e
or government). The exact form of the ￿ring cost aﬀects the nature of the contractual
incompleteness one needs to assume in order to get the positive welfare eﬀect of ￿ring
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The model is a one shot version of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching model.
Similar one shot versions have been used by Boone and Bovenberg (2002) and Hosios
(1990). This simpli￿cation allows for the introduction of an additional decision margin
(eﬀort choice of a worker) while analytical results can still be derived. The model consists
of four stages of which the timing is as follows.
At t =0 , ￿rms post vacancies v at a cost cr per vacancy and workers supply inelasti-
cally one unit of search intensity.7 Workers are distributed on the unit interval [0,1] with
measure one. The number of workers and ￿rms that match is determined by a matching
function m(u,v) where the number of unemployed u in this one shot game equals the
total mass of workers, u =1 .D e ￿ning market tightness as θ = v
u,i nt h i sc a s eθ = v and
the matching function can be written as m(θ)=m(1,θ), with the usual assumptions:
m(0) = 0,m 0 (θ) > 0,m 00 (θ) < 0 and
m(θ)
θ is decreasing in θ. Once the worker and the
￿rm are matched the suitability of the worker for the job, x, is revealed. In this section
the suitability x is the same for everyone. The next section shows what happens if x
diﬀers between workers ex post.
Because here everyone has the same suitability x, every worker who is matched with a
￿rm gets a contract and the contract stipulates a ￿ring cost cf.8 The fraction (1 − m(θ))
of workers that are not matched, stay unemployed and receive unemployment bene￿t
b ≥ 0.
At t =1the worker invests eﬀort e at cost γ (e) to raise his productivity in this match.
Because this is a one-shot model, this eﬀort e is ￿rm speci￿c. An important assumption
7One could endogenize workers￿ search eﬀort by introducing a search cost function for workers. This
would complicate notation but does not aﬀect the results. The reason for this is as follows. In this type
of model, agents tend to search too little because part of the surplus created goes to the government
as tax revenue. Firing costs in this context raise the wage for the worker and hence stimulates search.
Hence the welfare enhancing eﬀect of ￿ring costs is strengthened by endogenizing workers￿ search eﬀort.
8Strictly speaking there is also the possibility that x is so low that no one gets a contract. Since x is
known ex ante this implies that no vancancies are posted at t =0 . This irrelevant case is ignored and x
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is that e cannot be contracted9 and that the cost is born by the worker10. One can think
here of eﬀort invested by the worker to get to know the ￿rm, the procedures used, eﬀort
to help colleagues or eﬀort invested in a formal training program. As noted above, the
contractual problems surrounding e are discussed in section 5.4.5.
After this eﬀort e has been sunk, the industry conditions ι are revealed at t =2 .T h e
industry shock ι ∈ < is randomly distributed with density function g (.) and distribution
function G(.). The following simple relation between the suitability for the job, x,t h e
eﬀort choice, e,t h ei n d u s t r ys h o c k ,ι, and total output of the match y is assumed:
y = x + e + ι (5.1)
After ι has been revealed, it may be the case that the worker and ￿rm decide to split up
if ι is rather low. In that case, the ￿rm pays the ￿ring cost cf and the worker becomes
unemployed. These unemployed workers receive an unemployment bene￿t b (just as their
fellow workers that did not match with a ￿rm at t =0 ).
The worker and ￿rm combinations that do not separate produce output y at t =3 .
Furthermore, the ￿rm and the worker bargain about the wage rate. The ￿nal output is
the numeraire and it is assumed that there are no other production costs than labor costs.
In the following subsections, the model is solved using backward induction. First, the
wage rate and pro￿ts are derived, then the workers￿ eﬀort choice e and ￿nally the number
of vacancies posted by the ￿rms.
9This means that the eﬀort is not observable but the productivity resulting from the eﬀort is.
10A r eo n l yc o n s i d e r e dh e r ei n v e s t m e n t sm a d eb yt h ew o r k e r sa st h e s ea r et h eo n e so n es h o u l dl o o k
at when considering employment protection, as the latter represents a cost incurred by the ￿rm, and
therefore, a tool at the disposal of the ￿rms to guarantee to the workers that they will not be ￿red
easily. For the reader interested in investments made by ￿rms (in general or speci￿c human capital), see
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5.4.1 Wages and pro￿ts
The surplus y is divided by the worker and the ￿rm using Nash bargaining. Thus, the
wage is determined by the following maximization problem
max
w (w − b)
β (y − (1 + t)w − T + cf)
1−β , (5.2)
where β (1 − β)i st h ew o r k e r ￿ s( ￿rm￿s) bargaining power, b is the unemployment bene￿t
level and thus the worker￿s fall back position, t and T denote components of the wage tax
levied by the government and cf is the ￿ring cost. That is, −cf is the fall back position of
the ￿rm: if the worker and ￿rm do not reach agreement on the wage, the worker is ￿red
and the ￿rm has to pay the ￿ring cost cf. It follows from this that the worker￿s wage w




(y − T + cf)+( 1− β)b, (5.3)
π =( 1 − β)(y − T − (1 + t)b) − βcf, (5.4)
Part of the surplus y that is not distributed to ￿rm or worker goes to the government as
tax income:
taxes = y − w − π, (5.5)
= tw + T, (5.6)
The worker and ￿rm will separate after ι has been revealed if and only if the joint surplus
they generate is less than the sum of their outside options. Due to Nash bargaining, one
can verify that the following two conditions are identical:
π ≤− cf, (5.7)
w ≤ b, (5.8)
That is, the ￿rm and worker always agree on when to separate: pro￿ts are below the
outside option (−cf) if and only if wages are below the outside option (b). It is routine
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Lemma 5.1 The ￿rm and the worker separate after ι has been revealed if and only if
y ≤ e y
where
e y ≡ (1 + t)b + T − cf (5.9)
Given x and e, the probability that the worker and ￿rm separate is given by
Pr(x + e + ι ≤ e y)=G((1 + t)b + T − cf − e − x) (5.10)
Hence, the worker and ￿rm continue after the industry shock if and only if output
y exceeds the gross wage costs of a wage equal to the unemployment bene￿t( w o r k e r ￿ s
outside option) minus the ￿ring cost (￿rm￿s outside option). For given values of e,b,t and
T,ar i s ei nt h e￿ring cost cf implies that fewer matches are dissolved.
5.4.2 Eﬀort choice
This section derives the eﬀect of the ￿ring cost on worker￿s eﬀort investment. To do this,




(x + e + ι − T + cf)+( 1− β)b, (5.11)
What is important here is that the worker and ￿rm bargain over the wage after the eﬀort
e has been sunk. In other words, there is a hold up problem. One would expect the
worker and ￿rm to look for opportunities to remove this hold up problem. Section 5.4.5
discusses what type of contractual incompleteness one needs to assume so that the worker
and ￿rm cannot solve the hold up problem themselves.










where the eﬀort costs satisfy by assumption γ (0) = 0 and γ0 (.),γ00(.) > 0.I n w o r d s ,
raising the eﬀort level e raises the eﬀort cost γ (e) and has two bene￿cial eﬀects. First,5.4. The model 169
as e goes up, it becomes less likely that the worker is ￿red. Second, raising e raises the
wage that the worker receives if the match is not dissolved. The ￿rst order condition for
this maximization problem implies that marginal costs are equal to marginal bene￿ts:
γ




The second order condition is satis￿ed if γ00 (e) −
β
1+tg(e y − e − x) > 0.I f γ00(e) −
β
1+tg (e y − e − x) > 0 holds for all e ≥ 0 then equation (5.13) has a unique solution.








The intuition for these results is as follows. As cf goes up, it becomes less likely that
the worker is ￿red. Hence it becomes more likely that the eﬀort e will yield a revenue in
terms of a higher wage. Similarly, as x goes up, it becomes less likely that the worker is
￿red and hence he is more willing to invest eﬀort e.
5.4.3 Vacancies
This section determines the number of vacancies that are created in the economy at t =0 .
Pro￿ts can be written explicitly as a function of e and ι.
π(e,ι)=( 1− β)(x + e + ι − T − (1 + t)b) − βcf, (5.14)
Then the expected value of being matched with a worker equals
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We assume that there is free entry into the business of posting vacancies. Hence the







θ is the probability that a ￿rm is matched with a worker.
The eﬀect of cf on the number of vacancies follows from the eﬀect of cf on the expected
value of a match E (J).
∂E(J)
∂cf







Ar i s ei n￿ring costs reduces a ￿rm￿s expected pro￿ts for two reasons. First, it increases
the direct cost at separation and second, the wage goes up since the ￿ring costs improves
a worker￿s bargaining position relative to the ￿rm. This would suggest that a rise in ￿ring
c o s t si sa l w a y sb a dn e w sf o rt h e￿rm. The next lemma derives conditions under which
that is the case. However, there is also a positive eﬀect of the ￿ring cost for the ￿rm.
Higher ￿ring costs imply a higher eﬀort investment by the worker and hence a higher
surplus y to be divided. If eﬀort e is suﬃciently elastic (or equivalently, γ (.) suﬃciently
linear), the last eﬀect dominates and the ￿rm gains as ￿ring costs go up.
Lemma 5.3 If G(e y − e − x)is close to 1 then
∂E(J)




The intuition for the ￿rst eﬀect is as follows. The bene￿cial eﬀect for the ￿rm of a rise
in cf is that it raises worker￿s eﬀort. However, if it is unlikely that the match survives
(G(e y − e − x)is close to 1)t h i se ﬀect on eﬀort is small. On the other hand, if it is likely
that the worker has to be ￿red, a rise in cf raises expected ￿ring costs substantially. The
second result says that there are functions γ (.) such that the elasticity of eﬀort with
respect to cf is big. In that case, a small increase in ￿ring costs leads to a big rise in eﬀort
and hence a big rise in a ￿rm￿s pro￿ts. In that case, the rise in ￿ring costs is bene￿cial
to the ￿rm.5.4. The model 171
5.4.4 Welfare and normative results
In the model there are two externalities which create bene￿cial eﬀects of ￿ring costs.
First, there is a hold up problem which causes workers to underinvest in eﬀort. A rise
in ￿ring costs induces a higher eﬀort level and hence can be welfare enhancing, even
though the ￿ring cost is a pure waste from a social point of view (i.e. it is not a transfer).
Second, because of taxation the social value of a match exceeds the private value of a
match. This causes the private parties to dissolve too many matches. Some matches are
dissolved which have a positive social value because of the tax revenues generated by it.
Introducing a ￿ring cost stops some of these matches from being dissolved and hence can
be welfare enhancing. This section derives conditions under which the welfare maximizing
￿ring cost is strictly positive.
Welfare is de￿ned as the sum of utilities of workers and ￿rms. The expression for the
expected value of a match for a ￿rm is derived in equation (5.15) above. The analogous
equation for expected value for a worker of being matched with a ￿rm is




Welfare Ω c a nb ew r i t t e na s
Ω =( 1− m(θ))b + m(θ)E (W)+m(θ)E (J) − crθ, (5.20)
Using the government budget constraint
taxes = g +[ 1− m(θ)+m(θ)G(e y − e − x)]b, (5.21)
we can write welfare as
Ω = −g + m(θ)
•
−γ (e) − G(e y − e − x)cf +
Z +∞
e y−e−x
(x + e + ι)g (ι)dι
‚
− crθ, (5.22)
Maximizing welfare with respect to eﬀort e yields that the ￿rst best eﬀort level is deter-
mined by
γ
0 (e)=g (e y − e − x)((1 + t)b + T)+[ 1− G(e y − e − x)], (5.23)172 5. Employment Protection and On-the-job Investments
Simple comparison of this equation with (5.13) yields the following result.
Lemma 5.4 If t>0 and (1 + t)b+T>0 then the ￿r s tb e s te ﬀort level exceeds the eﬀort
in the private outcome
There are two reasons for this eﬀect. First, there is the hold up problem (
β
1+t < 1):
the worker bears all the cost of the eﬀort e but gets only a fraction of the gains. In
particular, part of the additional output of the worker￿s eﬀort is shared with the ￿rm and
the government. Second, the matches with y ∈ h0,(1 + t)b+T −cfi are dissolved because
they yield no private surplus although they do yield social surplus as y>0.B yr a i s i n ge
such matches with strictly positive social value are saved.
Next the socially optimal number of vacancies (or tightness) is compared with the










Multiplying both sides with θ
m(θ) and de￿ning the elasticity of the matching function as
α =
m0(θ)θ











Comparing this equation with the market outcome in equation (5.17) one gets the follow-
ing result.
Lemma 5.5 Suﬃcient conditions for the socially optimal tightness θ to exceed tightness
in the private outcome (see (5.17)) are
α ≥ 1 − β
[1 − G(e y − e − x)](T +( 1+t)b)+
β
1 − β
cf ≥ γ (e)5.4. The model 173
The intuition for these conditions is as follows. The ￿rst inequality is related to the
Hosios condition (see Hosios (1990)) and says that the ￿rm￿s bargaining power should
not be too big. The reason is that creating vacancies causes a negative external eﬀect
(congestion externality): if a ￿rm opens an additional vacancy, the probability that other
￿rms are matched with a worker is reduced (
m(θ)
θ is decreasing in θ). If the elasticity of the
matching function α equals ￿rm￿s bargaining power (1 − β) this externality is internalized
and ￿rms do not create too many vacancies from a social point of view. Clearly, if ￿rm￿s
bargaining power is even lower (1−β ≤ α) ￿rms are not overinvesting in vacancies either.
The second inequality compares parts of the social surplus overlooked by the ￿rm. First,
tax revenues on surviving matches do not add to the ￿rm￿s surplus and hence the ￿rm
tends to underinvest in vacancies. Second, part of the ￿ring cost that is subtracted in
￿rm￿s pro￿ts goes in fact to the worker (cf raises worker￿s wages) and is not lost from a
social point of view. Finally, since the worker bears all of the eﬀort cost γ (e) the ￿rm
does not take this cost into account when creating vacancies. This eﬀect tends to work in
the direction of the ￿rm overinvesting in vacancies. The inequality implies that the ￿rst
two eﬀects dominate the latter and hence the ￿rm underinvests in vacancies.




for cf ∈ [0,ﬂ cfi where ﬂ cf > 0.
This result implies that the socially optimal ￿ring cost is strictly positive, although
the ￿ring cost is a pure waste from a social point of view. The intuition is that by raising
the ￿ring cost (from cf =0 )w o r k e r s ￿e ﬀort is increased which is below the social optimum
and fewer matches are destroyed which have a strictly positive social value.
This result cannot hold for all eﬀort functions. Suppose for instance that eﬀort is174 5. Employment Protection and On-the-job Investments
costless until e =1and in￿nitely expensive for e>1.11 Then all workers invest the
socially optimal eﬀort level already and raising cf just raises costs for the economy (as
￿ring costs are a pure waste). Hence, it must be the case that eﬀort is suﬃciently elastic
to changes is cf to get the positive welfare eﬀect of cf.
The welfare maximizing ￿ring cost is ￿nite, because as cf → +∞,p r o ￿ts are reduced
to zero and hence no vacancies will be created.
5.4.5 The nature of ￿ring cost and contractual incompleteness
So far ￿ring costs were assumed to be a pure waste, say paper work needed to ￿re an em-
ployee. Alternatively, one can distinguish ￿ring cost as a ￿ring tax paid to the government
and severance pay which is a ￿ring cost paid to the employee. For each of these types
of ￿ring costs the welfare eﬀects of a rise in the ￿ring cost and the sort of contractual
incompleteness one needs to assume to defend government intervention in these cases are
discussed.
In all three of these cases one needs to assume that the eﬀort e of the worker is not
contractible. This seems reasonable in many circumstances. Such eﬀort costs are hard to
observe and are usually not veri￿able in court. Think here of a worker￿s eﬀort to cooperate
with colleagues, to behave towards customers etc. If this eﬀort level were contractible,
the hold up problem would disappear and there would be no case for ￿ring costs.
Furthermore, one needs to assume that the ￿rm cannot commit to leaving the gains
from eﬀort to the worker. For instance, the following contract would solve the hold up
problem. The ￿rm sells itself to the employee at t =1for a price equal to its expected
pro￿ts, thereby leaving all gains from eﬀort to the worker. This contract is infeasible if one
assumes that the worker has a liquidity constraint. Again this is a reasonable assumption
in most cases.
11That is, γ (.) is of the form: γ (e)=
(
0 if e ∈ [0,1]
+∞ otherwise
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To defend government intervention in the case where the ￿ring cost is a pure waste
(created by the government), it is necessary to answer the question ￿if this ￿ring cost
creates additional surplus, why don￿t the worker and ￿rm write a contract themselves
saying that money should be burned in case the worker is ￿red?￿ There are two answers
to this question. First, although the ￿ring cost may create additional welfare, it may
b et h ec a s et h a tt h e￿rm loses due to the ￿ring cost (i.e.
∂E(J)
∂cf < 0). The only way in
which the worker can induce the ￿rm to sign a contract stipulating a ￿ring cost is to
compensate the ￿rm ex ante. In other words, the worker bribes the ￿rm to sign such a
contract. Assuming that the worker has a liquidity constraint rules out such a contract and
necessitates government intervention. Another argument why government intervention is
needed even if the ￿rm would gain from the ￿ring cost (i.e.
∂E(J)
∂cf > 0)i sg i v e nb yN i c k e l l
and Layard (1999). They claim that adverse selection problems may be an important
reason why private ￿rms in the US do not oﬀer employment protection themselves. The
idea is here that there are two types of workers: one likes an easy life and job security, the
other is willing to work hard and does not mind a bit of risk. By oﬀering (unilaterally) a
contract with high cf,a￿rm attracts disproportionately the wrong type of worker. This
makes the selection of workers very expensive. Hence ￿rms only oﬀer contracts with low
￿ring costs.
If the ￿ring cost takes the form of a transfer to the government (￿ring tax), then
it is less surprising that a higher ￿ring cost can raise welfare because the ￿ring cost is
not a waste from a social point of view. So in this case one needs fewer assumptions on
the contractual incompleteness to make the story work. In this case, one only needs to
assume that eﬀort is not contractible, so that there is a hold up problem. The ￿ring tax
is then an excellent way for the government to raise revenue as it raises eﬃciency instead
of decreasing it.
If the ￿ring cost is a transfer to the employee (severance pay), it is again easier to
get a welfare enhancing rise in the ￿ring cost because it is not a waste from a social176 5. Employment Protection and On-the-job Investments
point of view. On the question why the government needs to stipulate such contracts,
similar arguments as above can be used (adverse selection problem; worker has a liquidity
constraint). Note that in this case the level of the ￿ring cost will be lower than in the
two other cases because of the following moral hazard problem on the worker￿s side. One
reason why the worker exerts eﬀort is to avoid bankruptcy by the ￿rm. If the worker
gets severance pay cf in case the match is dissolved, there is less incentive to try to avoid
bankruptcy since the worker now gets b + cf i n s t e a do fj u s tb.
Summarizing, to get the welfare enhancing eﬀect of ￿ring cost one needs to assume
that the worker￿s eﬀort is not contractible. In order to make a case for the government
to stipulate contracts with ￿ring cost one needs to assume that either the worker has a
liquidity constraint which prevents him from bribing the ￿rm into a contract with ￿ring
costs or that ￿r m sf a c ea na d v e r s es e l e c t i o np r o b l e m sw i t hd i ﬀerent types of employees.
5.5 A numerical example
This section illustrates the functioning of the model by means of simulations. It assumes
that no unemployment bene￿ts are paid and there are no other government expenditures.
Therefore, there are no taxes12. Furthermore, it is assumed that g( ) ∼ N(0,4). The
matching function has the following form: m(u,v)=auαv1−α,w i t ha =0 .9 and α =0 .5.
The other parameters are speci￿ed as follows: α = β =0 .5,c r =2 ,φ=0 .1,γ(e)=1
2ϕe2.
This combination of parameter values ensures plausible values of unemployment rates over
a wide range of values for x. The initial situation is such that x =1 .5. The ￿rst column of
Table 5.1 shows the simulation results with respect to a number of relevant parameters in
case ￿ring costs, cf =0 . The eﬀort e =4 .7. This induces the employers to open up many
vacancies such that the matching probability is equal to 1. Every unemployed worker
meets a vacancy. However, 6.1% of the matches split up immediately after the industry
12This approach is stylized and does not modify fundamentally the basic results.5.5. A numerical example 177
conditions are revealed. Therefore, total unemployment equals 6.1%. Pro￿ts equal 3.15
and welfare 2.73.
If ￿ring costs are introduced initially there is a decline in unemployment and an in-
crease in welfare. This is shown in Figure 5.1. The decline in unemployment is caused
by two opposite eﬀects. First, because ￿ring costs increase, pro￿ts decline and therefore
less vacancies are created. This reduces the matching probability and has a positive eﬀect
on unemployment. Second, because ￿ring costs increase, workers have an incentive to
generate eﬀort, which reduces the number of matches that split-up. This has a negative
eﬀect on unemployment. Initially, at low ￿ring costs the second eﬀect dominates the ￿rst
eﬀect. However, as ￿ring costs keep increasing there is situation where almost all matches
sustain. Then, the second eﬀect is obsolete and only the ￿rst eﬀect remains. Therefore, a
further increase in ￿ring costs will increase unemployment. Figure 5.1 shows that under
the set of parameter values chosen the optimal value of the ￿ring costs is c∗
f =0 .70. At
this level of ￿ring costs unemployment is at its lowest point and welfare is maximized.
The second column of Table 5.1 shows the full simulation results in this optimum. Ef-
fort is now higher and less vacancies are opened. The matching probability is still 100%.
Since productivity is higher less matches are destroyed in the optimum and the unem-
ployment rate now equals 2.9%. Pro￿ts are lower but because there is more employment
and productivity has increased welfare has also increased.
It is interesting to investigate whether it makes sense for employers to oﬀer two types
of contracts with diﬀerent ￿ring costs. The contract with the high ￿ring costs resembles
a permanent position (high expected duration) while the contract with the low ￿ring
cost represents a temporary position (low expected job duration). To get both types of
contracts to be oﬀered by ￿rms in equilibrium x is allowed to vary over job matches. All
workers are the same ex ante, but ex post their suitability for a job x may diﬀer. Some
workers are matched with a job for which they are very suitable (high x)s o m ew i t haj o b





















































































Figure 5.1: Firing costs, unemployment and welfare
Table 5.1 illustrates what happens if a worker is less suitable. The third and fourth
column present simulation results in case x =1 . The third column of Table 5.1 presents
the results in the case of no ￿ring costs. The suitability for the ￿rm is lower but the
matching probability is still equal to 1. After the industry conditions are revealed more
matches split-up than in the previous situation. Both eﬀects result in an unemployment
rate of 8.1%. The fourth column of Table 5.1 shows the situation of optimal ￿ring costs.
The optimal ￿ring costs are lower than before, c∗
f =1 .2. Because of the introduction
of ￿ring costs workers generate more eﬀort than before. But not every match sustains.
And, the low suitability induces employers to generate less vacancies. Because of the low
matching probability overall unemployment is higher than in the case of more suitable
workers. Note that unemployment is higher with optimal ￿ring costs than it is without
￿ring costs.13 Overall welfare is higher because even though less workers are productive,
the productivity per worker is substantially higher.
The results that less suitable workers are oﬀered less employment protection is intu-
itively clear. Note that due to the lower level of employment protection unemployment is
higher for less suitable workers. The main reason for this is that for less suitable workers
13Unemployment is lowest (4.8%) if the ￿ring costs are equal to 0.9.5.6. Conclusion 179
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cf =0 .0 c∗
































Table 5.1: Simulation results
employers ￿nd it less worthwhile to open up a lot of vacancies. In conclusion, for high
productivity workers the welfare maximizing contract speci￿es a high ￿ring cost. There
may be a limit to this positive relationship. If the eﬀort produced without employment
protection is already high oﬀering a lot of employment protection will not increase eﬀort
suﬃciently if the eﬀort function is very steep. Then, the costs of providing extra eﬀort
may be too high. So, it may be that for high levels of x there is a negative relationship
between x and c∗
f
14 (c∗
f is the value of the ￿ring cost that maximizes welfare under the set
of parameter values chosen).
This conclusion is interesting since it corresponds to the observed facts: Low produc-
tive workers are over-represented in temporary employment (with low ￿ring cost) relatively
to long-term employment (with high ￿ring cost).
5.6 Conclusion
This Chapter proposes a theoretical analysis of the welfare eﬀects of employment pro-
tection. In the theoretical framework, the duration of the employment contract is en-
dogenous. Firing costs associated with an employment contract serve as a commitment
device for the ￿rm and give incentives to workers to invest in productivity enhancing
14In the current parameter setting there is no negative relationship at higher levels of x.I no r d e rt o
generate such a relationship a diﬀerent eﬀort function would have to be used.180 5. Employment Protection and On-the-job Investments
human capital. Employment protection can then be analyzed focusing on the trade-oﬀ
between ￿exibility and commitment. In the initial situation, all workers have the same
productivity. Then, it is shown that for a given productivity there is an optimal degree
of employment protection. If there is a productivity distribution it is welfare improving
if diﬀerent types of contracts, i.e. contracts with diﬀerent ￿ring costs, are oﬀered.
The optimal degree of employment protection is country-speci￿c, i.e. depends on
some parameter values that are speci￿c to the countries. Over the last decade, many
countries have substantially changed their employment protection legislation, towards
more ￿exibility essentially. It could therefore be that they are now closer to their optimum.
The important conclusion of this Chapter is that the optimal ￿ring cost is in most cases
larger than 0.
Finally, a nonlinear relationship between the ￿ring cost and unemployment is derived,
which may be one of the reasons why some empirical studies ￿nd that the employment
protection legislation does not aﬀect the unemployment rate.
5.7 Appendix
P r o o fo fl e m m a5 . 2















∂cf > 0 because the term in square brackets is positive due to the second order
condition for e. In a similar way one can derive ∂e
∂x > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.3
Clearly, if [1 − G(e y − e − x)] ≈ 0,w eh a v et h a t
∂E(J)
∂cf < 0.
Substituting the expression for ∂e











1+tg (e y − e − x)5.7. Appendix 181
Let ￿ e denote equilibrium value. Then, using a second order Taylor expansion, γ (e) can
be written as γ (e)=γ (￿ e)+γ0 (￿ e)(e − ￿ e)+1
2φ(e − ￿ e)
2 where φ = γ00 (ζ) for some ζ
between e and ￿ e. Changing the concavity of the function γ (.) around ￿ e (while keeping
γ0 (￿ e) unchanged) aﬀects how elastic e reacts to cf, but does not aﬀect the equilibrium ￿ e.
In other words, one can verify φ without changing ￿ e. It is routine to verify that as φ comes
close to
β




Proof of Lemma 5.5
Since cθ
m(θ) is increasing in θ (by assumption), the socially optimal number of vacancies
exceeds the private number of vacancies if and only if
α
•





≥ (1 − β)
‰








If α ≥ 1 − β as u ﬃcient condition for this inequality to hold is
−γ (e) − G(e y − e − x)cf +
≥ [1 − G(e y − e − x)](cf − T − (1 + t)b) −
cf
1 − β
which can be written as
[1 − G(e y − e − x)](T +( 1+t)b)+
β
1 − β
cf ≥ γ (e)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
As shown in lemma 5.3, if γ (.) is suﬃciently elastic then we have
∂E(J)
∂cf > 0.I ti sc l e a r
that
∂E(Ve)
∂cf > 0 because cf raises the wage rate. Furthermore, Nash bargaining implies
that w(e,ι) ≥ b for all matches that survive. Together with γ (0) = 0 it follows that
E (Ve) >b . Hence
∂E(J)
∂cf > 0 implies that ∂θ
∂cf > 0 and hence
∂[(1−m(θ))b+m(θ)E(Ve)]
∂θ > 0.182 5. Employment Protection and On-the-job Investments
Furthermore, by choosing γ (.) such that in the market equilibrium (determined by γ0 (e))
it is the case that
[1 − G(e y − e − x)](T +( 1+t)b)+
β
1 − β
cf ≥ γ (e)
lemma 5.5 implies that the rise in θ is welfare enhancing as well. Q.E.D.Bibliography
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Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de uitgebreide literatuur van arbeidseconomie. In een
maatschappij waar werk zo een belangrijk deel uitmaakt van het leven, is het niet ver-
rassend om te zien dat wetenschappers zoveel aandacht hebben besteed aan het analyseren
van het functioneren van de arbeidsmarkt. De mate van belang van arbeidseconomie als
veld is snel toegenomen nadat olieschokken in de jaren ￿70 de economie van ontwikkelde
landen, en met name van Europese landen, aangetast hadden. De Verenigde Staten en
in zekere mate andere Angelsaksische landen herstelden zich sneller dan de meeste Eu-
ropese landen. De literatuur opende toen het debat dat de ￿exibele Verenigde Staten
tegenover het institutioneel rigide Europa zette. Alhoewel het niet zonder meer duidelijk
is wat achter deze relatief vage concepten schuilt, bestaat er nu een lange traditie in het
geloof dat er belangrijke reguleringen in Europese landen waren die het aanpassingsproces
op de arbeidsmarkt na de olieschok vertraagde. Zoals de titel van dit manuscript reeds
aangeeft, is het de ambitie om te begrijpen wat voor eﬀe c t e nr e g u l e r i n g e no pd ea r b e i -
dsmarkt hebben en hoe ze tot stand zijn gekomen. Allereerst is er een behoefte aan een
operationele de￿nitie van de concepten ￿arbeidsmarktinstituties￿ en ￿arbeidsmarktpresta-
ties￿. Arbeidsmarktinstituties zijn reguleringen die het evenwicht op de arbeidsmarkt
wegdrijven van het competitieve evenwicht. Dit is niet de enige kracht, maar ongetwijfeld
wel een belangrijke. Vandaar dat er belangstelling bestaat voor belastingen op arbeid,
arbeidsstandaarden en ontslagbescherming, vakbonden, het systeem van loononderhan-
delingen, minimumlonen, uitkeringen, ￿actieve￿ arbeidsmarktpolitiek, onderwijspolitiek
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en belemmeringen in geogra￿sche mobiliteit. De keuze is uiteraard tot op zekere hoogte
arbitrair, daar sommige van deze instituties ook mensen aangaat die geen deel uitmaken
van de totale arbeidskracht (zoals bij het belastingstelsel) en omdat er andere reguleringen
zijn die hier niet genoemd worden maar wel invloed zouden kunnen uitoefenen op de ar-
beidsmarkt (zoals productmarktreguleringen etc.). Het functioneren van de arbeidsmarkt
wordt aan de andere kant meestal beoordeeld op basis van verschillende indicatoren. Deze
indicatoren kunnen oneindig ver￿jnd worden. Er zijn twee typen indicatoren: indicatoren
die de voorraad meten, zoals het werkloosheidspercentage, het werkgelegenheidspercent-
age en de graad van deelneming, en indicatoren die stromen meten, zoals de creatie en
destructie van banen, de in- en uitstromen in de werkloosheid, etc. Het lijkt erop dat
sommige instituties een invloed hebben op de arbeidsmarktstromen, maar geen duidelijk
eﬀect hebben op de voorraad, en vice versa. Het is daarom nuttig het onderscheid te hand-
haven. De arbeidsmarktprestatie is slechts een onderdeel van de economische prestaties
van een land. De eﬀecten van arbeidsmarktinstituties moeten derhalve vanuit dat licht
geanalyseerd worden. De economische groei en bevolkingsgroei zijn evenzo belangrijk,
als niet belangrijker dan de situatie op de arbeidsmarkt. Het is cruciaal om dat in het
achterhoofd te houden wanneer de vraag naar de consequenties van bestaande rigiditeiten
wordt gesteld.
Er zijn veel studies in de literatuur die empirisch en theoretisch het eﬀect van deze
reguleringen bestuderen. Het geloof dat rigiditeiten in Europese landen verantwoordelijk
zijn voor zwakke arbeidsmarktprestaties is gedeeltelijk bevestigd door empirisch werk.
Maar sommige puzzels zijn onopgelost. Sommige landen die normaal gesproken als rigide
worden geclassi￿ceerd zijn er in geslaagd om de werkloosheidsgraad aanzienlijk terug te
dringen. Het beste voorbeeld is Nederland, dat de werkloosheid met 10 procent zag dalen
over de laatste 15 jaar. Dit proefschrift geeft enkele verklaringen voor dergelijke puzzels.
Het basisargument is dat instituties niet intrinsiek slecht zijn, maar dat wat uitmaakt de
combinatie van instituties is. Instituties hebben heel verschillende eﬀecten in verschillendeSamenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 199
landen en als gevolg daarvan kan een institutionele hervorming in het ene land een succes
zijn terwijl het in een ander land verkeerd uitpakt. Sommige instituties hebben meer
aandacht in de literatuur gekregen dan anderen. Er is dan ook een uitgebreide literatuur
over de eﬀecten van arbeidsbelastingen, werkloosheidsuitkeringen, en de eﬀecten van vak-
bonden op de arbeidsmarkt. Wetgeving met betrekking tot ontslagbescherming, normaal
gesproken gede￿nieerd als de verzameling van reguleringen die het moeilijker maken voor
een ondernemingen om haar werknemers te ontslaan, heeft tot recente datum minder aan-
dacht gekregen. Dit is een reden waarom dit proefschrift dieper ingaat op de rol van zulke
wetgeving. Een andere reden is dat er vraagtekens gezet zijn bij de eﬀecten ervan op de
slechte arbeidsmarktprestaties in Europa. De theoretische literatuur laat zien dat het ef-
fect van ontslagbescherming ambigu is, daar het zowel de creatie als destructie van banen
vermindert. De empirische literatuur vindt geen signi￿cant eﬀect van ontslagbescherming
op de werkloosheidsgraad, en bevestigt daarmee in zekere zin de theoretische bevindin-
gen. Echter, ontslagbescherming heeft een positief eﬀect op de productiviteit per uur
(zie Nickell en Layard (1999)). Bovendien heeft ontslagbescherming een negatief eﬀect
op de arbeidsmarktstromen als we kijken naar de snelheid van herverdelingen van lage
naar hoge productiviteitsplaatsen. De strikte werkgelegenheidsbescherming zou verantwo-
ordelijk kunnen worden gesteld voor het hoge aandeel van lange termijn werkloosheid in de
meeste Europese landen. Dit zijn allen belangrijke aspecten die een nauwkeurige analyse
van werkgelegenheidsbescherming rechtvaardigen. Sommige vraagstukken verdienen in
het bijzonder de aandacht: waarom is werkgelegenheidsbescherming veel meer aanwezig
in Europese landen dan in de Verenigde Staten? Heeft werkgelegenheidsbescherming zin?
Is het politiek haalbaar om deze institutie te hervormen? Dit proefschrift geeft enkele
antwoorden hierop.
Dit proefschrift is als volgt georganiseerd. Hoofdstuk 1 leidt de lezer in tot de belan-
grijkste ontwikkelingen in arbeidsmarktprestaties en instituties gedurende de laatste vier
decennia. Tevens beschrijft het de literatuur binnen de arbeidseconomie die de origine200 Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
en consequenties van arbeidsmarktinstituties behandelt. De introductie geeft tevens een
overzicht van de belangrijkste conclusies van dit proefschrift. Hoofdstuk 2 analyseert de
eﬀecten van arbeidsmarktinstituties op de werkloosheidsgraad in OESO landen, op ba-
sis van data over de periode 1960-19 9 5 . D el a a t s t ed r i eh o o f d s t u k k e nz i j ng e w i j da a n
de analyse van ontslagbescherming. Hoofdstuk 3 geeft theoretische argumenten voor de
verschillen in ontslagbescherming wetgeving tussen de Verenigde Staten en de meeste Eu-
ropese landen. Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 laten zien dat ontslagbescherming zin heeft vanuit
een welvaartstheoretisch oogpunt, wanneer men de investeringen in menselijk kapitaal
in beschouwing neemt voor zover die voorafgaan aan het toetreden tot de arbeidsmarkt
(hoofdstuk 4) of voor zover die op het werk zelf worden gedaan (hoofdstuk 5).
Het eerste deel van hoofdstuk 1 relateert de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen sinds het
begin van de jaren ￿60 in arbeidsmarktinstituties en prestaties aan elkaar. De meest
bestudeerde indicator voor arbeidsmarkten is ongetwijfeld die van de werkloosheidsgraad.
Dit is waarschijnlijk zo omdat het de minst vrijwillige van alle posities op de arbeidsmarkt
is. OESO landen zijn erg gedivergeerd in termen van de evolutie in werkloosheidsgraden
na de olieschok van 1973. Drie groepen landen kunnen worden onderscheiden. Ten eerste
de landen die niet signi￿cant be￿nvloed zijn, zoals de Verenigde Staten, Japan, Noorwe-
gen, Zwitserland en tot op zekere hoogte ook Canada. Dan is er een groep landen die
een continue stijging hebben vertoond in de werkloosheidsgraad, zoals Oostenrijk, Belgiº,
Frankrijk, Duitsland, Italiº en Zweden. Tenslotte is er een groep landen die te maken
hadden met een stijging in de werkloosheidsgraad na de olieschok maar die er vervol-
gens in geslaagd zijn die signi￿cant te laten dalen, zoals Denemarken, Ierland, Finland,
Nieuw-Zeeland, Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Een andere arbeidsmarktindica-
tor van een voorraad die substantieel veranderd is over de tijd is de participatiegraad.
Er zijn algemene trends in de evolutie ervan in alle OESO landen: een stijging in de
p a r t i c i p a t i e g r a a dv a nv r o u w e ne ne e nd a l i n gi nd ep a r t i c i p a t i e g r a a dv a nm a n n e ne no u d -
eren. Er zijn ook belangrijke verschillen tussen landen die gerelateerd kunnen wordenSamenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 201
aan culturele of institutionele verschillen, zoals pensioenregelingen en onderwijssystemen.
Kijkend naar de indicatoren van de dynamica van de arbeidsmarkten dan zien we dat de
Verenigde Staten en Europese landen niet zo veel van elkaar verschillen in termen van
h e r v e r d e l i n g e ni nb a n e nm a a rw e li nt e r m e nv a ni n -e nu i t s t r o m e ni nd ew e r k l o o s h e i d .
De gemiddelde duur van werkloosheid loopt op tot 86,7 maanden in Spanje tegenover 2,2
maanden in de Verenigde Staten.
Er is ook geen eenduidig beeld wat betreft de arbeidsmarktinstituties. Ruw samengevat
kan men drie groepen van landen onderscheiden. Ten eerste zijn er de ￿exibele gedecen-
traliseerde landen zoals de Verenigde Staten en de Angelsaksische landen. Vervolgens zijn
er de rigide gecentraliseerde landen zoals de Scandinavische landen tot een decennium
geleden. Tenslotte zijn er de rigide medium gecentraliseerde landen zoals continentaal
en Zuid-Europa. De rigide medium gecentraliseerde landen zijn diegenen waar arbei-
dsovereenkomsten op industrieel niveau afgesloten worden. Flexibele gedecentraliseerde
landen hebben voornamelijk arbeidsovereenkomsten op het bedrijfsniveau en de over-
heid speelt daar slechts een beperkte rol in het laten functioneren van de arbeidsmarkt.
Zo is er een weinig stringente ontslagbescherming en zijn de belastingen en uitkeringen
laag. Rigide gecentraliseerde landen hebben hoge belastingen en uitkeringen en een ge-
centraliseerd systeem van loononderhandelingen.
De theoretische literatuur over de eﬀecten van arbeidsmarktinstituties kan in twee
groepen worden verdeeld: de literatuur over loononderhandelingen en de literatuur over
zoekmodellen. De eerste groep is met name nuttig in het bestuderen van de eﬀecten
van instituties op de voorraden in de arbeidsmarkt. Het richt zich op het proces van
het vaststellen van lonen en werkgelegenheid. De tweede groep maakt een algemeen
evenwichtsanalyse mogelijk van het functioneren van de arbeidsmarkt en richt zich op het
herverdelingsproces van arbeid, met andere woorden op het dynamische aspect.
Hoofdstuk 2 is ge￿nspireerd door de eerste groep van modellen (loononderhandelingen)
en richt zich met name op de ontwikkelingen in succesvolle OESO landen. Er is een uitge-202 Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
breide literatuur over de eﬀecten van arbeidsmarktinstituties op de economische prestaties.
Hier zijn veel lessen van geleerd, maar enkele puzzels bestaan nog. Een eerste serie van
studies analyseerde de eﬀecten van instituties op indicatoren zoals het werkloosheidsper-
centage, het werkgelegenheidspercentage en de groei van het nationaal product. Daarna
zijn er verschillende uitbreidingen bestudeerd. Ten eerste is er de suggestie van Blanchard
en Wolfers (2000) die suggereren dat Europese instituties op zichzelf niet slecht zijn, maar
dat ze de manier waarop de economie reageert op schokken be￿nvloeden. Ten tweede zijn
er verschillende papers die suggereren dat het de combinatie van instituties is die belan-
grijk is en niet zozeer de instituties zelf. Met andere woorden, het institutionele raamwerk
moet beschouwd worden als een verzameling van interactieve elementen. Hoofdstuk 2 gaat
dieper in op dit laatste argument. Het theoretische model is een eenvoudige uitbreiding
op het model van Nickell en Andrews (1983). Dit model is geschikt voor een analyse van
de eﬀecten van arbeidsmarktinstituties. Het model kan beschreven worden aan de hand
van twee curven: een arbeidsvraagcurve en een loononderhandelingscurve. De instituties
bepalen de elasticiteiten van deze twee curven en de grootte van de verschuivingen na een
institutionele verandering. De conclusie van deze theoretische studie is dat institutionele
hervormingen inderdaad sterk verschillende eﬀecten kunnen hebben naar gelang het to-
tale raamwerk van instituties. Een lage mate van centralisatie bijvoorbeeld, betekent een
vlakke loon- en arbeidsvraagcurve (in een gra￿ek waar werkgelegenheid op de x-as wordt
afgebeeld en het loon op de y-as). Dit betekent dat een institutionele hervorming voor-
namelijk eﬀect zal hebben op de werkgelegenheid. De empirische studie gebruikt andere
indicatoren dan de eerder genoemde studies. Sommige institutionele indicatoren die in
eerdere studies gebruikt zijn vertonen erg weinig variatie over de tijd (zoals de index voor
wetgeving met betrekking tot ontslagbescherming, centralisatie, co￿rdinatie, etc.). Echter,
belangrijke institutionele veranderingen zijn in sommige OESO landen ge￿ncorporeerd die
niet in deze indicatoren terugkomen. Daarom zijn in deze studie nieuwe indicatoren on-
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sommige institutionele hervormingen in sommige landen tot een beter resultaat hebben
geleid dan in andere landen. Met behulp van zeven blokken van vijf jaar en achttien
OESO landen is enige ondersteuning gevonden voor de interactie hypothese. Echter, er
wordt ook aangetoond dat sommige institutionele hervormingen tot een beter resultaat
hebben geleid dan anderen ongeacht het initiºle raamwerk. Als gevolg daarvan kan er op
basis van de schattingen in hoofdstuk 2 worden gesteld dat de meeste OESO landen een
betere arbeidsmarktprestatie zouden hebben neergezet wanneer ze dezelfde hervormingen
zouden hebben ge￿mplementeerd als in Nederland of het Verenigd Koninkrijk.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de politieke steun voor ontslagbescherming. Aan de ene
kant vinden we de Angelsaksische landen, in het bijzonder de Verenigde Staten, die een
zeer ￿exibele ontslagbescherming hebben (lage ontslagkosten, als die al bestaan). Aan
de andere kant vinden we continentaal en zuidelijk Europa waar een verzameling van
rigide regels het ontslagproces leiden. De vraag is dan waarom de politieke voorkeuren
voor ontslagbescherming in de Verenigde Staten en de meeste Europese landen zo sterk
van elkaar verschillen. In het model zitten drie essentiºle elementen: (1) De mate van
ontslagbescherming wordt bepaald door de mediane kiezer en deze kiezer heeft een baan.
Met andere woorden, ontslagbescherming wordt vastgesteld op basis van meerderhei-
dsstemmen en de meerderheid van de kiezers heeft een baan. (2) De arbeidsmarkt is
gemodelleerd binnen een zogenaamd zoekmodel zodat het herverdelingsproces van arbeid
benadrukt wordt. De werknemers en ondernemingen hebben tijd nodig om elkaar te vin-
den en ontslagbescherming vergroot de benodigde tijd. Inderdaad, wanneer het moeilijk is
om een werknemer te ontslaan dan zullen werkgevers aarzelen om werknemers in de eerste
plaats aan te nemen. Met andere worden, ontslagbescherming verlaagt zowel de creatie als
de destructie van banen. Het wordt dan moeilijker voor een werkloze om een baan te vin-
den en makkelijker voor een werknemer om zijn of haar baan te behouden. (3) Migratie en
ontslagbescherming zijn de (enige) twee concurrerende manieren voor werknemers om hun
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zal de mediane kiezer eerder geneigd zijn om te kiezen voor een lage ontslagbescherming
(en eenmaal werkloos dus snel een baan kunnen vinden) zodat hij snel naar de meest
productieve plaats kan gaan. Op basis van deze drie elementen wordt beargumenteerd
dat de essentiºle karakteristieken die de Verenigde Staten onderscheidt van de Europese
landen, zoals de grootte van het land en daarmee ook de economische diversiteit bin-
nen het land en tevens de migratiekosten, het verschil in politieke voorkeuren betreﬀende
ontslagbescherming kan verklaren. Europese landen hebben minder migratie mogelijkhe-
den zodat de werknemers liever een veilig gestelde baan hebben, zelfs als dit betekent dat
ze in lage productiviteitsgebieden blijven en eenmaal werkloos geworden langer werkloos
zouden blijven. Wanneer er eenmaal ontslagbescherming is dan verlaagt dit de prikkels tot
migratie nog verder hetgeen een tweezijdige relatie tussen ontslagbescherming en migratie
suggereert: Mogelijkheden tot migratie bepalen de voorkeuren voor ontslagbescherming
en ontslagbescherming de aantrekkelijkheid van migratie.
De vraag die behandeld wordt in hoofdstukken 4 en 5 is de volgende: is ontslagbescherming
zinvol? Wederom ligt de nadruk op wetgeving met betrekking tot ontslagbescherming.
Hoofdstuk 4 bekijkt het eﬀect van ontslagbescherming op de accumulatie van menselijk
kapitaal dat ontstaat voordat er tot de arbeidsmarkt toegetreden wordt. EØn conclusie van
hoofdstuk 3 was dat wanneer iemand hoge migratie kosten moet dragen om de meest pro-
ductieve baan te bezetten, ontslagbescherming welvaartsverhogend kan werken voor deze
persoon. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat verder in op dit argument door heterogeniteit onder werkne-
mers te introduceren. Er wordt verondersteld dat hoog opgeleide werknemers waarschijn-
lijk vaker geconfronteerd worden met het migratieprobleem dan laag opgeleiden. De reden
is dat hoog opgeleiden vaak over gespecialiseerde kennis beschikken en de vraag naar deze
kennis over tijd en ruimte varieert. Het bestaan van hoge migratiekosten zal daarom
eerder de hoog opgeleiden dan de laag opgeleiden treﬀen. Dit ontmoedigt het investeren
in gespecialiseerd menselijk kapitaal dat normaal gesproken aangeleerd wordt via tertiair
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Door het verminderen van het aantal mensen dat migratiekosten zal moeten betalen,
stimuleert het investeringen in gespecialiseerd menselijk kapitaal. Dit kan daarom verk-
laren waarom Europese landen meer publieke gelden besteden aan tertiair onderwijs dan
de Verenigde Staten doet. Het zou ook weer een additionele verklaring bieden waarom
de Verenigde Staten een meer ￿exibele werkgelegenheidswetgeving hanteert. Hoofdstuk
5 analyseert de opbrengsten van ontslagbescherming in relatie tot de kwaliteit van een
werkrelatie. We zien inderdaad dat zelfs in de Verenigde Staten contracten gespeci￿ceerd
worden met betrekking tot het eventuele opbreken van het contract, met andere woor-
den dat de feitelijke ontslagbescherming groter is dan de wettelijke (zie Nickell en Layard
(1999)). Wat dit betekent is dat zowel de onderneming als de werknemer het voordelig
vinden om een contract te hebben dat hen beschermt tegen negatieve schokken. Waarom
dit zo is, is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 5. Ontslagbescherming is een manier voor de
onderneming om zich vast te binden aan de belofte om de werknemer niet te ontslaan
wanneer er negatieve schokken plaatsvinden. In zekere zin is het ook een manier voor
de werknemer om zich vast te binden aan de onderneming en geen ontslag zal nemen
gedurende een negatieve schok. In ieder geval garandeert het dat de werkrelatie langer
stand houdt dan zonder ontslagbescherming. Een langere werkrelatie is interessant voor de
onderneming wanneer de werknemer de kwaliteit van de werkrelatie kan verbeteren door
het maken van relatie-speci￿eke investeringen, i.e. investeringen die geen waarde hebben
voor andere werkrelaties. Natuurlijk is ontslagbescherming ook een directe kost in geval
van het beºindigen van het contract en ontmoedigt daardoor de creatie van banen. De
conclusie van hoofdstuk 5 is dat er een optimaal niveau van ontslagbescherming bestaat in
termen van welvaart. Ontslagbescherming heeft zin als men gelooft dat er relatie-speci￿eke
investeringen gedaan kunnen worden door de werknemer die de kwaliteit van de relatie
verhoogt en die niet via een contract gegarandeerd kunnen worden waar het loon aan de
investeringen gekoppeld is. Bovendien laat hoofdstuk 5 zien dat dit optimaal niveau van
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opleidingsniveau. Het is daarom optimaal om hoog opgeleiden meer te beschermen dan
laag opgeleiden. Concluderend kan er gesteld worden dat hoofdstuk 5 een dubbelzijdige
relatie vindt tussen menselijk kapitaal en ontslagbescherming: ontslagbescherming heeft
een positieve invloed op investeringen in menselijk kapitaal gedurende de werkrelatie en
menselijk kapitaal stimuleert op zijn beurt ontslagbescherming.
De algemene boodschap van dit proefschrift is dat instituties een belangrijke rol spelen
in de prestaties van de arbeidsmarkt en de welvaart van een maatschappij. Bovendien
vindt er interactie tussen deze instituties plaats en interacties tussen deze instituties en
essentiºle karakteristieken zoals de mate van culturele en economische homogeniteit, de
mobiliteitskosten binnen en tussen landen, etc. Er is daarom geen unieke duidelijke aan-
beveling. Voor een goed ontwerp van een institutioneel raamwerk dienen deze interacties
in beschouwing worden genomen. Ontslagbescherming is vaak verantwoordelijk gesteld
voor de slechte arbeidsmarktsituatie in Europese landen. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat
het ook erg waardevol kan zijn. Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 suggereren dat een goed ontwerp
van de instituties afhangt van de karakteristieken van het land of het type van individuen,
met andere woorden, dat ontslagbescherming bijvoorbeeld verschillend zou moeten zijn
voor individuen met een verschillend opleidingsniveau.